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E. Lipinski: An Open Letter to E. Gierek
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The Appeal of the 13

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Ideologies in Soviet Society

Andrei Amalrik

"The wheel of ideologies" first appeared in my essay Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? [*which appeared in* Survey, *No. 73, 1969*]. *The thought* [*about the diagram*] *came to me at the last moment and that is why the diagram appeared there not on the pages where I am dealing with the problem of ideology. In 1974, when I was deported to Madagan, the local KGB officials gave me the published text of my essay and asked me to revise and renounce it. They even kindly provided me with the main lines of such renunciation in a written form. Although nothing came of this KGB-planned "revision," the idea of looking again at my essay after five years has not been lost: already in Madagan I had begun to tackle anew my "wheel." A year later, after my return to Moscow, during the period when I had very little time, I returned nevertheless to my "wheel", and wrote a new article on it. I thought immediately of publishing it again in your journal, sent it to you from Moscow, and when I arrived in July 1976 from Moscow to Amsterdam the printed galley-proofs of my article were already waiting for me there for correction. In this way the "wheel of ideologies" turned from the village of Akulovo in Ryazan province to Madagan (in the Far East), and from there through Moscow and Amsterdam to you in London.*

Andrei Amalrik

LET us define an ideology as a socially significant system of ideas held by one or another social group and serving to consolidate or change social relations. This may appear too banal a definition, but in any event, it will be as precise as is necessary for the purposes of this essay.

ALTHOUGH it is possible to speak of the de-ideologization of a part of society and even of de-ideologized societies, it is nevertheless hard to imagine a social group or even a single person totally lacking the rudiments of an ideology and totally unaffected by the "politicization" of his environment and his awareness of his position in that environment. In an epoch of political crises there even appears a terrifying type of "ideological man": as a rule, a person who is very energetic but lacks the ability that culture gives to make critical appraisals of his convictions, and the capacity for moral judgment that stems from belief in eternal values. When such a man becomes an adherent of an ideology, and that ideology becomes his substitute for culture and religion, it eventually reduces him to a ruthless automaton, while he reduces the ideology to a rigid set of dogmas.

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Many Bolsheviks have provided the perfect example of such an "ideological man." The Bolshevik revolution with its subsequent "proletarization" of society "at the bottom" and "bureaucratization" "at the top" gradually produced a peculiar society with "de-ideologized" masses and a compulsory ideology, acceptance of which is an admission ticket to the "top." [1] In the 1940s and 1950s a lively ideological movement began to make itself felt, just at the junction of these two blocks, somewhere on the borderline between the de-ideologized masses and the ritual ideology of the elite, in the shape of underground Marxist groups aiming to re-invest Marxism in Russia with its old, revolutionary, (instead of its present, conservative) character. Twenty years earlier it might have seemed impossible for any other ideologies to develop in the USSR.

However, this has not been the case. Over the last 10 years, in Soviet society, at first in somewhat amorphous form, and later becoming increasingly well-defined, several ideologies have begun to take shape, either entirely unconnected with Marxism or extending its limits by a considerable distance. Clearly the appearance of these ideologies is a consequence of the development and growing complexity of Soviet society, in particular the relaxation of its ideological intolerance and the ever-increasing inability of its official ideology to react to changes in "the country and the world." The concrete forms that these new ideologies, (new, that is, for our society), have begun to take were influenced, as far as we can judge, both by Russian pre-Bolshevik traditions and by Western example.

Since only one ideology continues to be officially permitted and only one party is allowed to represent it, the other ideologies have failed to gain more than a very small number of open supporters, let alone come to their logical conclusion, the founding of political parties.

However, this makes it all the more interesting to begin studying them while they are still, so to speak, at the foetal stage. Ideological struggle in the fullest sense of the word, the struggle of ideas, the struggle of minds and for minds always precedes actual political struggle, sometimes by a considerable length of time. Consequently, a close examination of embryonic ideologies, while not affording an opportunity for accurately predicting the future disposition of political forces, will at least enable us to define several alternatives.

Obligatory external uniformity gives a very misleading idea of the unapparent inside picture. In reality ideologies which, as I have already

[1] The compulsion of a single ideology has not only made the masses indifferent to it but has also had a singular effect "at the top." The typical Party *apparatchik*, waging an entirely real struggle with other *apparatchiki* for promotion and power, but within the frame work of a "single ideology," loses sight of ideology as a political doctrine expressing the interests of any militant social groups. To him, ideology is some sort of vague back-drop, while on stage the struggle goes on between specific individuals. This eventually forms in him a demonological vision of the world: in everything that happens, whether in his own or a foreign country, he sees not the operation of social forces, as in fact the ought to according to his professed Marxist philosophy, but intrigues by various crafty individuals. It was Ernst Neizvestny who drew my attention to this "apparatchik's demonology."

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said, can count few overt adherents, may have many clandestine and also potential supporters, while among adherents of the ruling ideology there may be those who are not only indifferent but even hostile to it.

The position of official ideology, at first sight undisputed, is more problematical than might appear. Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, for instance, disagree in their interpretation of its role. Solzhenitsyn believes that it is still of decisive importance in the determination of state policies; Sakharov asserts that it is merely a camouflage for the pragmatism of a de-ideologized elite. It seems to me, however, that it plays an intermediate role, and in addition, is not, basically, a unified ideology. Although the observations on its role as a camouflage are correct and I have already referred to it earlier in this essay as a "ritual" ideology, its force of inertia is nevertheless very great and it cannot be said that there are no people "at the top" who still regard it as an ideology in the true sense of the word.

IN 1969 I made a first attempt to examine the ideologies in Soviet society and—to my own surprise—found myself drawing an amusing diagram of ideologies merging into one another and forming a closed circuit, a sort of "wheel of ideologies." Unfortunately, I only made a rough sketch, and because I did not explain it clearly enough, not everyone understood it properly. I have now returned to it, revised and elaborated it, and I should like to submit it to the verdict of those who form these ideologies, as well as those who study them.[2] The present essay is simply a commentary to that diagram.

The structure of the scheme is as follows: taking three "ideological levels," (1) super-ideologies or social philosophies, (2) ideologies proper or political doctrines and (3) sub-ideologies or ideology-feelings, we represent them graphically in the form of circles within circles.

We shall term *liberalism* the social philosophy (super-ideology) within the framework of which the individual is inclined to identify above all with himself while acknowledging equally the rights of other, similarly autonomous individuals. We can assume that this philosophy attracts the most independent-minded and self-confident people: in social terms, people in the free professions and people with an interest in freedom of private initiative.

We shall term *Marxism* the social philosophy (super-ideology) in which the individual is inclined first and foremost to identify himself

[2] In fact I would prefer to avoid the verdict of the latter, since they are the people who regard a criminal trial as the best way of evaluating any idea that does not appeal to them. In 1970 such a court examined and valued at three years' imprisonment my book *Will the USSR Survive until 1984?* (Amsterdam, 1969), in which I wrote about, among other things, Soviet ideologies (pp. 8–10, diagram on p. 37). [Also in *Survey*, No. 73, Autumn 1969, p. 65.] When we examine the connexions between ideologies, and their prospects, we must keep in mind the over-all idea that the growth or decline in the influence of ideologies is linked with the waxing or waning in influence of the social groups on which the ideologies in question depend for their support. We must also grant, however, that in crisis situations a social group may relinquish—if only partially—its old ideology.

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

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with the class to which he belongs, and to regard other classes as suitable for annihilation, subordination or assimilation. We can assume that this philosophy attracts, in the first instance, representatives of the "oppressed" classes, needy, envious or embittered people, people who have "nothing to lose," as well as intellectuals striving to destroy traditional culture from within. Should the representatives of this ideology seize power by violent means, it becomes the natural ideology of *apparatchiks* unsure of their power and of their own significance without power and hence embittered and aggressive.

Finally, we shall term *nationalism* the social philosophy (super-ideology) within which the individual is inclined above all to identify himself with his nation, regarding other nations as neutral, or hostile, alien formations. On the one hand this is the philosophy of traditional societies closely bound up with the land, and it thus attracts people with a romantic turn of mind. On the other hand, we can assume that it will also attract in the first instance representatives of "oppressed" nations, nations suffering from the consciousness of their own inferiority in comparison with other, historically more fortunate, nations.

These super-ideologies are not separated from one another by impenetrable barriers, but are contiguous. They form the outer circumference of our diagram.

THE middle ring consists of ideologies proper, not as universal in character as the super-ideologies, and with a specifically Soviet complexion. Although each differs, sometimes quite sharply, from the other, one can find connecting ideas between "neighbouring" ideologies: the basic connecting ideas are shown on the diagram. The names of the ideologies are my own; representatives of them may disagree with my terminology. As I have already said, these ideologies have as yet no organized shape or form [3] and some of them are extremely diffuse; yet each has a "right" and a "left" wing, sometimes with intermediate gradations, its extremes linking it with "neighbouring" ideologies.

Let us begin our examination of ideologies with *neo-Stalinist Marxism.* This is Marxism pulled through the needle's eye of Leninist theory of the seizure of power and Stalinist practice in holding on to it, then passed through the pragmatic sieve of Stalin's heirs. The social group which supports this ideology is that of the party and government *apparatchiks,* in the first instance of the centre. Its most representative figure would appear to be M. Suslov.

The next ideology, going clockwise, is *neo-Stalinist nationalism.* This is a peculiar kind of national-Bolshevism, on the one hand "under the banner of Marxism," on the other "let the banner of Suvorov be your shield," but Bolshevism brought up to date and pulling in the direction of ever greater Russian nationalism with antique Muscovite notions of a powerful, "paternalistic" regime. Here too the social support comes

[3] The only legally existing party, the CPSU, is guided by at least two ideologies.

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from party and government *apparatchiks,* perhaps with a larger provincial representation. Linking it with the other official ideology, "neo-Stalinist Marxism," is the common idea of conservative bureaucratism. It is customary to regard bureaucratism not as an idea but as a form of practice. However, what we have here is precisely bureaucratism elevated to the rank of an idea. In view of the Soviet leaders' striving towards depersonalization it is hard to say which of the representatives of "neo-Stalinist nationalism" is the most conspicuous figure—V. Grishin, perhaps.

The next ideology, this time unofficial, is *neo-Slavophilism,* which might also be termed "romantic conservatism." Its typical features are belief in the exclusivity of Russia and the need to revert to old Russian pre-Marxist and generally pre-Western traditions, and great interest in Orthodoxy. It contains the rudiments of a "complete world philosophy" and will scarcely be tolerant of other ideologies. Although it is hostile to the official ideologies, its right wing is linked with "neo-Stalinist nationalism" by the idea of chauvinism. However, the humanist features characteristic of "neo-Slavophilism," which is a kind of "nationalism with a human face," are utterly alien to "neo-Stalinist nationalism." As a nationalistic ideology, "neo-Slavophilism" can count on very broad-based support, from the urban and rural semi-intelligentsia as well as from the more general public. Since the concepts of "nation" and "tradition" are very closely linked with language, many writers are the finest exponents of this ideology, the most typical among them being, perhaps, Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

We come next to "*social-ethical ideology,*" which from the traditional point of view one could also refer to as a "populist" ideology. It is an ideology which attempts to formulate ideas of social justice based not on economic determinism but on certain moral postulates.[4] Its connexion with "neo-Slavophilism" is the common idea of Russian messianism: belief in Russia's special role and a belief that Russia has given, or will give the world perfect and unique forms of human society. This too is a traditional Russian ideology and is capable of attracting sizeable sections of the intelligentsia who are disillusioned with Marxism but have populist inclinations. Evidently also it answers certain deeply-felt popular needs. Very typical of its right wing was the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People headed by Igor Ogurtsov; however, for its left wing, for the moment at least, what is characteristic is simply an ethical attitude.

The idea of humanism, the acknowledgement of the value of the individual human being, links the left wing of this ideology with *liberal-democratic ideology.* "Liberal-democratic ideology," which grew under

[4] Since both "Marxism" and "populism" talk of "social justice" and "socialism," it is possible for their followers to switch directly from one ideology to the other, or to converge for tactical reasons; but they are swiftly disillusioned, because at bottom the two ideologies are in mutual opposition. Historically speaking, Marxism emerged from liberal economic theories, while the populists in Russia were left-wing Slavophiles.

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the influence of Western liberalism, believes in the desirability of gradually transforming the Soviet system into a Western-style democratic, pluralistic society which would take account of the structure of property-ownership that has developed, but in which society would have effective control over the economy and there would be considerable freedom for private initiative. The social group supporting this ideology would be a considerable part of the "middle class," a concept which overlaps but does not totally coincide with that of the "intelligentsia," the word more usually employed in the Russian context—all those people who are not only active and educated enough not to lose their bearings in a free society, but will even achieve a certain success. We can regard Andrei Sakharov as a spokesman for the left wing of this ideology and Yury Orlov as representing its right wing.

The next ideology, *liberal Marxism,* is connected with "liberal-democratic ideology" by the common idea of the rule of law, that is, the establishment and strict observance of laws guaranteeing, in particular, human rights. "Liberal Marxism" is the ideology of "socialism with a human face" applied to the Soviet Union. It envisages the democratization and pluralization of society, while retaining Marxism as the leading ideology and the Communist Party as the leading political force. The social support for this ideology comes from a sizeable part of the middle class raised on Marxism and including, as far as we can judge from fragmentary data, many Party functionaries and industrial managers. However, this is, so to speak, the invisible part of the iceberg. The most distinguished spokesman for the right wing of this ideology is Pyotr Grigorenko, and for the left, Roy Medvedev.[5]

"Liberal Marxism" is connected with "neo-Stalinist Marxism" by the common idea of building socialism. This connexion is rather like a tiny, narrow tube between two communicating vessels, which might allow the adherents of each ideology to flow into the other under the impact of events.

THUS the "wheel of ideologies" is come full circle. Let us now pass on to the sub-ideologies or ideology-feelings, which form the inner circle in our scheme.

We begin with the *conservative ideology of the regime* since this is in practice the ruling ideology. It is the instinct for self-preservation expressed in more or less ideological terms. Like any feeling associated with an inferiority complex, however, it is extremely aggressive. It is the emotional sustenance of, and is ideologically sustained by, in the first instance, "neo-Stalinist Marxism" and "neo-Stalinist nationalism," but is indirectly connected with "liberal Marxism" and "neo-Slavophilism" as possible lines of retreat.

[5] I use the expressions "left" and "right" in this essay only as conventions within the clockwise directional system I have chosen for the graphic representation of my thesis. In this sense one can say that for three-quarters of a century Marxism in Russia has travelled leftwards, from the liberal-Marxist Struve to the nationalist Grishin, but has ended up on the right, going from left-wing liberalism to right-wing nationalism.

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Egalitarianism and mass nationalism is even more of a feeling than an ideology, and does not figure in any dissertations or directives, although it is possible to trace popular moods. This ideology-feeling may be termed "passive-explosive," since it is apt to break out abruptly, through its passive acceptance of reality and its desire simply to "live," into sudden, usually individual outbursts. Should these become group outbursts, they will represent a great threat to the stability of the Soviet system. "Egalitarianism and mass nationalism" are directly connected with "neo-Slavophilism," and "social-religious ideology," and at the same time are indirectly influenced by "neo-Stalinist nationalism," which is linked with the popular idea of a powerful regime, and by "liberal-democratic ideology," which answers the people's craving for a higher standard of living after the Western example.

Finally, there is *middle-class reformism,* the generally conformist approach to reality that is typical of the middle class, the attitude expressed as "in the meanwhile we have to live, and gradually things will improve more or less of their own accord." It is combined with the desire to avoid any sharp upheavals and sudden changes in any direction. "Middle-class reformism" has a direct ideological connexion with "liberal-democratic ideology" and "liberal Marxism," and also an indirect link with "neo-Stalinist Marxism," in so far as part of the middle class consists of Party and government functionaries, and with "social-religious ideology," in so far as it is a national ideology that to a certain extent answers the moral requirements of the middle class.

To conclude this description of our scheme of ideologies, something should be said about the peculiar negative links between the sub-ideologies. The "conservative ideology of the regime" and "egalitarianism and mass nationalism" are drawn together by their common opposition to "the intelligentsia" as a stratum hostile to the people and dangerous to the regime, a connexion emotionally reinforced by the fact that many Party and government *apparatchiks* were once peasants and the children of peasants. "Egalitarianism and mass nationalism" and "middle-class reformism" are drawn together by their common opposition to the regime, from which both these social groups are "alienated." "Middle-class reformism" and "the conservative ideology of the regime" are, in their turn, drawn together by their common opposition to the masses, in whom both the *apparatchiks* and the middle class see a threat to their privileges.

While I submit these three "ideological circles within circles" for serious consideration, I should stress yet again the theoretical nature of the scheme, the blurred form of the ideologies I have singled out and the vagueness of the social stratification of Soviet society, as well as its low level of "ideologization" in spite of the fact that the word "ideology" is referred to at every turn—a kind of dialectical unity of opposites. If we take youth, as is often done, as an indicator of public attitudes, we see that it is, on the whole, totally indifferent to ideology as such. At the same time, this de-ideologization seems to me to be a

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temporary phenomenon, as it were, an "ideological air-cushion" between moribund Bolshevik ideology and the ideology that will take its place. We cannot rule out the possibility that the youth of the 1980s will be highly "ideologized."

I should also like to make the reservation that the ideology represented by millions of *apparatchiks* invested with power, and the ideology represented by a handful of dissidents, play entirely different roles in society. Furthermore, an ideology in opposition and the same ideology in power are essentially two different ideologies.

The same can be said about an ideology in a pluralistic society and what may appear to be the same ideology in a totalitarian society: they are not identical. Nevertheless it would make an interesting comparison to apply a scheme based on Soviet material to a pluralistic society with several freely competing parties.

Taking West Germany as an example, let us start from "neo-Stalinist Marxism," but this time travelling in an anti-clockwise direction. Obviously the equivalent of Soviet "neo-Stalinist Marxism" will be the German Communists; of "liberal Marxism" (at the junction Marxism and liberalism)—the Social Democrats; of "liberal-democratic ideology"—the Free Democrats; of "social-ethical ideology" (at the junction of liberalism and nationalism)—the Christian Democrats and Christian Social Union; of "neo-Slavophilism"—the National Party; of "neo-Stalinist nationalism" (at the junction of nationalism and Marxism)—the extreme right and extreme left, the "bombers' party." The ideology of the people obsessed by extreme national and class hatred plays a negligible role in a prosperous, stable society. However, in a sick society undergoing a protracted crisis it may come to the fore, as Nazism did in Germany.

NOW, with the scheme of ideologies in front of us, let us play through a few versions of the Soviet "ideological future." For the sake of convenience we shall denote the ideologies, starting from "neo-Stalinist Marxism" and going clockwise, by the letters A, B, C, D, E and F.

Let us separate the sheep from the goats, three of one and three of the other. We have every reason to assume that a stable society improves the chances of the "middle ideologies" (A, C, E), i.e. those lying, as it were, at the midpoint of the super-ideologies, while a society in crisis improves the chances of the "extreme ideologies" (B, D, F), i.e. those situated at the extremities where the super-ideologies meet. For example, we saw how, during the crisis in Czechoslovakia—a country with the same system as the USSR but with a democratic history—in 1967–68, ideological supremacy passed from "neo-Stalinist Marxism" (a middle ideology) to "liberal Marxism" (an extreme ideology). If the situation had stabilized there and Soviet troops had not intervened, I believe that the ruling ideology would have become "liberal-democratic." The

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stabilization achieved by Soviet intervention restored the supremacy of "neo-Stalinist Marxism."

Let us go further and divide the ideologies into pluralistic (D, E, F) and totalitarian (A, B, C); alien-Western (A, F, E) and home-bred Eastern (B, C, D); ethico-political (C, D, E) and purely political (F, A, B). It is quite clear that in the USSR, in any imaginable political cataclysm, whether probable or impossible, the people who will have the greatest chance of survival and victory will be those who follow totalitarian and not pluralistic ideologies, home-bred Eastern and not alien-Western ideologies, purely political ideologies, not ethico-political ideologies burdened with all sorts of ethical notions of the kind the great Lenin so disliked.

It so happens that only one ideology meets all three conditions, and that is "neo-Stalinist nationalism." Since it is already one of the reigning ideologies and since, moreover, it meets the condition I earlier stipulated by being an "extreme" ideology, in crisis conditions one may expect the regime to veer ever more strongly in this direction.

At the same time I believe that the chances of "neo-Stalinist nationalism" are not all that high; its total victory might very well signal the beginning of a breakdown of the entire country. The fact of the matter is that, as a narrowly nationalistic doctrine, this ideology could only count on the support of the Russian population, who now account for no more than half of the total population of the country, while it would provoke hostility and intense annoyance on the part of all the other nationalities and their leading personnel.[6]

Let us imagine, however, that "neo-Stalinist nationalism" wins. The most likely form for it to assume would be that of a military dictatorship. Yet to the extent that the situation stabilized, it might gradually become less rigid and begin to drift in the direction of "neo-Slavophilism," a stable, "middle" ideology.

However, since regional nationalism makes the chances of this happening extremely unlikely, perhaps we ought to examine another possible outcome of a critical situation: a swing towards "liberal Marxism," an alternative extreme ideology.

A critical situation may be caused first of all by economic difficulties: a slowing in the growth of productivity, an inability of the agricultural sector to produce sufficient quantities of foodstuffs for the country, rising debts to the West and sinking gold and foreign currency reserves, the impossibility of reorganizing planning and economic management within the framework of a rigid political structure, and apathy on the part of the workers. It is not entirely impossible that, to the next generation leadership, perhaps more pragmatic and more tolerant, the ideas of "liberal Marxism" may at any rate seem a lesser evil than a military-nationalist dictatorship. It is difficult to predict just how far

[6] Central Asian nationalism may play a decisive role here in view of the high population growth of the central Asian republics.

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such a process might go—indeed, if it were ever to begin at all—because this Moscow version of the " Prague Spring " would suffer from a serious lack of historical liberal traditions of the kind that existed in Czechoslovakia. If, however, the process were to be crowned with success, as the situation stabilized the influence of the " liberal-democratic," " middle " ideology would grow stronger.

But these are all pure hypotheses.

Translated by Hilary Sternberg.

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The Face of Inhumanity

Lydia Chukovskaya*

ON 14 April 1976 Mustafa Dzhemilev was tried in the city of Omsk. Why Omsk? For one thing, because Mustafa had been serving out his last term in a camp not far from Omsk. For another, because Omsk is a very convenient place for holding any trial: it is firmly and squarely closed to foreigners. Here, far from the eyes of foreign correspondents, it is a handier place for selecting whom to admit and whom to keep out. A similar sorting process goes on in all our cities, even Moscow. However, in Moscow you can't get away with it without a fuss. In Omsk, though, who cares about a Tatar called Mustafa Dzhemilev? He is as much of a stranger among the local populace as cypresses are to the taiga that surrounds Omsk.

However, they didn't succeed in holding Mustafa's trial in complete silence and isolation from people—even in Omsk. Not for nothing had Dzhemilev spent a quarter of his life in prisons and camps (eight of his 33 years). Three times the trial had been postponed and three times his kinsfolk and friends had flown thousands of kilometres to Omsk. They flew in for the fourth time too—from Uzbekistan, the Ukraine, Oryol and Moscow. They numbered only 16 in all, but there were no seats for them in the courtroom. At first they were all refused admittance; then only his closest relatives were allowed in, but not for the entire length of the proceedings.

Think for yourself: what use at all are the accused's family and friends at his trial? They aren't the kind of public the court needs. Move out of the way, citizens, don't hold up our work! Citizens, the court isn't made of rubber. There just isn't enough room to go round. You can see for yourselves how many people there are. (After all, this isn't just any old trial, but an open one, a public one, so how can we do without the public? We are sticking to the law: we brought in our specially selected public by the back door well in advance.) Other arrivals will have to sit outside the door. His mother? Well . . . perhaps we'll let the mother in. She's a mother, after all, and we are humanists. How could we possibly not let the mother in? We'll let her in when it's the right time and we'll take her out when it's the right time. Well, all right then, we'll let the brothers and sisters in, but the rest of them can stay where they are on the other side of the door. If their behaviour becomes objectionable, it's bruises and a little trip to the police station for them. The same public who arrived in good time will twist their arms and drag them down the corridor: they're skilled professionals and it's just an ordinary job to them.

* Lydia Chukovskaya is the adopted daughter of the Soviet writer Chukovsky. She herself is a writer and editor; her books include *The Deserted House* and *Going Under*. She is also the author of several remarkable letters of protest against the persecution of Soviet writers and dissidents which have circulated in *samizdat*.

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Why am I writing about the trial of Mustafa Dzhemilev? Do I hope to help him? No. But at that trial the features of inhumanity were so blatantly on display that it would be a sin not to record them. I shall start from the end. The defendant's right to a final plea, long or short, is protected by law in every country in the world. It is protected by Soviet law too. On paper, that is. In reality the defendant is rarely allowed to deliver his final plea right to the end, especially in instances when his speech is not concerned with refuting a cunningly woven tissue of slander, but where he attempts to justify the essence of his ideas and the motives for his actions.

The judge did not allow Mustafa to make his final plea, although interrupting him was not only an offence against the law but a crime against humanity.

DZHEMILEV came and stood before the court after 10 months' hunger strike. " Stood " isn't quite the right description here, since he hadn't the strength to stand. When he answered questions put by the judge, the procurator and the defence counsel he somehow or other got to his feet in the dock, supported on either side by his escorts. But if standing was hard, speaking was even harder. His lips barely moving, he spoke in a hoarse whisper. Every word was torture, physical torture, because for 10 months they had been feeding him through a tube to prevent him from dying of starvation, forcibly feeding him, and a tube inserted into his throat every day was bound to scratch his larynx. In addition, Mustafa is gravely ill. He has heart trouble, a stomach complaint and atrophy of the liver.

The judge, on the other hand, suffered from an atrophy of human feelings. He is the satisfied man who does not comprehend the hungry; the healthy man who does not comprehend the sick; the judge whose chair of office rests four square on the solid supporting structure of the KGB. He is the inhuman man who is capable of calmly cutting short the defendant's final plea, knowing that they are probably almost the final words Mustafa will utter on this earth.

" Don't prevent him from speaking," asked Mustafa's brother. The judge had the brother removed from the courtroom, like his sister, for " disturbing the order."

The order?

Oh, when will the order that allows the regime to stop up the mouths of people who speak finally be disturbed in the Soviet Union?

The Constitution of the USSR guarantees freedom of speech for its citizens. The law also guarantees this freedom, but there are two formulae of monstrous vacuousness and capaciousness, " anti-Soviet propaganda " and " anti-Soviet slander," which guarantee the obliteration at one fell swoop of both the freedom and the man who practises it, irrespective of whether he is speaking the truth or lying. He is making patently clear something the regime is concealing—therefore let him hold his peace. " If a man has an ache he'll talk about it." In Mustafa's case, the ache is the Crimea. So he talks about it. The Tartars, forcibly and shamelessly deported from the Crimea in 1944, wish to return to the Crimea, the land they have cultivated and have grown to love. Why do Dzhemilev's peaceful speeches necessarily have to be taken as " anti-

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Soviet propaganda" instead of an entirely natural call for open, public, nationwide discussion of a festering, burning question? Why does the pain necessarily have to be driven inwards, and the man driven to his grave? Why is it that any working idea born of acute anguish is always regarded as *antisovietchina*? the concept of *antisovietchina* is as indeterminate as it is all-embracing. It is indeed an insatiable glutton, devouring human thoughts and destinies, hundreds and thousands of destinies—wordlessly, fruitlessly and without trace.

AT this moment, as well as worrying about Mustafa's fate, I am anxious about the fate of another man involved in his trial. His name is Dvoryansky and he is 26. It was, strictly speaking, on him and his testimony that the entire proceedings rested. Dvoryansky too is an inmate of a labour camp, but whether a criminal or a political prisoner I do not know. His past history before imprisonment is unknown to me, but the future that lies in store for him makes my hair stand on end.

Dzhemilev was tried for having allegedly continued to engage in "anti-Soviet propaganda" while serving a term of imprisonment near Omsk. Who was it who heard him utter unauthorized words? Dvoryansky. Dzhemilev had already served his ordinary term and had only three days left before freedom when a new investigation into his case was launched. The camp gates are just on the point of opening before you, but it's no use counting the hours: you are not to see your freedom after all; a new action has been brought against you. In protest at this deliberate, refined mockery Dzhemilev declared a hunger strike.

It didn't help. He was forcibly fed through a tube and, on 14 April, more dead than alive, was brought before the court. And there, a miracle occurred—for I can find no other way of describing what happened. The witness Dvoryansky, on whose evidence the whole re-concocted case hung, drew himself up to his full human height and with his full human voice declared to the court that the testimony he had given against Dzhemilev during the investigation was a lie. (Surely it is in this spirit that a man comes out from under cover to face bullets.) Dvoryansky declared that his false testimony during the investigation had been given under duress. They had used bribery, threats, the punishment cell. He had resisted; five times they dragged him off to the cells. If you give evidence against Dzhemilev we'll transfer you to somewhere nearer your home, we'll reduce your sentence. If you won't give evidence you'll be in for a bad time, and your family too, and you will only have yourself to blame. So he slandered Dzhemilev. Now, however, he declared that he had never at any time heard Mustafa say anything that discredited the Soviet system.

I do not know what sort of a person Dvoryansky was before, but at the trial he behaved like a man. A valiant man. Did the judge, though, behave like a man?

I am not a legal expert, but even without legal training, purely and simply as a matter of common sense I know absolutely and exactly what the judge was obliged to do in the circumstances.

He was obliged to release Dzhemilev immediately; after all, the prosecution's case had collapsed, had it not? He was obliged to institute

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immediate criminal proceedings against the investigators who had extorted false testimony from Dvoryansky.

But this could only have happened if the court had been deciding the case in accordance with justice and the law. In that case Dvoryansky's declaration would have changed everything. However, this court was deciding the case in accordance with injustice and lawlessness and, most importantly, in accordance with advance instructions from above.

Have I seen these instruction? No, I have not. No one ever sees instructions of this kind. We simply experience their consequences.

The court passed a sentence on Mustafa Dzhemilev of two-and-a-half years' detention in strict-regime labour camps as a penalty for anti-Soviet propaganda. Two-and-a-half years—and an extra three days, the three unserved days remaining from his previous term.

The court also passed a "special decision" to institute criminal proceedings against . . . against whom? The investigators who had wrung the false testimony out of Dvoryansky, you might think? No, against Dvoryansky. What for? For giving false testimony. Aha. And which testimony is that? The testimony he gave in camp? No, the testimony he gave in court. There you are—that's the face of inhumanity.

Translated by Hilary Sternberg

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Soviet Policy Towards the Automobile

John M. Kramer

THE automobile age has finally arrived in the USSR. The Soviet leadership has announced ambitious plans, and has already committed substantial resources, for a dramatic increase in the production of passenger cars. The ninth five-year plan (1971–75) called for the production of approximately 4·2 million to 4·9 million passenger cars, that is, 3 to 3·5 times more than were produced in the eighth five-year plan (1966–70). Available data indicate that these production targets have been met. The limited published data on the 10th five-year plan (1976–80) suggest that the growth rate of passenger car production will lessen appreciably during the plan period as compared to the previous plan; nevertheless, the new plan still envisages the production of approximately six million cars in 1976–80.[1] The Volga Motor Vehicle Plant perhaps best demonstrates the commitment that the Soviet leadership has made to the development of the automobile in the USSR. The plant, the single largest industrial investment project in the eighth five-year plan (1966–70), was designed by the Italian automobile firm FIAT and built at a cost of 1·5 thousand million US dollars (in 1965 dollars), much of it used for the purchase of machinery and technology in the West. The Soviets were hoping that the plant would produce over 600,000 cars annually by 1975, a figure that exceeds total Soviet automobile production in any year before 1972.[2]

This policy represents a sharp departure from that pursued during both the Stalin and Khrushchev years. Stalin's industrialization strategy primarily emphasized the creation of a heavy industrial base and placed little stress on the production of consumer goods, including passenger cars, while Khrushchev, although an advocate of "goulash communism," viewed the private automobile as a symbol of decadent capitalist

[1] Data on passenger car production from *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1974* (Moscow: Statistika, 1975), p. 249. See footnote 2 below, for detailed data on such production. In 1971–74, the USSR produced 3,295,200 passenger cars, so that in 1975 it needed only to produce an additional 903,600–1,603,400 units to meet the passenger car production targets of the ninth five-year plan. Since passenger car production in both 1973 and 1974 exceeded 903,600 units, the targets were probably met. Data on passenger car production in the 10th five-year plan from the *Draft Basic Guidelines to the 10th Five-Year Plan*, *Pravda*, 14 Dec. 1975. *The Guidelines* called for the production of 2·1–2·2 million motor vehicles in 1980, including 800,000–825,000 trucks. Assuming the production of about 70,000 buses in 1980 (1974 bus production: approximately 60,000 units), this would indicate a projected passenger car output in 1980 of 1·2–1·3 million units, the same target as for 1975. Since projected annual passenger car output in 1976–79 is not likely to fall below that for 1975 or exceed that for 1980, one can assume an annual projected output of about 1·2 million units for 1976–79 or about 6 million units for the plan period.

[2] For footnote see p. 17.

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societies and supported a car rental system and public transportation to serve the needs of the Soviet people.

A speech by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in the spring of 1965 was the first clear public indication that the current leadership would reverse the low priority accorded to passenger car production by previous regimes. Kosygin informed his listeners that they knew "with what obstinacy the idea was foisted upon us that our country needed no large-scale production of passenger cars," and he characterized Khrushchev's automobile policies as "subjective," and "economically unfounded." [3]

A number of factors undoubtedly influenced the leadership in its policy change. Thus, Khrushchev's car rental system was conceded to be a failure by most Soviet observers. As one of its critics commented, "If someone had set out purposely to organize car rental so as to discredit the system it is hard to imagine anything better than what is done at present." [4]

Further, the new policy is also to serve the purposes of the economic reform programme announced by the regime in September 1965, a programme designed to stimulate industrial production in part by providing workers and especially managerial personnel with greater material incentives in their work. Naturally, a policy which just provided higher wages without a commensurate increase in the availability of consumer goods would do little to spur productivity. Of course, this particular incentive would primarily stimulate managerial personnel, because the cost of a passenger car is still beyond the means of most ordinary workers.

Finally, the new leadership may have been influenced by the potential political benefits to accrue from a policy of expanded passenger car production. Such a policy would undoubtedly be popular among broad segments of the Soviet population, and particularly among groups whose

[2] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1974*, p. 249. The following table presents data on Soviet motor vehicle production in selected years.

Soviet Motor Vehicle Production in Selected Years (in thousands)

Year	Total	Trucks	Cars	Buses
1928	0·8	0·7	0·5	0·5
1940	145·3	135·9	5·5	3·9
1950	362·8	294·4	64·5	3·9
1960	523·5	362·0	138·8	22·7
1965	616·3	379·6	201·1	35·5
1966	675·2	407·6	230·2	37·3
1967	728·7	437·3	251·4	39·3
1968	800·8	478·1	280·3	42·3
1969	844·1	504·5	293·5	46·0
1970	916·1	524·5	344·2	47·3
1971	1,142·6	564·2	529·0	49·3
1972	1,378·8	596·7	730·1	51·9
1973	1,602·2	629·4	916·7	56·0
1974	1,846·3	666·3	1,119·4	60·6

Source: Ibid.

[3] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, 21 Apr. 1964, pp. 3–4.

[4] Quoted in Donald Barry and Carol Barry, "Happiness is Driving Your Own Moskvich," *New York Times Magazine*, 10 Apr. 1966, p. 53.

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incomes allowed them to purchase new automobiles. If this hypothesis is valid, it supports the argument that the USSR is slowly evolving into a more pluralistic system in which the political elite must increasingly concern itself with the demands of key groups in society.

That the present stress on expanded automobile production is a sharp departure from past policies with many significant implications is clear, but one must also place this new policy in perspective. Thus, even if all the targets on motor vehicle production in the ninth five-year plan were fulfilled, Soviet output of motor vehicles in 1975 would still represent only approximately 20 per cent of output in the United States.[5] Further, although Soviet citizens should own a minimum of six million private cars by 1980, this will place the level of car ownership in the USSR at that attained in the United States in around 1920.[6]

Table I presents data on comparative levels of car ownership in the USSR, the countries of Eastern Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany.

TABLE I

Automobile Ownership in Communist European Countries as Compared to the Federal Republic of Germany

Country	*Per Cent of Households Owning Automobiles in 1973*	*Equivalent Year in the Federal Republic of Germany for Level Of Automobile Ownership Attained in Communist European Countries in 1973*
Bulgaria	12	1954
Czechoslovakia	21	1960
German Democratic Republic	21	1960
Hungary	12	1954
Poland	8	1953
Romania	4	1933
Soviet Union	4	1935
Yugoslavia	14	1955
Federal Republic of Germany	80	—

Source: Compiled from data in the *Washington Post*, 13 Feb. 1976.

[5] Imogene Edwards, "Automobile Trends in the USSR," in *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies* (Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, 1973), p. 293.

[6] The projection of a minimum of 6 million private cars by 1980 is based upon the following assumptions: (1) Passenger car output of 6 million units between 1976–80 will be allocated among private consumers (65 per cent), exports (20 per cent), and state users (15 per cent), which would provide about 3·9 million units for private sale; (2) Retirement of passenger cars from active use during 1976–80 will reduce the automobile inventory by approximately 600,000 units (projected from data in Edwards, op. cit. p. 301 on retirement in 1972; (3) Since Edwards projects about 3 million private cars by 1975, this would indicate approximately 6 million such cars by 1980. The projection is a minimal one because it may overstate the dimensions of both passenger car exports and retirements during 1976–80, and somewhat understate the percentage of cars allocated to private over state users during the period. Edwards herself suggests that there could be approximately 8 million private cars by 1980 (Edwards, op. cit. p. 313), but this seems to assume a greater output of passenger cars in 1976–80 than the 10th five-year plan actually envisages.

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Production and Allocation Policy

Under the Stalin and Khrushchev regimes the Soviet motor vehicle industry placed its greatest stress on the production of trucks, and it was not until 1970 that the level of passenger car production exceeded that of truck production attained in 1950, and not until 1972 that the absolute production level of the former exceeded the latter.[7]

The Soviets mass-produce four types of passenger cars: the Zhiguli, produced at the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant; the Moskvich, produced at the Moskvich and Izhevsk Motor Vehicle Plants; the Zaporozhets, produced at the Zaporozhe Motor Vehicle Plant; and the Volga, produced at the Gorki Motor Vehicle Plant. Standard saloons comprise the overwhelming majority of mass-produced cars, although all types, except the Zaporozhets, also include some station wagons. Only the Zhiguli has three models: a standard saloon and a station wagon which are copies of the FIAT 124 and a deluxe station wagon which is a copy of the FIAT 125. Soviet cars in mass production are smaller than all American cars except for the subcompact class. All cars have four-cylinder engines and none have more than 100 horsepower; the largest, the Volga, has a 98 horsepower engine and the smallest, the Zaporozhets, has a 40 horsepower engine. In addition, the Soviets also produce a limited number of Chaika and ZIL limousines.[8] In 1972 the Zhiguli and the Moskvich accounted for over 70 per cent of total passenger car production and in 1975 were planned to account for 80 per cent of production. Table II provides data on Soviet passenger car production in 1972 and estimates for 1975.

These cars are allocated among private consumers, export, and state employees. Private ownership is steadily increasing, and by 1975

TABLE II

Soviet Passenger Car Production by Model, 1972 and 1975 Estimates (in thousands of units)

Model	*Production*		*Per Cent of Total*	
	1972	1975	1972	1975
Zhiguli	320	600	44	48
Moskvich	204	400	28	32
Zaporozhets	96	135	13	11
Volga	65	75	9	6
Others*	45	50	6	4

* Mostly jeep type vehicles and limousines.

Source: Imogene Edwards, " Automobile Trends in the USSR," in *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies* (Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, 1973), p. 293.

[7] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1974*, p. 249.

[8] A detailed discussion of Soviet motor vehicle production facilities and an analysis of the technical characteristics of individual automobiles lie beyond the scope of the present study. For such discussions, see Edwards, op. cit. pp. 294–99; William Baxter. " The Soviet Passenger Car Industry," *Survey* (Summer 1973), pp. 218–40.

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approximately two-thirds of all cars in use were in private hands.[9] Yet many Soviet authorities still express strong reservations about permitting the ownership and/or use of private automobiles to develop as extensively as they have in many other countries. As one of the participants in a debate on this subject in *Literaturnaia gazeta* commented, "We must reject the slogan '*vsegda i vse*' ('always and all') but then the question becomes '*kogda i kto*' ('when and who')."[10] While most of the debaters did agree that the USSR should not simultaneously allow the unrestricted ownership and use of automobiles, they diverged sharply over the appropriate types of restrictions. Two broad positions emerged, one advocating restrictions on ownership and the other on use.[11]

Opponents of unrestricted ownership and/or use base their opposition on both pragmatic and ideological grounds. Pragmatic opponents usually stress the negative consequences of allowing unrestricted automobile development—e.g. air and noise pollution, traffic congestion and traffic safety. Further, the reduced growth rate of passenger car production in the 10th five-year plan as compared to the previous plan may reflect the leadership's reluctance to allocate the additional vast sums required for continued expansion of automobile production and necessary support infrastructure. Some individuals also oppose the automobile's unrestricted development on ideological grounds, arguing that it would subvert the ideals of socialism by inculcating among the masses a "materialistic mentality" and a "compulsion to acquire."[12] Other ideological opponents may also fear a restrictive automobile ownership policy because this raises embarrassing ideological questions about why some groups may have automobiles while others may not.

The regime's official policy appears generally to support those who advocate restrictions on ownership but not on use. While it is true that the production of automobiles has expanded impressively in recent years, the purchase price of a new car is still far beyond the means of the average Soviet worker. Thus, the purchase price of a 1972 Zhiguli was almost 3·5 times greater than the average income of a Soviet worker in that year, while the price of a new Volga exceeded his annual income by more than 5·5 times. Table III provides the purchase prices for various models of Soviet automobiles with their dollar equivalents.

Further, these prices, which must be paid in cash since no credit is allowed, appear deliberately set to preclude all but the most affluent from acquiring automobiles, because they are far higher for new automobiles on the domestic market than they are when the same cars are exported.[13] One observer has suggested recently that individuals be permitted to purchase new automobiles in instalments so that ordinary workers could more easily acquire them. This system, he argued, would

[9] Edwards, op. cit. p. 301.
[10] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 31, 1971, p. 12.
[11] Ibid. Nos. 31, p. 12; 39, p. 12; 43, p. 12; 1971.
[12] Ibid. No. 11, 1971, p. 12.
[13] Thus the purchase price of a Zhiguli is 5,500 rubles on the domestic market, but is sold in Western Europe for approximately 1,500 rubles.

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TABLE III

Purchase Price of Various Models of Soviet Cars with their Dollar Equivalents

Car Name and Model	*Price*	
	Rubles	*Dollar Equivalent*
Volga, GAZ–24	9,000	12,000
Zhiguli, VAZ–2101	5,500	7,400
Moskvich, Moskvich–412	4,936	6,600
Zaporozhets, ZAZ–968	3,510	4,700

* Rounded, and converted at the rate of one ruble equals $1.34.

Source: Edwards, op. cit. p. 299.

eliminate the "undesirable social effect," of restricting automobile ownership primarily to the managerial and technical elite.[14]

Yet the real price of a new car often is substantially higher than even its official price, because prospective buyers frequently offer officials bribes (at times exceeding the car's purchase price) to ensure that they can purchase an automobile in a reasonable period of time. A buyer failing to offer a bribe may well wait two or three years, and in some cities even 10 years, to purchase his new car. The average Soviet worker finds even less relief from such prices if he attempts to purchase a used car, because demand for automobiles often makes these cars more expensive than new ones. Second-hand cars must be sold through commission shops which set their purchase prices (and charge a fee of 7 per cent of the purchase price to complete any sale), but since 1971 owners can sell their cars to the buyer of their choice and then register the sale with the commission shop on payment of the service fee. Although the officially-set prices for used cars are below those for new models, they do not accurately reflect demand so that the actual price agreed to privately between the individual buyer and seller is usually far higher than the official price.[15]

The consequence of this is that private automobile owners are concentrated primarily among members of the professional and managerial elite resident in urban areas. The absence of a well developed road network and insufficient maintenance facilities in rural areas further contributes to the concentration of most automobiles in Russia's urban centres. Present policy envisages between 150 and 200 cars per 1,000 residents in the largest urban centres by the year 2,000, which is roughly the level of car ownership found in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1975.[16]

[14] *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva*, No. 5, 1975, p. 131.

[15] *Pravda*, 13 Nov. 1972; *Sovetskaia torgovlia*, No. 5, 1974, pp. 25–27; Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York, 1976), pp. 91–92. For a detailed discussion of the regulations for buying and selling second-hand cars, see *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 9, 1974, pp. 111–14.

[16] See *Stolichnyi transport v generalnom plane razvitiia Moskvy* (Moscow, 1973), p. 36, for a discussion of the role of the private automobile in the general plan for Moscow's development. Data on automobile ownership in Prague from *Rude pravo*, 10 July 1975.

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Passenger car exports and their allocation for official use have also helped to keep private automobile ownership small. Soviet automobile exports have increased from approximately 85,000 units in 1970 to over 285,000 units in 1974, although they have been steadily declining as a percentage of total passenger car production since 1971. East European members of Comecon receive the overwhelming majority of these exports, many of them in payment for parts and components that the East Europeans supply to the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant. Automobile exports to advanced capitalist countries, primarily in Western Europe, have actually declined in recent years, but the USSR hopes to increase them substantially in the future, relying particularly upon the Zhiguli (known as the Lada in Western Europe). Fiat dealers throughout Western Europe can service this car, and thus overcome the maintenance problems that traditionally have made West Europeans reluctant to purchase Soviet-built automobiles. Further, the Zhiguli is priced competitively with many Western cars, including Italian-built Fiats, and its contemporary design should prove more appealing to consumers than the designs of other Soviet cars offered for export. Lada sales have recently increased in some Western European countries, primarily at the expense of Italian Fiats and several Japanese makes. The USSR also plans to export the Lada to the United States beginning in 1976. Initial plans are for the export of 3,000 to 4,000 cars annually at a unit price of under $4,000. The Lada is now undergoing emission control tests, and it will be marketed once their results conform to United States Environmental Protection Agency standards.[17] Tables IV (below) and V (at end of article) present data on various aspects of Soviet automobile exports.

The number of passenger cars available for sale to the public is further reduced, because the Soviets assign many automobiles to state employees for various official uses. This number is steadily declining relative to

TABLE IV

Soviet Automobile Exports in Selected Years

Year	*Total Passenger Car Production (in thousands)*[a]	*Total Exports (in thousands)*[b]	*Exports as per cent of Production*[b]
1960	138·8	30·2	21·8
1970	344·2	84·8	24·6
1971	529·0	149·7	28·3
1972	730·1	194·9	26·6
1973	916·7	237·5	25·8
1974	1,846·3	287·3	15·5

Sources:

[a] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1974*, p. 249.

[b] *Vneshnaia torgovlia*, No. 1, 1973, p. 51; ibid. No. 6, 1974, p. 53; ibid. No. 6, 1975, p. 53.

[17] *New York Times*, 22 Nov. 1975.

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the number in private use, and it is planned to reduce it further by selling in the near future between 15 per cent to 20 per cent of all official cars to private buyers. Nevertheless, in 1975 official cars still constituted more than one-third of all passenger cars then in use in the USSR. Table VI (at end of article) contains data on the distribution of passenger cars between private and public users in recent years.

While the number of automobiles in the USSR may not be impressive by Western standards, it is still sufficiently large to compel the Soviet regime to develop policies to cope with the many problems accompanying their rapid expansion in recent years. We now turn to a consideration of these problems and the Soviet response to them.

Automobile Services and Maintenance

These facilities have not kept pace with the recent expansion of automobile production. For example, relatively few petrol stations exist even in the largest urban centres. Thus, Moscow, a city with over 250,000 private automobiles, had only 12 stations in 1971, while there was approximately one station for every 10,000 automobiles in Kazakhstan in 1972. Long queues frequently develop at the few existing stations, and it is not unusual for a motorist to wait over an hour for an opportunity to fill his tank at the self-service pumps typical of most Soviet gasoline stations. The difficulty in purchasing petrol has led to the enormous theft of state-owned fuel for sale on the black market. An *Izvestiia* article indicated that in 1972–73 more than one-third of all Soviet motorists were driving on state-owned petrol, and a Western source estimates the annual amount of illegally acquired fuel at 150 million gallons worth approximately 60 million rubles.[18]

Owners also face serious obstacles in maintaining and repairing their automobiles. Supplies needed for proper maintenance, such as oils and lubricants, are frequently unobtainable or of low quality. Hence even many new automobiles experience premature breakdowns and require extensive repairs.[19]

Yet the number of repair facilities and spare parts is completely inadequate to meet demand. As one account commented:

> As yet, there is no order of any kind in the operation and technical maintenance of motor vehicles ... primitive methods are used, the repair bases are in a sorry state, and the needs and requirements of car owners are satisfied only 20–30 per cent of the time.[20]

In 1972, there were only 370 service stations and repair shops for private automobiles throughout the USSR, and in 1971 the Russian Republic had service facilities sufficient for only 12 per cent of the republic's automobiles.[21]

[18] *Pravda*, 21 Jan. 1971; ibid. 14 Oct. 1971; *Izvestiia*, 1 Jan. 1975; Smith op. cit. pp. 82–83. Radio Liberty is the Western source for the amount of illegally acquired fuel.
[19] *Izvestiia*, 3 Mar. 1974.
[20] Ibid. 13 Apr. 1972. [21] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 6 Mar. 1972; *Pravda*, 24 July 1971.

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Service facilities are especially inadequate for the Zhiguli automobile. A spokesman for the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant indicated that the plant had already received "thousands of letters" from Zhiguli owners complaining that facilities for the repair of their automobiles were almost nonexistent. The authorities had established no such facilities in Leningrad by 1972, and in 1973 Moscow had only two stations equipped to service this car. A recent *Izvestiia* article indicated that for the entire USSR existing facilities are sufficient to service only 25 per cent of these cars in use. The lag in service facilities for the Zhiguli has compelled officials to take the drastic step of halting or reducing sales of the car in those areas where the facilities are inadequate.[22]

Further, the existing repair stations are often poorly equipped. Thus, the Ministry of Motor Vehicles of the Russian Republic, which includes Moscow, reported that in 1973 its service stations had no equipment to perform body repair work, to test steering mechanisms, or to make diagnostic checks. Frequently, repair stations do not have mechanics, or if they do, the mechanics are often poorly trained. By 1974 not one institute, technical college, or vocational-technical school in the USSR offered programmes to train automobile mechanics. Also, it is difficult to attract talented individuals to this profession, because wage scales are substantially below those in many other occupations.[23]

An acute shortage of spare parts is one of the most critical aspects of the maintenance problem. Owners find it especially difficult to acquire spare parts for cars no longer in production, yet such cars in 1975 still constituted approximately 40 per cent of all the cars in Moscow.[24] Items such as windscreen wipers, side view mirrors, batteries, and sparking plugs are in very short supply. Owners attempting to acquire a bumper for the Volga 21 or the Moskvich 401 find it a "virtually insoluble problem."[25]

The shortage of spare parts has created, in the words of an *Izvestiia* article, "a nutrient medium for speculation and all sorts of machinations and stealing."[26] Parts are often stolen from new cars before they are delivered to their owners, and sold on the black market. Auto repairmen are particularly prone to stealing various items from automobiles in order to sell them to desperate motorists. One individual found when he came to retrieve his car that the repairmen had stripped the car of its steering wheel, seats, battery, and even its chassis, and had substituted old parts for them. Another man found that his automobile was missing two wheels when he came in for it at the repair station. "They were missing when you brought the car in," said the repairman.[27]

[22] *Izvestiia*, 13 Apr. 1972; *Leningradskaia pravda*, 13 Feb. 1972; *New York Times*, 8 Apr. 1971, XI, p. 7; *Izvestiia*, 24 Aug. 1974; *Za rulem*, No. 4, 1972, pp. 18–19.

[23] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 19, 1973, pp. 10–11; *Izvestiia*, 3 Mar. 1974; ibid., 24 Aug. 1974.

[24] *Gorodskoe khoziaistvo Moskvy*, No. 4, 1975, p. 36.

[25] *Izvestiia*, 20 Nov. 1973; ibid. 23 July 1972; *Ogonek*, No. 8, 1972, p. 17.

[26] *Izvestiia*, 20 Nov. 1973.

[27] Ibid. 22 July 1972; *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 8, 1973, p. 12.

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Several factors complicate the supply of spare parts to automobile owners. First, the well known effect of such production criteria as monetary value or gross weight which cause manufacturers to prefer the production of expensive or heavy parts when owners frequently need relatively cheap or light items. Second, the inefficiency of the distribution system; parts unavailable to consumers may abound in the warehouses. Third, automobile owners themselves foster the spare parts shortage by buying them whenever possible irrespective of immediate need.[28]

In such conditions it may be surprising that any cars are running at all. And indeed many cars do not run: in Moscow in the spring of 1970, approximately 25 per cent of the private automobiles were unable to move because of poor maintenance facilities and the shortage of spare parts. Since Moscow is generally much better supplied than other Soviet cities, the situation in outlying areas is presumably worse.

Finally, the road network and travel aids are inadequate. The USSR's road network in 1973, excluding urban arteries, was approximately a quarter of the length of the United States system. Hard surface roads comprised about 45 per cent of the system, and many of these were paved with gravel. Of course, many areas with few roads, such as the Far North, have little population and even fewer automobiles. Yet, a Soviet expert estimates that the present urban road network has the capacity for only half of the demand placed upon it.[29] Further, detailed road maps and travel signs are few. One observer feels that many highway officials still believe in the ancient Russian proverb that "your tongue will direct you to Kiev."[30] The weary Soviet motorist will also find few places to rest along the highway: motels, rest stops, and dining facilities are almost nonexistent.[31]

Soviet officials are certainly aware of many of these problems, and they have initiated a number of steps to combat them. Thus, the ninth five-year plan (1971–75) provided for the considerable expansion of repair facilities, the establishment of mobile repair units, the construction of several thousand filling stations, and a substantial increase in the production of spare parts. Included within these targets were plans to establish a system of 33 repair facilities (eventually to be expanded to over 100) specializing exclusively in the maintenance of the Zhiguli. The 10th five-year plan (1976–80) envisages the further expansion of the Zhiguli service network. It calls for the construction of 50 specialized Zhiguli automobile centres and 95 service stations with a total of approximately 4,000 service bays. Many of the new facilities will be located in the non-European regions of the USSR where they are currently almost non-existent. Between 1971–75, the USSR built ap-

[28] *Izvestiia*, 20 Nov. 1973; ibid. 3 Mar. 1974; *Ogonek*, No. 8, 1972, p. 17.

[29] The total length of the Soviet road network in 1974 was approximately 1·4 million kilometres, of which 628,000 kilometres were hard surfaced. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1974*, p. 493; *Pravda*, 6 Feb. 1972.

[30] *Izvestiia*, 13 Nov. 1969.

[31] Ibid. 7 Feb. 1973.

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proximately 89,000 kilometres of hard-surface highways, and plans to build or reconstruct an additional 62,000 to 65,000 kilometres of hard surfaced roads between 1976–80, each of which, however, is considerably less than it built between 1966–70. The RSFSR Ministry of Automobile Transport will open in the near future five vocational-technical schools to train car mechanics. A Voluntary Automobile Society has also been established, one of whose functions is to cope with the service problem. The Society's members receive priority in the maintenance and repair of their cars at service stations. In addition, the Society organizes driver instruction clinics, publishes guidebooks and maps, and gives its members first choice at motels and campsites.[32]

Even if fully implemented, such programmes only begin to overcome the problems. One high-ranking Soviet official estimates that if the current targets for automobile servicing and repair are fully met, they will satisfy only 35–40 per cent of the need.[33]

However, numerous Soviet press accounts indicate substantial delays in implementing these programmes. Construction organizations apparently view automobile maintenance facilities as low-priority projects, and have "resorted to every imaginable pretext" to avoid building them.[34] On the specialized Zhiguli service network, one authority recently commented:

> Let us speak frankly! Progress has been less than modest. Instead of 33 centres, fewer than a third of that number opened on schedule. . . . More than 20 did not reach the finish line on time. Worse yet—not even half the work has been completed at many of them.[35]

In addition to the typical reluctance of construction organizations to build such facilities, the plans for the Zhiguli service network have also apparently provoked sharp bureaucratic in-fighting. Reportedly the plans have met with a "cool reception" among some republic and local officials. There are often inordinate delays in assigning plots of land for repair facilities, and when done "almost everywhere it is isolated, far from existing utility lines and transportation routes." Finally, plans for the substantial expansion of spare parts production and bases to distribute them are far behind schedule: such plans are "in even worse condition" than the construction of the Zhiguli service centres.[36]

It is understandable that the USSR is confronting so many problems in the provision of services and maintenance for the private automobile, since this has become an important goal only in the last decade. Not surprisingly, the regime initially concentrated primarily on expanding

[32] Edwards, op. cit. p. 303; *Izvestiia*, 18 Feb. 1976; *Pravda*, 14 Dec. 1975; *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 19, 1973, pp. 10–11; *Izvestiia*, 23 Feb. 1973.

[33] *Izvestiia*, 24 Aug. 1974.

[34] *Pravda*, 24 July 1971; *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 19, 1973, pp. 10–11.

[35] *Izvestiia*, 7 Feb. 1974. A later *Pravda* report indicated that 21 of these 33 service stations were in operation. *Pravda*, 2 Mar. 1975.

[36] *Izvestiia*, 13 Apr. 1972; *Stroitelnaia gazeta*, 2 Apr. 1972, p. 24; *Izvestiia*, 24 Aug. 1974.

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the production of automobiles and has only recently devoted serious attention to the creation of an adequate infrastructure to support them. Yet our analysis suggests that ambitious plans to alleviate problems specified above are unlikely to be implemented quickly or satisfactorily.

Traffic Safety

Traffic safety is an increasingly serious issue for both motorists and pedestrians. Although the authorities do not publish nationwide figures on road traffic accidents and fatalities, the available data do suggest that safety is a far more serious problem than one might expect with the Soviet Union's still relatively small stock of motor vehicles. Thus, Hedrick Smith, former *New York Times* correspondent in Moscow, reports that he was told "unofficially but reliably" that in 1974 there were approximately 45,000 road accident-related fatalities in the USSR as compared to 46,200 in the United States, and that the former's automobile fatality rate was roughly 10 times higher than the latter's.[37] Soviet reports lend support to Smith's data. For example, a recent *Pravda* account reported that traffic accidents in 1971 caused "thousands of dead and injured." In 1971 there were almost 9,000 traffic fatalities in the republics of Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, twice as many as in California in the same year, although that state had almost five times as many vehicles. Comparative data indicate that in 1972 Moscow with seven times less automobiles suffered almost 60 per cent as many traffic fatalities as New York City. Further, traffic fatalities in Moscow more than doubled between 1970 and 1974, although reportedly they decreased somewhat in the first 10 months of 1975. Finally, the available Soviet data may seriously understate the number of traffic accidents and fatalities, because officials of local soviets who gather such data tend to "blind themselves to the facts for the sake of good report indices." [38]

Although state-owned vehicles are involved in many of these accidents, the number of accidents involving private automobiles is increasing rapidly. Thus, the accident rate for private motorists increased by almost 85 per cent in the first seven months of 1974 over the comparable period in 1973, and in many areas private motorists are now involved in approximately 50 per cent of all traffic accidents.[39]

Soviet authorities cite a number of factors contributing to the relatively high rate of road accidents and fatalities. First, several accounts blame poorly trained and/or drunken drivers for approximately 70 per cent of all accidents. Frequently drivers are ignorant of traffic rules and the fundamentals of safe driving, because only one-third of all private motorists have received adequate driver training. The "green snake"

[37] *Pravda*, 26 Jan. 1973. Smith, op. cit. p. 57.

[38] *New York Times*, 17 Oct. 1972, p. 17; *Izvestiia*, 28 Mar. 1975; *Pravda*, 25 Nov. 1975; *Izvestiia*, 25 Apr. 1973.

[39] *Izvestiia*, 1 Oct. 1974.

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(i.e. vodka) is a factor in many accidents: drunken drivers are blamed for between a quarter and one-third of all road accidents.[40]

Pedestrians are a primary cause of almost one-third of all such accidents, and in Moscow in 1974 they were responsible for over half of them. Drunken individuals and children comprise a disproportionate share of these pedestrians. Drunkenness is a factor in approximately 20 per cent of all pedestrian-caused accidents, and drunken pedestrians were responsible for almost 10 per cent of all traffic accidents in 1973. One recent report noted that in some areas every fourth traffic fatality is a child, and "in almost every instance the primary cause of misfortune is the child's ignorance of traffic rules and not realizing that he must always follow the rules."[41]

Dangerous road conditions reportedly account for 20 per cent of all traffic accidents in some areas, and in 1974 as compared to 1973 there occurred a "very considerable increase" of such accidents in several union-republics. Further, the fatality rate in these accidents is far higher than the rate for all traffic accidents.[42] Table VII presents data on traffic accidents resulting from various dangerous road conditions in selected union-republics.

Finally, many traffic fatalities and casualties result from the almost universal absence of safety equipment, including seat-belts, on Soviet automobiles. The State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate estimates that almost 75 per cent of automobile fatalities could have been avoided by seat-belts.[43]

Legal and propaganda measures predominate in Soviet efforts to reduce these accidents. Under Article 212 of the RSFSR Criminal Code culpable passenger car drivers who cause victims "less grave or light bodily harm" are subject to deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding two years or to correctional tasks for a term not exceeding one year; when the driver's actions result in "death or grave bodily injury" he is liable to deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding 10 years.

A recently enacted traffic safety decree specifies measures to improve highway maintenance, driver training, motor vehicle inspection, and the installation of modern traffic control devices. The decree also establishes a committee under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to coordinate traffic safety measures.[44] Additional legal measures include new national

[40] *Kommunist tadzhikistana*, 30 Mar. 1972; *Izvestiia*, 18 July 1972; *Pravda*, 23 Sept. 1973; ibid. 8 Oct. 1974.

[41] *Izvestiia*, 17 Nov. 1971; *Gorodskoe khoziaistvo Moskvy*, No. 6, 1975, p. 33; *Pravda*, 8 Oct. 1974; ibid. 2 Feb. 1975.

[42] *Izvestiia*, 25 Apr. 1973; *Za Rulem*, No. 2, 1976, p. 25. Traffic accidents resulting from dangerous road conditions in 1974 as compared to 1973 increased by 59·5 per cent in Kirgiziia, by 45·7 per cent in the Ukraine, by 40·5 per cent in Tadzhikistan, and by 39·1 per cent in Azerbaidzhan. The fatality rate per 100 such accidents was 48 in Azerbaidzhan, 45 in Georgia, and 37 in Kazakhstan, although for all traffic accidents it was 19 per 100.

[43] *Pravda*, 8 Oct. 1974; *Izvestiia*, 5 Aug. 1973.

[44] *Izvestiia*, 19 Feb. 1976.

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traffic regulations that specify the safety obligations of both motorists and pedestrians, the mandatory provision of seat belts on all new automobiles beginning in 1975, the enactment of the nation's first speed limits that became effective on 1 January 1976, and the requirement from 1 June 1976, that all new applicants for driving licences must first complete a formal course in driver training.[45]

A propaganda campaign on road safety involves film shorts, radio and television and officially proclaimed traffic safety months. The authorities especially emphasize the importance of propagandizing traffic safety among children, although the press carries persistent criticisms of these efforts. One recent interesting innovation is the construction of miniature "motor cities" where children learn the rules of traffic safety in a setting that simulates real driving conditions. Although not yet widespread, these "motor cities" seem to have proved effective.[46]

The Soviet Union's traffic safety programme has so far apparently achieved mixed results, although the many recently enacted measures may somewhat ameliorate the problem in the future. Published reports indicate that 1972 saw a "significant decline" in the traffic accident rate for the country as a whole, that in 1973 the rate remained stable, but that in 1974, "the situation has become more complicated." The increased accident rate in 1974 may well be a function of the expanded number of Zhigulis whose owners are involved in almost four times as many accidents as are owners of the Moskvich and almost double that of owners of the Volga. The recent increase in traffic accidents and fatalities indicates that traffic safety remains a serious problem that will elicit continued official concern.[47]

The Automobile and the City

Along with their counterparts in the West, Soviet city planners and local government officials are increasingly concerned with the many problems that accompany substantial numbers of automobiles in urban centres. Traffic congestion, inadequate parking facilities, and air and noise pollution exist and are used as arguments against the automobile in central cities.

Traffic jams, perhaps the ultimate symbol of the automobile's negative impact on the city, are an increasingly common occurrence in many of Russia's larger urban centres. A *Pravda* account noted that one can cite "quite a few examples" of bumper-to-bumper traffic in central cities.[48] One Western observer reported in 1970, "evidence that Moscow is bent on strangling itself with automobiles is everywhere—from Red Square ... to the arteries leading out of the city, which are barely adequate to accommodate the present number of vehicles."[49] Urban street systems

[45] Ibid. 28 Mar. 1975; ibid. 23 Aug. 1973; *Pravda*, 4 Jan. 1976; *Izvestiia*, 13 Mar. 1976.
[46] *Pravda*, 8 Oct. 1974; ibid. 3 Jan. 1975.
[47] *Pravda*, 8 Oct. 1974; *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 47, 1973, p. 13.
[48] *Pravda*, 6 Feb. 1972.
[49] *New York Times*, 18 Aug. 1970, p. 14.

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are further burdened because highways do not normally bypass city centres. Finally, the narrow crooked streets characteristic of many Russian cities contribute to traffic congestion. According to a resident of Donetsk, "it is as if the condition of the city's main streets was deliberately defying the passage of almost 50,000 vehicles." [50]

A garage is a particularly prized possession to avoid damage by vandals as well as the Russian winter. Yet in Moscow in 1973 garages of all types could accommodate only 30 per cent of the private automobiles and many of the garages did not have roofs. Private garage cooperatives have appeared in several Russian cities, and membership, which is prestigious and practical, costs over 1,300 rubles. One cooperative is charging new members over 3,700 rubles, almost three years' salary for the average worker.[51]

Many desperate owners build makeshift garages; although "categorically forbidden," these are "springing up like mushrooms after a rainstorm. They are appearing in city squares, on streets, and in areas set aside as lawns and children's playgrounds." [52] Owners with no shelter of any kind for their cars go through an annual ritual to prepare them for the coming winter. They drain the radiator, often remove tyres, mirrors, batteries and other items that might be stolen, and wrap the car in canvas to lie deep in snow and be used again in the spring.

The growth of air and noise pollution by traffic in Soviet cities is well attested. Thus, the mayor of Moscow notes that in his city "the main source of air pollution is the automobile." Automobiles in Erevan "continually discharge smoke of bluish colour in the air," "while in Alma-Ata the amount of toxic elements in automobile emissions often exceeds the maximum permissible limits." [53] Motor vehicles, including private automobiles, have also caused substantial noise pollution. For example, on the streets of Moscow and several other cities noise levels have reached 117 decibels. *Pravda* noted that motor vehicle noise had provoked "bitter words" from numerous readers, while one irate individual charged that "on his street the density of transport creates impossible conditions for life and work." [54]

Remedial steps are only too familiar from the more advanced automobile countries. Among those being introduced by Moscow and several other cities are computer-run traffic control systems to facilitate vehicle movement, and reduce not only traffic congestion, but also air pollution, since motor vehicles markedly increase their emission of pollutants during braking and acceleration. Amongst improvements in urban road networks, Moscow has announced plans to expand the network of super-

[50] *Izvestiia*, 16 Aug. 1969.

[51] *New York Times*, 5 Nov. 1973, p. 41; *Gorodskoe khoziaistvo Moskvy*, No. 4, 1974, p. 34.

[52] *Izvestiia*, 20 May 1973.

[53] TASS, 24 Aug. 1973; *Kommunist* (Erevan), 7 Jan. 1975; *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 18 Feb. 1973.

[54] *Izvestiia*, 2 June 1968; *Pravda*, 26 May 1968; *Izvestiia*, 2 June 1968.

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highways that ring the city and to build a system of underground vehicular tunnels in the city centre that will parallel the surface road network. Tallinn prefers several deep open trenches, each wide enough to accommodate a six-lane divided highway, rather than follow Moscow's example, because of difficulties of ventilation in underground tunnels.[55] As elsewhere vehicles powered by liquefied gas and electric batteries are being developed with considerable difficulties. Finally, Soviet reports say that noxious emissions could be reduced by three to five times by ensuring that engines are properly tuned and regulated, yet even in Moscow, only 10 to 15 per cent of all automobile engines are in such condition.[56]

Increased use of public transport is another means of coping with the automobile's adverse consequences. Transportation planners see the underground, perhaps in combination with high-speed electric trams and commuter railways, as the basic form of transportation in the largest urban centres, since it contributes neither to air or noise pollution nor to traffic congestion. They feel buses should serve primarily to transport people within suburban areas and bring suburbanites to transfer points with the underground system or the commuter railways if they wish to travel into the city centre.[57]

The Soviets are expending considerable resources to improve many mass transit systems. They have constructed or are constructing subway systems in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Baku, Kharkov, and Tashkent, and are expanding several of the systems already in operation. In addition, they are introducing high speed electric tramlines in several cities including Kiev, Saratov, and Volgograd. Further, the ninth five-year plan (1971–75) called for a substantial increase in the production of buses, almost all of which will be used in metropolitan areas.[58]

However, the Soviet press contains numerous complaints concerning the operation of mass transit systems. The disproportion between their passenger capacity and the demand placed upon them is their most serious inadequacy. The problem is especially acute in many of the rapidly growing suburban districts of metropolitan areas; the capacity of mass transit systems in these areas often will have to be doubled to meet expanding passenger demand. Press complaints also note many other deficiencies, including irregular service, poorly designed and maintained equipment, and a shortage of trained personnel that keeps many vehicles idle, particularly buses.[59]

Several Soviet cities have also placed restrictions on automobile use. Thus authorities in Riga have established a "quiet zone" in the city

[55] *Izvestiia*, 10 July 1970; *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, 22 Mar. 1973; *Izvestiia*, 6 Jan. 1973; *New York Times*, 3 Jan. 1974, p. 8.

[56] *Vechernaia Moskva*, 3 Jan. 1967; *Pravda*, 22 Sept. 1972; *Izvestiia*, 25 Jan. 1973; *Pravda*, 18 Oct. 1968.

[57] See especially *Pravda*, 24 Apr. 1969, and 20 June 1972 for discussions on the development of mass transit systems in metropolitan areas.

[58] *Pravda*, 13 Mar. 1973; ibid. 1 Apr. 1975; ibid. 12 Oct. 1971.

[59] For typical criticisms see *Pravda*, 24 Aug. 1969; ibid. 12 Mar. 1972; ibid. 6 Aug. 1974.

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centre for pedestrians only. Officials in Tallinn plan gradually to close the city's historic "old town" to motor vehicles, while authorities in Bāku have designated a number of streets exclusively for pedestrian use during certain hours.[60]

With so much experience in other countries and now the same problems emerging in their own, Soviet authorities have an opportunity to undertake policies that will prevent motor vehicles from inflicting on their cities the degree of damage that cities in the capitalist world have suffered. The next several years should provide a good indication of whether they will take advantage of this opportunity.

THE Soviet Union has finally entered the automobile age, a development bringing some benefits but also many problems to the regime. The primary benefit appears to be the political one that the regime derives from a policy eliciting widespread support from the Soviet people, particularly the managerial and professional elite. The leadership's automobile pricing policy confirms its particular concern for the consumer welfare of the elite by making it exceedingly difficult for anyone but its members to purchase a new automobile.

Among many problems that have accompanied the automobile, some, such as an inadequate infrastructure for its service and maintenance, result primarily from the regime's initial concentration on increasing the stock of automobiles and its only recent concern for providing a support infrastructure. The regime has sought to alleviate these problems and allocated substantial sums for this purpose. However, as noted, the passenger car production targets of the 10th five-year plan (1976–80) may reflect a growing desire among the Soviet leadership to reduce these allocations and use them for other purposes. Hence, the future extent of the automobile in the USSR will be critically influenced by the leadership's response to the competing demands of many claimants for the allocation of resources.

A second set of problems is common to all societies with large numbers of automobiles. Indeed, the automobile age seems inevitably accompanied by urban congestion, air and noise pollution, and traffic safety problems. Naturally, the USSR's comparatively small stock of automobiles makes these problems less severe there than in many other countries, and it also has the advantage of their experience in responding to them. In addition, the centralized Soviet system may prove more effective than systems with greater decentralization in implementing metropolitan-wide planning measures to manage the automobile.

Finally, the automobile presents the Soviet regime with a set of problems not found in most other countries. Thus, some socialist critics fear that the stress on consumer welfare symbolized by the increased availability of automobiles will inculcate a "*petit-bourgeois Weltan-*

[60] *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, 7 Sept. 1974; *Pravda*, 6 Feb. 1972.

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schauung" among the people and thus consumption becomes an end in itself, an attitude contrary to the ideals of the "New Soviet Man."

Politically, the automobile may complicate the regime's traditional concern to control tightly the population's movements. Further, the automobile potentially can provide its owner not just with physical freedom of movement, but with emotional freedom as well. The Polish writer Marek Hlasko captured this latter capability of the automobile in the last chapter of his novel *Next Stop: Paradise* where he portrayed the automobile as "the most beautiful thing invented by twentieth-century man, the only thing thanks to which it is possible to run away from life, from oneself, and from others."[61] This, too, contradicts the ideals associated with the "New Soviet Man," an individual working within the collective who perceives his personal worth and ultimate fate as inextricably linked to the collective achievements of the Soviet people.

The regime can combat these problems by restricting automobile ownership, a response, however, not without its own political risks. Hence, the automobile's restricted availability will contribute to the further stratification of Soviet society by identifying its owner's social and economic status. This circumstance is especially dangerous for a society supposedly dedicated to the gradual elimination of inequalities and the eventual creation of a classless society, since it raises the difficult ideological question of why some in socialist society should have private automobiles while most use public transport. Indeed, it seems clear that in the USSR, as elsewhere, no panacea exists for dealing with the problems of the automobile.

[61] Marek Hlasko, *Next Stop: Paradise* (New York, 1960).

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TABLE V

Soviet Automobile Exports to Various Groups of Countries in Selected Years

Year	Total Exports (thousands of units)	Exports to Socialist Countries (thousands of units)	Exports to Socialist Countries (as per cent of total)	Exports to Advanced Capitalist Countries (thousands of units)	Exports to Advanced Capitalist Countries (as per cent of total)	Exports to Developing Countries (thousands of units)	Exports to Developing Countries (as per cent of total)
1972	194·9	156·7	80·4	26·9	13·8	11·3	5·7
1973	237·5	187·8	79·0	45·1	18·9	4·6	1·9
1974	287·3	228·3	79·4	42·7	14·8	16·3	5·6

Source: *Vneshnaia torgovlia*, No. 6, 1974, p. 53; ibid. No. 6, 1975, p. 53.

TABLE VI

Estimated Distribution of Private Owners and State Users of Passenger Cars in Thousands in Selected Years

Year	Inventory*	Private	State				As Per Cent of Inventory	
			Assigned to Officials	Taxis	Other State Uses	Total	Private	State
1970	1,700	800	700	90	110	900	47·0	52·3
1971	2,000	900	850	100	150	1,100	45·0	55·0
1972	2,400	1,250	850	110	190	1,150	52·0	47·9
1975	4,700	3,000	1,000	180	520	1,700	63·8	36·1

* Estimates based on output adjusted for exports and retirements.
Source: Adapted from data in Edwards, op. cit. p. 301.

TABLE VII

Accidents on All-Union and Republic Roads Because of Unsatisfactory Road Conditions in 1974 (as a percentage of the total number of such accidents) *

Republic	*Slippery Surface*	*Uneven Surface*	*Poor Condition of Verge*	*Ice and Snow*	*Absence of Engineering Equipment*	*Absence of Needed Traffic Signs*
Latvia	54·0	10·8	8·6	5·8	1·4	8·6
Armenia	51·2	16·3	4·7	2·3	0·0	2·3
Ukraine	61·2	7·6	9·5	1·1	1·9	2·6
Tadzhikistan	75·8	6·1	3·0	0·0	6·1	0·0

* Columns across do not add up to 100 in the original.
Source: *Za rylem*, No. 2, 1976, p. 25.

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A Typology of Cultures based on Attitudes to Death

Leonid Rzhevsky*

RELATIONSHIPS are the primary fabric of social life, and they form a basic theme in sociological research, however it is obtained and in whatever terms and conceptual categories it is expressed. Any description of a historical event, any explanation of a social phenomenon, any social model, however abstract, seeks ultimately to reveal specific or general features of relationships and interactions between the people involved. Even when we use language which does not appear directly to reflect the reality of human relations and contacts, for instance, when we say: "This system is democratic and that one totalitarian," we are expressing, in the most generalized form, opinions on the subject of how relationships between people are established, maintained and severed in one or another concrete or model situation.

Relationships, that is persistent, prolonged and mutual contacts, vary in nature according to the importance the participants attach to the ending or severance of the relationship. As a purely formal exercise we can postulate four types of relationships, taking as our criterion the significance of severance for the participants.

1 Both or all participants gain by the severance.
2 Severance is a gain for the person who leaves and a loss for those who remain.
3 Both the leaver and those who remain lose by the severance.
4 Those who remain gain by the severance and the leaver loses.

This typology may be used in at least two ways. Firstly, various relationships may be classified *per se* in accordance with the four models. For instance, relationships of mutual love or friendship belong to the third model; the relationships involved in games of chance, in a gang, or in a profitable business, to the fourth; the relationships of people accidentally thrown together in the cramped cellar of an air-raid shelter to the first, and so on. Secondly, one may claim that the use of this typology makes possible an overall description of the entire system of relationships into which a particular individual enters. To justify our approach, we shall turn to the phenomenon of death.

DEATH has a threefold significance: it is the end of bodily life; the rupture of conscious existence, and the severance of all external contacts. Because of this complete severance, death is an event of unique importance, defining the individual's life as a whole in one of the four

* This essay, sent to *Survey* from Moscow, analyses some of the themes dealt with by Peter Wiles in his essay "On Physical Immortality" (*Survey* Nos. 56 and 57, July and Oct. 1965).

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ways mentioned above: i.e. as a "game" [1] (if his associates gain by his death while he himself loses), as "coexistence" (everyone loses), as a "misunderstanding" (everyone gains), or as a "service" (those who remain lose while the deceased gains). Death is, as it were, a life completion experience, the realization of the rupture of relations which reveals the character of an individual's relationships as a whole, lends them a certain complexion and sets the tone for each separate relationship. An individual's attitude towards the world, and the significance of his death, are of the same essence.

Human relationships are thus to a certain extent a function of their end; that is, behaviour in the present is determined by an event in the future. This is specifically applicable to human reality and requires special methodical examination.

We can assume that a person already has an attitude to death, or that this attitude arises at a particular time; that is, he is ultimately able to define for himself what death means to a dying man—himself or any other person—and what it means for those he leaves behind him. In the latter case, as one who is left behind, his attitude to death will be a summation of all the negative experience he has hitherto acquired of the severance of contacts. It is at this moment, strictly speaking, that the individual is born as a human being, since his relationships, with their varying forms of expected ending, are dependent on his unconscious attitude to death as the extreme example of severance. Death imparts meaning to life, and the significance a person attaches to death will pervade his understanding of life.

From the significance of death to the individual it is a natural progression to the significance of attitudes to death in the formation of social relationships and bonds. Human orientation towards the problems of death and mortality thus becomes the key feature of a general system of orientation typifying one or another cultural community.

In order to justify the emphasis I have placed upon the significance of death, I need only point to the important position death occupies in all religious systems and in all peoples' generalized cultural experience. In giving pride of place to this problem, we are not only *not* breaking with the Weberian tradition in sociology; on the contrary, we are assuming that a person's attitude to death is a component part, and the most important part, of his attitude to the absolute. The latter, according to Weber, is decisive in determining the ethics of human relationships and thus the whole structure of human life. Without departing from these Weberian guidelines, we shall neverthless try to present our arguments in a more strictly formal manner in the belief that what our account loses in richness and colour will be more than compensated for by its logical consistency and orderliness.

[1] I have used these terms for the sake of convention to refer to each of the main characteristics of the given type of relationship.

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Construction of a Typological Field:
Chinese, Indian and Judaeo-Christian Culture

To obtain a framework for deductive classification, we shall take as coordinates our four original concepts: "the leaver," "the remaining," "loss" and "gain." The cross-combination of these concepts gives a figure divided into four segments. To find empirical references to the subsquares we have obtained by our analysis, we shall glance briefly at world religions, for simplicity's sake dealing only with Chinese, Indian, European-Christian and Russian culture. What do they have to tell mortal man?

CHINESE culture solves the problem of departure from this earth in a calm, optimistic manner which is also characteristic of other, less developed cultures based on ancestor worship (Malagash, for example). In fact, for the Chinese there is no departure. The Chinese outlook has man living in a universe peopled with the "living dead," who remain in close touch with him and help him to live in this world. To put it more precisely, the whole world, including the world of the dead, is this world, and the Chinese are unique in the way they honour old age and smile at funerals. As T. Grigoriev [2] writes: "for [the Chinese sage] 'death' in the absolute sense does not exist (as movement in one direction; everything arises from non-existence and returns to non-existence, death passes into life and life turns into death)." But what on the sophisticated philosophical plane appears as *Tao*, eternal rest, absolute nothingness, manifests itself in the popular mind as ancestor-worship, belief in the existence of *incarnations* (that is, the dead moving amongst the living in another guise) and in a whole series of rituals and customs. No other culture with a different attitude to death has a coffin carried everywhere behind the head of state, as it was wherever the Chinese emperors went, or keeps a coffin as a natural item of household furniture; in China the giving of a coffin to a man dangerously ill is regarded as a sign of sympathy and kindness, and the purchase of a coffin for one's aged parents is considered a token of filial love. The Chinese gaze upon death not with fear, but with pleasure. The dying man regards death as setting off on a long journey to see long-lost friends and those he leaves behind him often sell all they have in order to give their relative a magnificent funeral. As Confucius said: "Render everything unto the dead man as though he were alive . . ."

Thus the Chinese attitude to death can be expressed by the formula $\frac{+}{+}$ or "everyone gains by the departure."

ANOTHER man who does not die is the Indian. What lies in store for him is an endless succession of rebirths in various guises and bodily incarnations. Unlike the Chinese attitude to life and death, the Indian

[2] T. Grigoriev: "Makhayarai-kitaiskiye ucheniya" in *Sbornik*: *Izucheniye kitaiskoi literatury v SSSR* (Moscow, 1973).

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outlook is tinged with pessimism in everything relating to life. The chain of births becomes a painful burden from which one has to be delivered. Life in any of its manifestations is suffering, and deliverance from life, absolute and final death, is a blessing; if one must die, then one should, in the process, be transformed into nothingness, merge with the great void, the *atman*. This is the lot of the pious, the enlightened, the buddhas. The Indian view of the sorrow and pain of life is particularly vividly expressed in the *Puranas*. The very existence of the foetus in the mother's womb is depicted as unimaginable torment: "The wretched creature is unable to move. Its body is bent double: it can do nothing to resist the worms which gnaw at it. It is covered with dirt and foulness. It suffers from bitter and acid substances . . ." (*Padma-Purana*). The popular view of death finds its expression in the Indian proverb: "It is better to sit than to walk, better to sleep than to stay awake; but death is the best of all."

In accordance with this philosophy, life has always been regarded as worthless in India, and disdain for earthly things and the inclination towards voluntary departure from this life, towards mass suicide, have only been repressed because of the belief that it is impossible to break the chain of births without having first attained the proper standard of holiness. Moreover, the people who remain behind are deprived by the departure of the holy men, those who have succeeded in stopping the wheel of *samsara* (reincarnation). Hence the idea of Boddhisatva or the holy remaining among the living even when they have acquired the power to depart into eternal bliss, into the great void, into Nirvana, in order to help the living cast off the heavy burden of their existence.

In their interpretation of departure from this life and in their description of the absolute, the Chinese and Indian outlooks have many features in common, and this is noted by Grigoriev in the work mentioned earlier. What distinguishes them is their totally different attitude to life this side of the grave: optimistic in the case of China and pessimistic in that of India. "The leaver gains while the person left behind loses" is ingrained in Indian culture and may be expressed by the formula $\frac{+}{-}$.

LET us now examine the two remaining typological possibilities. As far as one can see, the formula $\frac{-}{-}$ can be most appropriately used to describe Judaeo-Christian culture. Strictly speaking however, the formula is more applicable to purely Jewish culture with its "global pessimism," its absence of faith in life beyond the grave and its acutely negative attitude to the present, the here and now. The "global pessimism" of Jewish culture makes the very existence of a Jewish community extremely problematical; witness their stormy history. In Christian culture this global pessimism is mitigated by the idea of resurrection. The Christian has the prospect of salvation, but it is not such an unconditional or

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unproblematical prospect as that held out by the Indian and Chinese philosophies. In fact the European, as he dies, departs into the unknown. He does not know for certain what awaits him on the other side, or how his life will be weighed in the scales at the Last Judgement. In any case, the Last Judgement is itself an event in the indeterminate future, and if life is a preparation for death and existence after death, then this world is merely a preparation for the heavenly kingdom which will come to pass after the second coming of the Messiah. The whole existence of European man is therefore one of intense expectation, an existence filled with the keen awareness of the temporal and the dependence of the future on the present. But even though life is experienced as a " vale of tears " and a " kingdom of sin," and death as a problem and not a deliverance, European man imagines that the way he organizes the present may be a guarantee and a basis for the future. Departure from this life is therefore interpreted as a mournful event, a loss. The organization of this world in the name of the future is an exclusively European occupation, and it is this that lies behind all the " progressivism " of European culture with its combination of striking individualism and—less noticeable to the superficial glance although it constitutes possibly an even more important element of European culture—the human solidarity of the remaining people who are filled with determination to " achieve liberation by their own hands " (a slogan which its borrowers have imbued with quite different shades of meaning).

HAVING completed our brief survey of three world cultures and dealt in the process with three of the subsquares in our typological field, let us go straight to the Russian funeral wake, which turns into an occasion for merry-making and a drinking binge. What does the funeral wake have to say to the deceased? That we are sorry for him—he has lost a great deal by his untimely departure, and, it must be owned, that when all is said and done, those who remain behind only stand to gain by his death. There are his colleagues who are thinking of the vacancy at work; there are his neighbours in the communal apartment who for the moment have respectfully forgotten their petty squabbles (" We're all right, but what about him, poor man! "); there are the distant acquaintances who hardly knew the deceased but are glad of any opportunity for a drink. And lastly, standing apart, in sympathetic detachment, there are the " nearest and dearest " for whom the person's death is a blow and a loss.

Where does this " most Christian " of peoples get its amazing sense of the preferability of any form of life to any death? Did not Orthodoxy instil into it the very same concepts of paradise and hell, of the resurrection of Christ and the Day of Judgement which were instilled into Western man by Catholicism? It may have tried, but the question is, did it succeed? We shall take the liberty of claiming that Russian culture completely lacks any sense of the eternal, even its most primitive form

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of ancestor-worship. For the Russian people, the vast majority of whom are essentially animists, the Christian faith has for centuries constituted the outward covering of a body of pagan beliefs, a faith in house-spirits and water-sprites, a covering which was gladly worn, but also easily shed. The experience of revolution all but shattered the illusions of Russian intellectuals and idealists as to the Christianity of the Russian people. The idea of Christ failed to take firm root in the pagan consciousness, lacking as it did a fourth, temporal dimension, and the image of the crucifixion was easily replaced by other images in the rites and ceremonial processions of a new era.

WE are making what appears at first sight to be a bold assumption: that the upper right-hand subsquare of our typological field coincides fairly accurately with the reality of Russian culture and the Russian world picture, aptly summed up by the expression, " Live as long as there's life in you," or translated into the language of our formal diagram, $\frac{-}{+}$. This assertion immediately takes us into the sphere of long-standing arguments about the religiosity or irreligiousness of the Russian people and the characteristics of Russian Orthodoxy, arguments which may be said to have begun with the polemical dispute between Gogol and Belinsky, and which continued right up to the great October Revolution (an event which one might think constituted definite empirical corroboration of the rightness of those people who had little faith in the Russian devotion to religion), arguments which have flared up again recently with redoubled force, on the pages of *Bulletin of the Russian Student Christian-Democratic Movement*.

Naturally, within the framework of this essay we cannot deal in depth or even attempt anything approaching a full treatment of all the questions connected with the problem of Russian religiosity; we believe however that our approach holds the clue to the solution of many of its riddles. The typology we suggest places us indubitably in the same camp as Belinsky and Chaadayev, who emphasized the absence of religious feeling in the Russian people. While we disagree with some of the conclusions drawn by " furious Vissarion " [Belinsky] from the national characteristics he noted (his historical optimism was refuted by the even more furious " Vissarionovich " [Stalin]), one cannot but agree nevertheless with the words he addressed to Gogol:

> According to you the Russian people is the most religious in the world: this is untrue! The basis of religiosity is piety, reverence, fear of God. But the Russian utters the name of God as he scratches his arse. He says of the icon: " If it's good, pray before it, but if it's no good, it can cover a pot." Look a little more closely and you will see that by their very nature the Russians are a profoundly atheistic people.

And:

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> Mystic exaltation is entirely absent from their nature: they have too much good sense, lucidity, and too positive a mentality for that; and perhaps it is this that contains a promise of their vastness of scale in their historical fortunes in the future.

It is clear that however many lances are broken in eloquent polemics, an answer to agonizing questions of this kind can only be obtained by a minutely detailed examination of the fate of the Christian idea on Russian soil. The first priority of such an examination must be to try to see " through the mask " and not allow oneself to be confused by outward attributes and names. Of course, many people will dispute, or even find blasphemous, the idea that the atheistically-minded European conforms more to the Christian religious outlook than the Orthodox but still heathen Russian. The contrast was put by Merezhkovsky as: " Paganism pretending to be Christianity like Tolstoy's, or Christianity masquerading as paganism, like Nietzsche's.[3] Our methodology, however, invites us not to be seduced by the letter of religious doctrines but to try to discern the influence of more primitive, " basic " cultural attitudes on ideas and concepts that sprang up in a different soil, a different cultural climate. The Christian concepts of resurrection and redemption, which arose like a ray of salvation in the gloom of Jewish global pessimism and flourished in the fertile soil of the European psychological type with his generally pessimistic disposition towards the things of this world, were turned inside out when they combined with the optimistically secular, earthly, " cheerful " pagan consciousness of the Slavs (and before them the Byzantine Greeks). The fruit of this combination was Orthodoxy, in which Christos bears as little resemblance to the Judaeo-European Christ as the plump, smiling, pot-bellied Buddha in Chinese art does to his Indian prototype. (Is not Marxism undergoing similar changes before our very eyes as it reaches Russia, China, etc.? In a few decades from now, the Chinese variant of Marxism will bear more resemblance to Confucianism and Taoism than to the European original. In order to grasp the extent to which the thinking of Soviet Marxist functionaries reproduces the stereotype of their Tsarist predecessors one has only to read a little Saltykov-Shchedrin, or the chief of the *gendarmes* himself, Baron Dubelt.)[4]

[3] D. S. Merezhkovsky, *Polnoye Sobraniye Sochinenii*, Vol. 9, p. 168. The reader will find in the essay " L. Tolstoy and Dostoevsky " a splendid and profound analysis of the religious consciousness of these giants of the Russian spirit.

[4] " . . . I shall not be there, but from the better life I shall see if you Russians are as you ought to be. Do not be infected by the madness of the West—it is a filthy cesspit from which you will pick up nothing but the stench. Do not place any faith in Western sophistries; no good will come of them for you or for anyone else. . . . Is not the beautiful youth of Russia better than the decrepit, decayed old age of Europe? For fifty years it has been seeking perfection, but has it found it? Whilst we are peaceful and happy under our good masters, who may, and sometimes do make mistakes, and so on and so on." In short, bring the style and terminology a little more up to date, put the signature of Modrzhinsky to it, and you could safely print the whole thing in *Pravda*. The quotation is taken from the journal *Golos Minuvshego* [Voice of the Past], March 1913. " Dubelt's Apologia in Defence of the Foundations of the Fatherland."

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THE life-philosophy of people in a pagan type of culture is irreligious in the sense that it lacks any prospect of eternal life and resurrection, but not, of course, in the sense of denying the existence of a god or gods. In so far as life on this earth is perceived as the greatest of blessings, life beyond the grave is either denied completely or takes the form of some arbitrary force outside human control, a master of fates and bringer of blessings in this life. Otherwise, as in Islam, life after death is depicted as a more or less exact projection of earthly blessings into heaven (the most optimistic version of this type of culture as regards attitude to life after death). Accordingly, for the pagan type, Christ is reinterpreted and merges completely with the supreme arbiter, losing his *human* godly features, and an insurmountable wall is raised between heaven and man.

Bearing this analysis out, the heresies which continually sprang up in Byzantium were all based on this same idea of Christ. Christ the saviour, the son and messenger of God, was superfluous in this world where any earthly life was better for man than any life which was not necessarily accessible. V. Solovyov points out that all the Byzantine heresies were simply variations on a single theme: " Jesus Christ is not the true son of God, consubstantial with the Father; God is not incarnate; nature and humankind are separate from the deity, are not one with it, and so the kingdom of man has every right to preserve its absolute independence and absolute supremacy." The optimistic perception of this life, characteristic of the pagan, prompts him to deny such things as redemption, unity with God, the sanctity of the material, sensory world. In the pagan world-picture, man is a finite form with no freedom, and God is infinite freedom with no form. God and man were assigned to two opposite poles of being with no connexion between them.[5] As a result, by the mid-ninth century a situation had arisen in Byzantium, whereby " emperors accepted Orthodoxy once and for all as an abstract dogma, while Orthodox hierarchs gave their blessing for all time to the paganism of community life. . . . The sham Orthodoxy of Byzantium was in fact no more than heresy driven inwards." [6]

An interesting consequence of this separation of the earthly and the divine is exaggerated asceticism, at least in one section of the pagan community. Asceticism is, at it were, a reverse side of the idea that this world is the best of all worlds, the reaction of a section of the people of this world, those with religious sensibilities, to the unrestrained licentiousness of the flesh and man's riotous enjoyment of earthly pleasures. A person with a religious " ear " comes to feel an acute loathing for everything earthly, sinful, corporeal, if he is surrounded by people for whom the earthly and the corporeal are all that matter. Under these materialistic conditions, in place of Christianity with its lenient attitude towards man's sinfulness (man is a fallen angel, but an angel all the same), there arises

[5] V. Solovyov, *Rossiya i vselensskaya tserkov* (Moscow, 1911), pp. 21–25.
[6] Ibid.

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Monophysitism (the belief in the singular character of Christ) with its "petrified numbness" to the divinity of man. Monophysite ascetisism sees in man simply an "evil, unclean animal who must be destroyed or tormented in order to change him into an angel." "It regards the world as a trap for man, from which he must at all costs escape." [7] It is precisely this revlusion for the world, this denial of its temptations which lies at the root of pagan piety—from the *stolpniki* (hermits) and eunuchs to Leo Tolstoy. (This rebellion against the earthly, optimistic passions of one's fellows is somewhat akin to the revolt in the opposite direction by European athesists (e.g. men of the Renaissance, Nietzsche) against the basic pessimism and organic asceticism of their cultural environment.) [8] The Christian nature of this pagan piety is illusory, however; although outwardly Christian, in fact it "leads to enslavement by this world and the service of all the masters of this world, to obedient consent to entrust the world to the prince of this world." [9] The pagan environment regards its saints and monks with a mixture of respect (as protectors before God and bringers of blessings) and pity—the functions of monastery and prison here easily combine in so far as both the monk and the prisoner appear to the pagan as simply "people who have lost, left or retired from the game."

ONE of the purest forms of the optimistically earthly culture is that of Islam. "Islam is consistent, candid Byzantium freed from all its internal contradictions. It is the total and open reaction of the oriental spirit against Christianity; it is a system in which dogma is closely bound up with the laws of life, in which individual belief is in complete harmony with the political and social system." [10] It is Islam which most clearly embodies an awareness of the gulf betwen the earthly and the divine, and which regards the earthly as all that is given to man, and God as the power controlling what is given, and demanding blind obedience from man.

To the Islamic soul the world appears as an unshakeable stronghold, against which no question of its progress, moral perfectibility and so on can be raised. "The ideal is simplified to an extent which guarantees its swift realization. Muslim society could have no other purpose than to expand its material power and enjoy its earthly blessings. To spread Islam by force of arms and to rule over the true believers with unlimited power and in accordance with the rules of elementary justice laid down by the Koran—that was the sum total of the mission of the Muslim state." [11]

[7] See A. Rudnev, "Usloviye dialoga" in *Vestnik Russkogo Studencheskogo Khristianskogo dvizheniya*, No. 106, IV, 1972.
[8] See the comparative analysis of the views of Nietzsche and Tolstoy in Merezhkovsky, op. cit.
[9] A. Rudnev, op. cit.
[10] Solovyov, op cit. p. 49.
[11] Ibid.

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RUSSIA inherited its Orthodoxy from Byzantium in a ready-made, dead, dogmatic form.[12] The preachers of Christianity, the first monks and clergy, were naturally representatives of the " pagan piety " described above. Their arrival in a high-spirited land of princely feasts, of jesters and folk-minstrels, of fist-fights and mass drunkenness, could not fail to provoke some severe conflicts; but even here, at the very beginning, the seeds had been planted for the entire course of the Russian Church's future degeneration into a semi-state-institution in the service of the prince of this world. The way for the degeneration in the Slavonic, " earthly minded " climate had already been paved by the Byzantine history of Christianity. Here too was the beginning of the future schism, the division of the country into the advocates of the optimistically patriotic idea of Russia as the Third Rome or the Second Israel (or the liberator of the workers of the world), and the bearers of " Orthodox asceticism " who refused to regard the existing debauchery as the best order of things. Official optimism and the belief that " a synthesis of unity and freedom and love " had already been offered and achieved in the Russian church and was not an ideal which had to be approached by way of innumerable obstacles and difficulties, became virtually the main distinguishing features of Russian Orthodoxy. The Orthodox Church in Russia became a state institution, a " kingdom of this world," and by doing so " repudiated itself and its own *raison d'être* and condemned itself to lifelessness and sterility." [13] It could hardly have happened otherwise in a culture so lacking in awareness of life beyond death and whose every instinct affirmed the earthly, the here-and-now.

" What do you mean? " the reader will exclaim in amazement. " Haven't the finest and most subtle minds in Russia, Dostoyevsky for example, always proclaimed that the Russians are a God-bearing people? " It must be admitted that I have heard assertions of the kind, and was secretly troubled in my soul. However a closer reading of Dostoyevsky has swept away all doubts. More than that, it has strengthened my conviction that the Russians are a God-bearing, but not a Christ-bearing people, that the principal idea of Russian Orthodoxy is faith in a national God of its own to sanctify the Russians' national idiosyncrasy and isolation. It is faith in a God who is the standard-bearer of victories and in a Church which is the organizer and inspirer of those victories. " The Russian people are the very essence of Orthodoxy," Dostoyevsky noted in the diary he kept during the last days of his life. This singularly vague formula is expressed much more clearly by Shatov, a hero of *The Possessed* and the chief mouthpiece for

[12] The direct continuity and " inner affinity between the Byzantine essence and the Slavonic spirit " was analysed in detail by H. Rückert, *Lehrbuch der weltgeschichte in organischer Dorstellung*, II Band (Leipzig, 1857). He wrote that the enlistment of the achievements of Western culture by Peter the Great " as a means to a definite end, as tools of state power," and his methods, " serve as evidence that Western culture will never find a true home here."

[13] I. S. Aksakov, *Polnoye Sobraniye Sochinenii*, Vol. 4, p. 193.

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Dostoyevsky's idea about the God-bearing people: "A nation is a nation," says Shatov, "only so long as it has its own particular God and excludes all other gods as irreconcilable; so long as it believes that with the help of its God it will conquer and banish from this world all other gods." It is hard to disagree that in respect of this optimistic, life-affirming sense of its own superiority the Russians have always been a God-bearing people. But one has also to agree with Merezhkovsky, who sees nothing Christian in this idea and even suspects that it conceals a hidden atheism, for it is not God who is here creating man, but man creating God (as Nietzsche writes: "In God a people honours its own virtues. It thanks itself for itself—that is why a people needs a God"). As Merezhkovsky quite rightly emphasizes, it is not Orthodoxy which becomes the chief characteristic of the Russians, but Russian-ness itself which is an essential and sufficient condition of Orthodoxy; Russian means Orthodox, correct. Through the mist of Dostoyevsky's formula we can clearly see the outlines of the insurmountable crag of Russian national pride, and if we substitute more modern terminology we get the formula: "The Soviet people is the bearer of the most progressive doctrine in the world; this progressive doctrine is guaranteed by the Party, and the Party is the vanguard leading the way to the shining summits."

THUS the cardinal difference between the European and the Russian outlook, is that one has a pessimistic and the other an optimistic attitude towards existence on this earth. This basic distinction, which goes far deeper and is far harder to eradicate than any of the doctrines and nuances of religious dogma, has a decisive effect on the fate of original and borrowed symbols of faith, institutions, ideas and ideals. In taking them over, each culture transforms them into something which corresponds with its own primordial spirit. One can discern this effect in literally any manifestation of the national spirit, but that is a task beyond the scope of the present essay. We shall therefore confine ourselves to an example from the sphere of religious architecture, which is a splendid illustration of our theories on the basic difference between European and Russian culture.

> As he enters under the mighty arches of Western cathedrals, the Christian is conscious of belonging to a *sinful, fallen world*, but at the same time he hears *the call to the untiring struggle for his freedom* and is given a *glimpse of paradise* through the slitted windows with their miraculous stained glass enticing the gaze upward to lofty heights.
>
> Russian church architecture with its vivid colours, its golden and green cupolas crowned with triumphant crosses, is inspired by the *opposite* theological idea.
>
> The Orthodox Christian *does not aspire to subjugate nature*, to force it to transcend its limits; on the contrary, he calls lovingly upon the Holy Spirit to *descend to the maternal flesh of earth, to sanctify* and transform it. In the place where the Eucharist is

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performed, where believers meet together as a single family with their children and babes-in-arms, *the earth blazes with the colours of the heavenly kingdom*, everything inside the cathedral is filled with light and joy and heaven comes down to earth.[14]

PROCEEDING formally from our typology of cultures, we can obtain a series of supplementary characteristics of the cultures described, and they are fundamental enough to have a decisive effect on many derivative phenomena and attitudes.

Theorem I. A pessimistic attitude towards the " earthly " is a condition of interest in the " unearthly," the " other world," the " unknown," the " alien " and vice versa. This assertion is based not only on the logic of common sense but also on far profounder philosophical generalizations which long ago detected a very close link between aspiration towards truth and a pessimistic attitude towards life. Socrates was the " first of the decadents " inasmuch as it was he who first had the feeling not simply of the tragic element in existence but of despair in the face of life. He was also the first to conceive the notion of truth.[15] Plato pointed out to Socrates at the beginning of *Phaedon* that he who aspires to the truth secretly wishes for death, and that truth destroys life. But it was probably Nietzsche who most convincingly revealed this connexion between the search for truth and the denial of life, who wrote of science as the subordination of life to truth, as " a monstrous act," and as " fanaticism for the other world." He rightly regarded striving after truth as a rejection of the temporal in favour of the eternal, of the existent in favour of the abstract, as the undermining of the " free joy of life." In his opinion science had erected, on the ruins of the religion it destroyed, the very same cult of the eternal, i.e. the very same hatred of life.

Hostility towards " abstractions " is a typical feature of Russian writers of conservative persuasion—Grigoriev, Leontiev, Samarin, I. Aksakov and Katkov. All of them extol life, contrasting it with what they perceive as the dead schemata of science. The hero of one of Grigoriev's novels is intentionally called Vitalii—alive, living. Leontiev stressed the supremacy of the arbitrary, the distinctive, the colourful, as opposed to abstract theories.

The pagan Islamic outlook revels in the earthly and sees the other world simply as an absolute force turned upon the earth which " bows down naturally even on this earth only before a manifestation of external force, before the crude fact, without requiring any inner, ideal justification of it. Hence the indifference to truth, the respect for any skilful and successful lie which has always been a notable character-

[14] N. Zernov, Anglikanstvo i Pravoslaviye in *Vestnik Russkogo Studencheskogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniya*, No. 106, IV, 1972, p. 58. Author's emphases.

[15] " The idea of truth was nothing but a consolatory illusion with the aid of which Socrates strove to overcome our confusion in the face of the tragedy of finiteness of being." N. Grimaldi, *Alienation et Liberté* (Paris, 1972), p. 83.

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istic of the Eastern half of mankind, with the exception of the Jews." [16] This outlook is the basis for religious systems of the Islamic type, and Solovyov repeatedly demonstrated that Russian psuedo-Christianity is akin to Islam, except that God has frequently been supplanted by the state or the Tsar.

AND so, in accordance with our theorem, cultures may be divided into those which are open to the unknown and the alien and recognize the value of truth (Indian and European) and those which are closed to the unknown and alien and do not recognize the value of truth (Russian, Chinese).

Theorem II. A pessimistic attitude towards death is a condition of heightened activity in this world. This theorem is so obvious that it hardly requires substantiation. One is unlikely to find people who anticipate with certitude passing into another and better world and who regard their earthly existence as a more or less accidental episode in the face of eternity showing any great concern with making changes in this world. Hence the activity of European and Russian culture and the passivity of the Indian and the Chinese.

A cross-combination of the characteristics obtained gives a more precise definition of the orientation of a culture towards the alien and unknown. Thus in the case of European culture active interest appears as a "cognitive-scientific orientation"; the passive interest of Indians may be characterized as a "contemplative" orientation; the Russians' active absence of interest takes the form of "hostility," of vigorous "xenophobia," while Chinese culture is typified by a passive absence of interest, or "arrogance."

TAKING yet another look at our typological field, we may note the existence of diametrically or "diagonally" opposed cultures. Chinese culture occupies such a position with respect to European culture, and Indian with respect to Russian. Amusingly—and inexplicably—the position of the cultures in our analytical square is in striking coincidence with their actual geographical situation. More seriously, however, another peculiarity, at first sight purely formal, attracts the attention by the kinship it reveals between cultures situated in diametrical opposition, and that is, whether the formulae describing them contain only minus signs or only plus signs, or a mixture of both. We shall call this opposition a potential difference. Thus we obtain two cultures in which a potential difference is present (Russian $\frac{-}{+}$ and Indian $\frac{+}{-}$), and two in which it is absent (European $\frac{-}{-}$ and Chinese $\frac{+}{+}$). In trying to make some coherent sense of this formal description we have become convinced that it is

[16] Solovyov, op. cit.

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in some complex way connected with what the American sociologist Talcott Parsons calls " achievement orientation " (the second pair) and " ascriptive orientation " (the first pair).

Theorem III. Cultures in which a potential difference is present are characterized by an ascriptive orientation; in those where potential difference is absent an achievement orientation predominates. This theorem is the most difficult so far to substantiate rationally. Let us, however, try to support it by way of a heuristic metaphor and then by a few empirical illustrations. Metaphysically, a culture in which " potential difference " is absent may be imagined as an uncharged field in which, accordingly, there is no uni-directional flow of particles, i.e. no current. A culture, on the other hand, which is characterized by potential difference appears as a charged field in which the particles flow in a certain direction. If we endow these particles with the property of motion towards one another, then in the first case each of the particles, having no advance knowledge of the vector of movement of adjacent particles, will evaluate them first and foremost from the standpoint of where they are moving to, i.e. the standpoint of action or achievement. In the second case, if the direction of movement is fixed, it is the place of a particle in a formation which becomes the decisive factor in orientation, i.e. the relative position of the particles in a hierarchy, a caste system or any other order of classification.

The notion of potential difference also suggests the possibility of using measurement procedures, that is, of considering our formulae not simply as qualitative evaluations but also as valid formulae in which plus and minus can have various different quantitative values. The derivative characteristics we spoke of earlier would alter in accordance with these values.

Let us consider, for instance, the Judaeo-European type of culture. The value of the minus in the " numerator " of the fraction fluctuates from a maximum in the case of Judaism to a minimum in the Roman Catholic version of Christianity (but the minus remains a minus, i.e. even the Catholic outlook is characterized as pessimistic). If we assume the " denominator " as constant (negative), an increase in the value of the numerator must lead to a reduction in potential difference and an increase in activity. Empirically this is corroborated by a comparison between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. The more pessimistic Protestant culture has also shown itself more active, more achievement- and less hierarchically oriented than Catholicism. The materialism in European culture signifies a more doubtful attitude to the idea of salvation in the next world, and even complete denial of the possibility, which leads to the hyper-activity and hyper-achievement-orientation of the Jewish model (with all the fluid social consequences this entails) or is often compensated for by a rise in optimism in the lower part of the fraction (scientistic optimism, progressivism).

In Russian culture, reduction in potential difference takes place either

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at the expense of an increase in religiosity, in the sense of belief in life beyond the grave, or at the expense of a more pessimistic appraisal of the present. In the first case an increase in achievement orientation is accompanied by a reduction in activity (movement in the direction of the Islamic outlook and, taken further, to the Chinese, although in principle the Russian and Chinese cultures are not "convergent," since however much the value of the minus in the numerator of the Russian fraction alters, it does not become a plus, as it does in China). In the second case a rise in achievement orientation is accompanied by increased openness to the alien and the unfamiliar. Russian Old Belief and sectarianism can be viewed in the light of these two possibilities. In any event our analysis does not conflict with Russian historical reality: representatives of the schism and many of the millenarian sects were always the soberest, hardest-working, commercially most active, and most literate section of the peasantry, the "representatives of intelligence and the civic spirit among the common people in Russia." [17] On the contrary, materialism maximizes and strains to their limits the features which correspond to the extreme values of both components of the formula: activeness, xenophobia, and ascriptivity.[18]

THE peculiarities of Russian culture noted earlier provide the formal basis for a systematic description of that culture, although naturally the abstract schema we are using can never claim to embrace the whole compass of empirical reality with all its richness and contradictoriness. All it can do is provide a "visual angle," a way of constructing some sort of "geometry of attitudes" which, although it may not enable us to explain the *entire* history of the Russian nation or to predict the *entire* future development of Russian culture, will at least help us to understand something about the historical fate of Russia and the particular features of its social structure. If we are to go into the subject in any more detail we shall naturally need to elaborate the formulae we have obtained in far greater detail, and to study the mechanisms whereby cultures exert an influence upon one another and even cause cultural formulae to change (the most interesting examples in this respect apparently being Japan, and the conversion of ancient Europe from paganism to Christianity). We shall also have to try and discover sources of initial optimism or pessimism in particular features of early upbringing and relationship within the family. All these lines of investigation were suggested by the methodology we have chosen.

For the moment we shall try to pinpoint a few more consequences which follow from the basic formula for the Russian outlook. The first

[17] V. Andreyev, *Raskol i ego znacheniye v narodnoi russkoi istorii*, St. Petersburg, 1870.

[18] Ascriptivity here assumes a peculiar form masked by an outward mobility. Under cover of this mobility it is membership orientations which dominate (party membership, titles, diplomas and performance in questionnaires play a far more important role than real achievements and actions in determining a person's position in society).

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feature of the Russian national character, and one which is rooted in the here-and-now, earthly outlook of the Russians, may be termed their responsiveness. Let us illustrate what we mean.

A certain individual has been fairly punished by judicial measures, but a newspaper points out that it was unfair that he was not also punished by administrative and party measures and by his comrades. By the logic of things a fair punishment repeated three times is no longer a fair but an excessive punishment. But the logic of things is one thing and the logic of people quite another.

The logic of the Russians is a high degree of responsiveness, a disproportionate reaction to what they perceive at a given moment, at the present time; this is a well-known fact. Like any mental idiosyncrasy, a high degree of responsiveness is neither a good nor a bad thing but becomes one or the other according to the circumstances. It shows itself in blind rage and heightened aggression in response to a small annoyance (lack of restraint, boorishness),[19] and in the Russians' famous generosity and hospitality and their eagerness to please and be liked immediately. "A soul of many colours! At one moment he's a sheer brute, at another he frets, feels miserable, dissolves into tenderness and weeps over himself . . ." (I. A. Bunin).

Dostoyevsky, in his *Diary of a Writer* gives a typical example. A peasant flogs his horse to death because it refuses to pull (an example of extreme responsiveness common the world over). When the deed is done the peasant is utterly dismayed at the success of his enterprise: he had *expected* that he would have checked himself. A high degree of responsiveness can thus sometimes be destructive, and checking oneself then becomes a means of escape and a protective and stablizing influence. That is why the generous soul needs to be able to restrain itself; justice is the product only of both generosity and restraint. (And acts of self-restraint for their part need the generosity which conceals them.)

No Russian, then, is really interested in any "progress" of justice. It is fair to prevent an injustice, but it is wrong to fight for justice.

"The thing most beloved of us all, our most fatal characteristic is that we say one thing and do another!" (I. A. Bunin). But if you treat me unfairly, then by the reverse token I'll be dishonest with you—there is nothing surprising or fatal about that.

DISPARITY between word and deed entails a definite and non-utilitarian attitude, i.e. an aesthetic, the aesthetic of the lie. When perception is based on aesthetics and not interest, no misunderstandings arise: the lie does not grow into a deception. Deception always involves two people: it is not enough to have one to tell the lie, you need another

[19] It is said that some American sociologists conducted an experiment in a number of countries and charged specially instructed tourists to record the reactions of passers-by to pushes, shoves, accidental collisions, etc. The results of the experiment showed the Russian public to be the most aggressive.

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to believe it. This is why the aesthetic of the lie develops in a situation where "nobody believes anybody else." (We may remark that in this situation deception of quite another kind is also possible: when one person speaks the truth and the other refuses to believe him). (We must also point out that this aesthetic is not rooted in any special art: "one can even lie sincerely." (Dostoyevsky.) There exists no art of lying, the lie is artless; what does exist is the art of deception.)

Bearing in mind this particular characteristic one can even claim that in a way Russian society is freer and more humane than any other society in the world. There flourishes here an unparalleled freedom from responsibilities; nowhere else are there as many opportunities for shirking work, stealing from the state, substituting words for deeds and not taking words for deeds as there are in Russia. Society demands little of man, and man demands little of himself (freedom from conscience). All know that they are deceiving one another, and no one is aroused to indignation by this,[20] for truth, *pravda*, as understood in Russian has nothing in common with abstract truth, *istina*. It is the truth of immediate advantage, the pragmatic truth of the moment. In such an atmosphere a man really does breathe freely if he has not been infected with prejudices from different cultures, and the Russian will not exchange his own special freedom for any freedoms of expression (which he does not value), or any legal guarantees (in which he does not believe).[21]

By virtue of (and in proportion to) his aesthetic attitude to the world the Russian mind is more than open; it is a public thoroughfare. All ideas are guests, to be received and sent away in peace or with a kick in the pants. But lodgers are not proprietors, and Russian minds are in essence always free, or sometimes just vacant.

IT is the changeableness from one moment to the next that is the source the cheerful unconcern and extravagence in the Russian character which is so atractive when experienced in direct personal contact and is often cited in contrast to the coldness of Europeans, but which at the same time can become an inability to plan, see ahead and take thought for the morrow. There is probably no other country in Europe where you will come across a drunkard who steals an expensive fur coat worth a thousand rubles and promptly sells it outside the shop for three rubles so he can go and buy a bottle of vodka. Such an incident—and it is typical—did in fact happen in Lenigrad in 1969.

20 "The management pretends it's paying us and we pretend we're working."

21 Tolstoy caught this Russian national characteristic brilliantly in his portrayal of Lavrushka, the valet in Napoleon's serivce. Merezhkovsky analyses him thus: "Lavrushka was one of those rude, insolent servants who know a thing or two about the world and feel it their duty to be vile and cunning in everything they do. . . . An *unconscious Russian nihilist*, Lavrushka, on the strength of his *inner freedom* [from conscience—L.R.] and his contempt for people, even feels a certain moral and intellectual superiority over Napoleon: in a conversation with him about war and politics he lectures him, leads him by the nose and, all the while pretending to be a fool, he fools the man by whom all the cleverest minds in Europe have been fooled." Author's emphasis.

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ANOTHER quality in the Russian make-up which follows from our formula is a sense of hopelessness. The die is cast. There is no escape. We only live once. Here and now is better than there and later. All these phrases are different expressions of the Russians' instinctive certitude that there is nothing on "the other side." This hopelessness is akin to the despair inherent in the relationships linking players in a game of chance. Let us take a close look at those relationships. Either the conditions of the game impose certain sanctions upon all the players and no one may leave his table, or an interminable succession of tables, until the game is over, or the psychology of the gambler prevents him from leaving the game even if he has won a fabulous sum and the more so if he has been losing and is trying to recoup his losses. In short, all game-of-chance relationships, if they continue for any length of time, are based on the formula: "leaver loses, remaining person gains." This is the same formula which lies at the basis of the irreligious, of the despairing reality of relationships in Russian society, where nobody will let you leave the game before the end and nothing is condemned so much as departure, emigration, suicide, divorce; and in any case you would be unwilling to leave the game of your own accord for fear of finding yourself somewhere worse and not being allowed back to the "table." And death? Involuntary death is total defeat for you; you have, as the saying goes, lost lock, stock and barrel, leaving all you had for others.

The despairing outlook of the Russians thus causes the attitude of the first type to alter, turning them into gamblers with all the characteristic features of the gambler's mentality. It was no accident, and not merely because he was himself a gambler, that Dostoyevsky decided to take a look at Russian reality through the windows of the casino at Karlsbad. A reliance on luck, chance, coincidence, the ability to take a risk and the inability to work, are all typical features of the gambling mentality, as Dostoyevsky has shown on many occasions. "We don't like having to make an effort, we aren't used to moving one step at a time; we prefer to leap straight to our goal with a single stride or hit the bull's eye first time. . . ." [22] Trusting to fortune, luck, success, makes Russians amazingly un-independent and irresponsible, and accustoms them to expect somebody, whether God, the state, or any other somebody, to take care of them and do their worrying for them, as well as to decide and give orders for them:

> Oh, how boring it is to sit idle in a carriage; well, it's just as identically boring to live in this Russia of ours with nothing of one's own to do. Though they drive you about and take care of you and sometimes even lull you into such a stupor that you might think there was nothing more at all to do, you still feel such a terrible

[22] Dostoyevsky, *Polnoye Sobraniye Sochinenii*, Vol 5, p. 62. The Americans tell a joke which sums up their observations on the behaviour of immigrants arriving in their country. The joke goes that when a German arrives he starts saving money, when a Frenchman arrives he tries to invent something and get rich quick, but when a Russian arrives he searches for a wallet in the street.

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> melancholy, and it's precisely because you are not doing anything yourself, because you are being taken too much care of, and all you have to do is sit and wait to be taken somewhere else. . . .[23]

A throng of many millions of people massed around the roulette wheel of history, winning and then immediately throwing away all they have won, waits expectantly for the moment when manna from heaven will rain down upon their heads and they will no longer have to do any work at all but simply open their mouths. Fate is most commonly personified in the all-powerful authorities to whom all responsibility and all initiative are transferred for the present but who will later be blamed in mutinous accusations for the non-advent of paradise on earth, for defeats, for famines, for lagging behind " the Germans." But the poor authorities—the very flesh of the flesh of that throng—have no idea of how to think ahead; they are experts in lavish spending and sailing close to the wind, but working or saving money—no. So it is difficult for them to supply everything their trustful dependents expect of them; tired of caring for these orphans they begin seizing their chances and thinking first of filling their own bellies, just as irresponsibly as do their wards, leaving events to take their " historical course." Is it not by virtue of this universal lack of responsibility and initiative that the Russian is so ideally adapted to life in the army or the prison camp? Voluntary servitude is as natural a condition for the ordinary Russian as a life of complacent idleness and plenty was for the Russian *grand seigneur*.

Russian society has always been divided into the benefactors—" fathers "—and the beneficiaries—" children." The fathers are the embodiment of popular notions about the sources of universal happiness, those who know the secret of how to achieve victories, greatness, and riches. Tsar, gentleman landowner, general—and regional party secretary—are all different images of " authorized benefactors." For them, all is permitted. *They are fate.* You can grumble at fate but it is foolish to criticize it or set your own will against it; nor can fate be taught or prompted. Finally, you can of course rise up against fate, only to entrust yourself to a different fate in a different guise. But nothing sickens the Russian so much as seeing his neighbour actively making good, and with prospects for the future. At this the Russian spirit rises in rebellion, even if it is the genial spirit of a Dostoyevsky, and there begins the persecution of the bourgeois or the kulak or the Jew, anyone who shows circumspection, calculation, individualism.

THE Russian opposes all of this not with just anything but with *brotherhood*, which is " absent in the French nature and in the Western nature as a whole " but which Russians, apparently, have more than enough of.

On the subject of brotherhood, it is true, Russian thinkers were never

[23] Dostoyevsky, op. cit. p. 52.

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unanimous. Vladimir Solovyov, who was on the whole kindly disposed towards his own people, remarked nevertheless that " voluntarily doing good for our fellow-citizens is rather like squaring the circle. . . ." But what permanent ingredient in the Russian social make-up could have engendered the ideal of brotherhood and made that ideal the very backbone of the national character? This " in spite of the age-old sufferings of the nation, in spite of the barbaric ingrained crudeness and ignorance of the nation, in spite of the centuries of slavery and the invasions by foreign races." (Dostoyevsky.) [24]

Firstly, the responsiveness and generosity of soul which we discussed earlier and which are rooted in the immediacy and earthliness of the Russian outlook. Then there is fear of being left out of the game. The " typical " Russian cannot bear solitude. He seeks to live cheek by jowl, gregariously, " corporately," continually looking round at his neighbours (" I must do as other people do "),[25] at the same time suspecting them of being interested in one thing only—cleaning him out, stripping him naked and throwing him out. The lives of Solovyov's and Dostoyevsky's fellow citizens are spent in daily elbowing and fighting their way on to buses or for a place at the cooking-stove or at the counter, and so on. In critical periods of history (Ivan the Terrible, Stalin) this crush takes the extreme form of fratricide; at other times it makes for the usual " game of dice " atmosphere. A society of this kind might be thought to be doomed to rapid disintegration. But it is its very hopelessness, in the sense in which we earlier described it, which gives it the stability that so strikes every inside observer of the small but exhausting " war of each against all " and expects the end to come at any moment and society to cease its existence. The centripetal force of the roulette wheel turns out to be no bad source of integration. Just hang on, wait for your chance, have patience, don't trust your neighbour, and, most important of all, don't imagine that things might be better somewhere else: it's even worse beyond the grave or across the frontier—the ironical " the best place is where we're not."

This hopelessness and their optimistic attitude to their situation in this world are also explanations of the mystery of the Russians' fatalism, although at first sight, lack of faith in existence beyond the grave ought merely to beget a fear of death and the desire to cling on to life. This peculiarity of the atheistic consciousness is noted by, among others, Bonhoeffer,[26] who writes: " Where death is the end, fear of death is accompanied by scorn for it. Where death is the end, life on earth is either all or nothing. The other side of an arrogant belief in the permanence of the earthly is the frivolous treatment of life. Compulsively clutching at life and immersing oneself in it go hand in hand with

[24] V. Solovyov, *Letters* (Moscow, 1923), p. 54, letter to M. Stasyulevich.

[25] " Better to be at the back of the herd and in it than to drop behind and become an orphan."

[26] See E. Bethge, ed. *Ethics*, 1955.

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indifference and contempt for life." This indifference and contempt have played an important role in the sphere of Russian military prowess. They are best portrayed by Bunin in his story *Blue Birds of Paradise* in which he makes the subtle observation that the fatalistic Russian expression, "you can't have two deaths and you can't escape one," springs not from faith in God, heaven, and so forth, but from an utterly pagan and almost vegetable attachment to life: "There are all sorts of birds and beasts, brother, but they don't think about heaven, and they aren't afraid of freezing to death."

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Paying for the Party*

Robert H. McNeal

ONE of the rituals of congresses of the CPSU is the simultaneous "discussion" of the report of the chairman of the Central Revision Commission and the principal report of the General Secretary. In most respects this singular honour is hollow. The report of the chairman of the Central Revision Commission (hereafter CRC) is relatively short (something over 3,000 words at the 25th Party congress); it is rarely if ever mentioned by speakers in the "discussion" of the General Secretary's report, despite the bracketing of the two in official accounts of congresses; and the chairman of the CRC is consistently a grey and unimposing political figure.

Since 1966 it has been G. F. Sizov, whose background makes it clear that the title of Chairman of the CRC does not make him the real treasurer of the Party. Indications are that the "Administration of Affairs" section of the Central Committee apparatus handles the real responsibility, no doubt under Brezhnev's supervision, for money is to some extent power in any political system. Sizov, who was born in 1903, was an agronomist until the second world war, after which he embarked on a successful career in party administration, attaining the rank of *oblast* First Secretary and membership in the Central Committee. For a time he was a member of the budget committee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, which seems to have introduced him to the field of fiscal management. Sizov dropped out of the Central Committee when he took charge of the CRC in 1966, for there appears to be an unwritten rule that one cannot serve concurrently in both bodies.

But, with all its limitations, the report of the Chairman of the CRC does deserve some attention as a symbol of an important question in the affairs of the CPSU—its finances. Somehow this matter has been neglected in Western studies, partly because information on it is scant, partly because of uncritical acceptance of the impression projected by the Party that it covers its own expenses.

This is an important, implicit part of the myth of the Party as a voluntary association, which is probably associated with a tacit assumption that money, even if necessary at the present stage of communist construction, somehow lacks moral loftiness and should be disassociated from the image of the Party. In recent years there has been a substantial increase in corruption involving money (or awareness of this problem) in the USSR and it is surely vital to the Party to attempt to keep its name free of such scandal. One of the very few novelties in Sizov's CRC report to the 25th congress seemed to be a delicate allusion to this,

* The author is indebted to Jerry Hough, Mervyn Matthews and Boris Shragin for sharing with him their thoughts on this problem.

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perhaps even an implicit acknowledgment of some allegations touching the central authorities. For the first time in the history of CRC reports, the chairman found it desirable to state that his body had made an audit of the accounts of the Central Committee, and that "As a result of this audit no violations in the conduct of fiscal operations were ascertained." [1]

Even assuming the validity of such an assertion of purity (though one doubts the capability of any agency to make a truly independent audit of the Central Committee), the fact remains that the Party does not live by ideals alone. It also requires bread. In its early history this reality was painfully clear, and western scholars have learned quite a lot about Lenin's tribulations in obtaining revenue from the most diverse sources. Once in power, the nature of the problem changed fundamentally. The resources of a vast empire became at least potentially available to the Party, and since 1917, through all the vicissitudes of the national economy, there has never been any sign that the CPSU was suffering from a fiscal squeeze. Just how this satisfactory state of affairs has been achieved is unclear. Only in 1926 did the Party establish a centralized or unified budget with a single treasury for all its organizations. Since that time, chairmen of the CRC have repeatedly asserted that (as Sizov recently phrased it) "the budget was observed with an excess of revenue over expenses."

WHAT does this mean? Despite the absence of anything resembling a full public audit, there are fragments of official information available that make it possible to consider the plausibility of the Party's claim to solvency.

First, CRC reports give rough data on the share of revenue from each of the two sources of Party revenue in recent years: dues and publishing. It appears that income from publishing means profit, and the present investigator will therefore bypass the complicated questions of sales and expenses that pertain to this industry.[2] Since the beginning of the sixties the balance between revenue from dues and publishing has been quite steady, with dues constituting about two-thirds and publishing the remainder. True, the Party Rules refer to "other" sources of revenue, but this was reported as only 3 per cent in 1952, declining to ·5 per cent in the 1961 report. Subsequent CRC reports indicate that "other" revenue is no longer a factor.

Second, CRC reports since 1952 have included data on the growth

[1] The most recent CRC report appeared in *Pravda*, 26 Feb. 1976. The reports for congresses 19–24 appear in the series *Current Soviet Policies*, I-VI, in English translation. The first CRC report that dealt significantly with finance was delivered in 1930 at the 16th Party congress.

[2] That the publishing enterprises run at a profit was implied in the CRC report to 20th Party congress, at which it was lamented that 43 out of 100 local Party newspapers in the RSFSR required a subsidy. At the 22nd Party congress the CRC report implied that "income" from publishing meant profit. It noted that this had been increased, partly by cutting administrative costs. If gross revenue had been the point, a reduction in these costs would have been irrelevant.

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rate of Party revenue. This can be compared with the growth rate of Party membership and of the income of workers and employees, who represent the overwhelming majority of Party members. Figures available for 1961–70 show a rise in total membership and personal income sufficient to explain the rise in Party revenues (bearing in mind that in this period revenue from membership dues has been a fairly steady proportion of all revenue). However, the recent five-year period presents serious difficulties. While Party revenue increased by "more than 50 per cent" according to Sizov, Party membership increased by less than 8 per cent according to Brezhnev and worker/employee income increased by 20 per cent according to Kosygin. The declining rate of recruitment of new members affects not only the total dues-paying population, but also the revenue from entry dues, a once-only assessment of 2 per cent of one month's income. (It never formed a large part of Party revenue but it was higher in the early sixties than the early seventies.)

TABLE I

Growth of Party revenue, membership and personal income of workers and employees (party and nonparty)

	Growth of Party Revenue (%)	*Growth of Party Membership* (%)	*Growth of Personal Income of Workers and Employees* (%)
1961–65	32	27	c. 15 [a]
1966–70	39·4	17	26
1971–76	Over 50	8	20

[a] Adapted from 1959–65 figure.

How can this be, assuming that revenue from dues is based on the income of Party members? Three possible answers are: (1) the average income of Party members increased much more rapidly than the national average; (2) the increase in Party members' income pushed many of them into high brackets on the progressive dues rate table; (3) efficiency in dues collection increased markedly. The trouble is that there is no evidence that any of these variables underwent any major change in the last few years. They should have been operating more or less as forcefully in the 1960s when they would have reinforced a higher rate of membership increase and a higher rate of personal income increase. But in fact CRC reports show a significantly *lower* growth rate for revenue in the 1960s than in 1970–75. The discrepancies in this area are serious enough to raise questions about the credibility of the thesis that the Party pays for itself.

Another area on which there is some solid information is the process of dues collection, which is discussed in the CRC report and various open publications. Party dues are a kind of progressive income tax. On the lower levels it is rather sharply progressive. A member earning 101–150 rubles per month (R/mo) pays at a rate that is twice as high

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as a member who earns 51–100 R/mo. On the other hand, the progressive character of the scale tops off at 3 per cent of earnings for any income over 300 R/mo.[3]

The present rate table for dues has been in effect since 1952, when a substantial reduction in dues obligations was enacted. While the over-300 R/mo bracket was not changed, a reduction of ·5 per cent was applied to the lower levels. Thus a member earning 51–100 R/mo had to pay 1 per cent until 1952, but only half that much thereafter. This change represented only a paltry sum *per capita* but a substantial change in the aggregate revenue that the Party could expect from many of its members, and once again one wonders how they balanced the budget. The CRC report of 1956 admitted that there had been a reduction in revenue from dues (85 per cent of all revenue in 1952, 73 per cent in 1955), but implied that this had somehow been offset by gains elsewhere in the budget.

The few lines that the Party Rules devote to dues are plainly an inadequate guide for the low-level officials who have to run the system. For their benefit there is a more detailed " Instruction on the Membership Dues of Members and Candidates of the Party." [4] This document contains examples of five forms that every primary Party organization is supposed to prepare in connexion with dues: a roster of members, showing their earnings and dues for each month; a receipt to be signed by the State Bank branch that receives the dues collected by a primary Party organization; and summary statements of the primary organization of its dues collection for each month, quarter and year. These demonstrate that no primary organization is permitted to keep for its own expenses any of the revenue it collects and that the revenues from dues reach the central Party authorities through the State Bank, thus involving at least that agency of the Soviet state in the fiscal affairs of the Party, if only (but perhaps not only) as a custodian of funds generated by the Party itself. Even this function raises the question of bank interest on what should be a substantial account, a question that has never been touched on in CRC reports. The detailed instructions also provide a table which enables the primary Party official to levy the correct dues on a given monthly income without resorting to mathematics. One also learns that members who have no income in a given month (students without stipends or artists with no honoraria in a given month are mentioned as examples) nevertheless have a minimum dues obligation of 2 kopeks. While this must be highly exceptional, it is not so unknown as to require no regulation, and it does call attention to the fact that the lower levels of the Party system of dues seem designed purely as a matter of discipline or

[3] Grey Hodnett (ed.), *Resolutions and Decisions of the CPSU*. Vol. 4, *The Khrushchev Years* (Toronto, 1974), p. 281.

[4] *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika*, Vol. 4, pp. 495–507. A new version of this instruction, issued in 1967, does not seem to have been published in the same reference work and was unavailable to the present writer. A related, informative source is *Spravochnik sekretaria pervichnoi partiinoi organizatsii*, which exists in numerous editions, containing a chapter on the collection of dues.

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symbolic participation. There must be a significant number of Party members who are in the lower income brackets, including the poorer *kolkhozniki* or pensioners who make less than 50 R/mo, pay up to 10 kopeks a month, and collectively contribute a derisory sum of money to the Party coffers. Party instructions specify that the *kolkhoznik* who gets paid only in an annual lump sum should pay dues only at the rate of 10 kopeks/mo and then should have the annual lump payment averaged over the year as a basis for the calculation of additional dues (when and if such a payment comes).

Even though most Party members do not have to pay a substantial monthly sum to their primary organization, the system involved is sufficiently complex to open the way to many of the torments—and evasions—of the kind of income tax system that one finds in the United States, repeated not just annually but monthly. Thus in Party publications there are references to the kind of problem dear to the hearts of American tax experts. Is a bonus awarded on Metallurgy Day classified as a one-time prize, not subject to Party dues, or as a regular bonus, which is subject to dues? (Mercifully it is considered a one-time prize, even though it might happen annually.) [5]

Obviously, the secretarial personnel of primary Party organizations can spend only a limited amount of time going over the incomes of each Party member each month. The individual Party member is not subject to any system of automatic payroll deduction of dues and is not faced with some kind of "tax return.' No specific penalty for under-reporting is noted in Party literature and, of course, it is not a matter for state law. In short, there is plenty of room for under-reporting of income and hence underpayment of dues, especially in the area of supplemental forms of income such as bonuses (not to speak of non-monetary perquisites, which play so great a role in Soviet life and are simply not subject to Party dues). A former Party member who worked in an academic institution tells me that his experience led him to conclude that his colleagues reported their base income accurately but often cheated on supplemental payments, and were sometimes caught. However, the machinery is inadequate to check on over 15,000,000 members and 600,000 primary organizations (including shop organizations "with the rights of a primary organization"). While CRC reports had regularly complained about under-reporting of income by Party members, it was only in 1971 that a significant counter-effort was announced. Sizov said that in Gorky *oblast* alone underpayment of dues to the tune of 90,000 rubles had been discovered for the year 1970. In Orel *oblast* underpayment rose from 28,000 rubles in 1974 to 31,000 rubles in 1975. It is hard to say how thorough even these spot-checks have been or how much effort the operation is worth, given the relatively low incomes of many of the individual members who would have to be audited in a detailed investigation. This is not the only problem in collecting dues. CRC reports consistently

[5] *Partiinaia zhizn'*, 1969, no. 21, pp. 49–50.

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complain that some members are simply in arrears. Although article 8 of the Rules requires that the case of any member who is three months behind in dues be discussed with a view to possible expulsion, the CRC does not appear to believe that such pressure is applied very often.

But what of the substantial sum that is collected from members each month? In any system involving so much handling of cash there is reason for suspicion. Party regulations try to deal with this problem by requiring primary organizations, except in rural areas, to make deposits of dues every 10 days, but CRC reports chronically complain that this is not being done regularly. Indeed, the 1956 CRC report reproached the primary organizations of the Tatar Autonomous Republic for allowing their deposits to slide for up to 13 months. Even if the official procedures were always followed, it would be very difficult for auditors to check on every primary organization to see that the amounts turned into the banks, including a lot of odd kopeks, matched the total of the dues paid, according to each member's personal Party document. Probably Mr Sizov is almost as uncertain as I am concerning the true amount of leakage that may occur in Party dues throughout the vast and varied USSR.

It is impossible to make an accurate estimate of Party revenue from dues because there are no data on the distribution of income among Party members. However, some idea of the range of possibilities can be obtained by using existing data to estimate a parsimonious and a generous figure. The former can be calculated by taking the average income reported by Kosygin for workers and employees in 1970–75 (146 R/mo), looking up the dues owed on this (1·46 R/mo), and multiplying that figure by the number of Party members reported by Brezhnev to be workers and employees (13·4 million). Kosygin did not report an absolute income figure of *kolkhozniks*, but one that is applicable to Party members on the *kolkhozes* can be constructed. The guide for secretaries of primary Party organizations, published in 1965, gives 56 R/mo as a representative figure for a *kolkhoz* Communists' income. This is increased by the per cent of *kolkhoznik* income growth reported by Kosygin in the 24th and 25th Party congresses to bring it up to date. (These percentages include income in kind which in practice does not appear to be taken seriously by Party officials when levying dues, so the result may be overstated.) This produces a current *kolkhoz* communist average income of almost 100 R/mo. The dues on 100 R/mo is ·50 rubles; multiplied by the number of *kolkhoznik* Party members (2·18 million) this yields 1·09 million R/mo.

When increased by 50 per cent to take into account profits from publishing, this model produces total party revenue of about 31 million R/mo. The main objection to this estimate lies in its tendency to egalitarianism. It would be reasonably accurate if incomes in the USSR were fairly equal and if Party members generally earned the same as non-Party citizens. This not being the case, the " parsimonious " estimate

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TABLE II

Parsimonious estimate of dues revenue

	(*millions/ Party members*)	(*R/mo. average income*)	(*R/mo. dues*)	(*Revenue in million R/mo.*)
Workers and employees	13·4	146	1·46	19·564
Kolkhozniks	2·18	100	·50	1·090
			Total	20·654

does not do justice to the impact on dues revenue of income differentials, noting that the higher incomes are assessed at a significantly higher *rate*.

Any model that attempts to take reasonable account of wage differentials among Party members must involve a lot of guesswork. The following, " generous," example is not intended to produce an accurate estimate or even to show the maximum that one could imagine. It is, rather designed as a matrix to permit readers to see how difficult it would be to devise an alternative income distribution for Party members that would really yield a substantially higher total dues revenue.[6] The critical column is the one headed " number of members in bracket." One knows from Brezhnev's report to the 25th Party congress what the total should be in this column—that is distributed among (1) workers, (2) *kolkhozniks*, (3) technical intelligentsia and (4) persons in science, literature, art, education, medicine, administration and the armed forces. One can only guess how the various incomes of these diverse people are distributed in the dues rate table, but the structure is such that one can calculate a significantly larger total dues revenue only by shifting persons up in the income scale.

If this total is raised by 50 per cent to include publishing profit, the total income of the Party appears to be about 105 million R/mo., which is a great deal more than the " parsimonious " estimate of 31 million R/mo. Perhaps a still higher estimate is plausible, despite (1) the tendency of the Soviet rewards system to rely on non-monetary per-

[6] Mervyn Matthews, " Top Incomes in the USSR: towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite," *Survey*, Summer 1975, pp. 1–27, is a great help in making estimates for the upper level and in particular provided the figure of 250,000 used in the " over 450 " bracket, which I have reduced to allow for the presumption that a significant number of well-remunerated scientists and artists are not Party members. Other useful information on current wage levels in the USSR appears in Karl-Eugen Wädeken, " Income Distribution in Soviet Agriculture," *Soviet Studies*, January 1975, pp. 3–26, and (unsigned) " Rich and Poor in the USSR", *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 3, No. 6, pp. 6–7. Useful information on the saturation of various occupations by the Party appears in Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia* (London, 1972), pp. 219–22, and T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917–1967* (Princeton, 1968), ch. 14. In general it should be observed that the above model places more than 75 per cent of all Party members above the stated national average for workers and employees, an average that presumably includes the most affluent persons in the country. I do not believe that the works noted here tend to indicate so high a shift in income distribution of Party members, but this is intentional in constructing a " generous " model.

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TABLE III

Generous estimate of Party revenue from dues

Income brackets (R/mo.)	*Dues rates (%)*	*Est. income average (R/mo.)*	*Average dues/cap. (R/mo.)*	*Number of members in bracket (m.)*	*Revenue (million R)*
to 50	NA	50	·10	·494	·049
51–100	·5	75	·38	1·000	·380
101–150	1·0	125	1·25	2·300	2·875
151–200	1·5	175	2·63	4·500	11·835
201–250	2·0	225	4·50	2·900	13·050
251–300	2·5	275	6·88	2·300	15·824
301–450	3·0	375	11·25	2·000	22·500
over 450	3·0	500	15·00	·200	3·000
			Totals	15·694	69·513

quisites; (2) problems in dues collection; (3) the presence of many doctors, teachers, engineers, and junior armed services personnel in the *non*-worker/peasant sector of membership; (4) the presence of a significant number of pensioners in the party (10·4 per cent of members were over the age of 60 in 1973). But is it reasonable to envisage a substantially higher estimate?

HOW much higher would it have to be plausibly to provide a balanced budget? The expenses of the Party for the most part cannot be estimated, but some kind of attempt is at least possible concerning the wage bill. The Party employs both " responsible workers " (*apparatchiki*) and " technical workers " (clerks, chauffeurs, etc.). Although there are no firm official figures on either category, the 1970 USSR census makes possible some estimates.[7] There were about 145,000 " leaders " of Party, trade union, Komsomol and other social organizations in 1970. " Instructors " (not meaning pedagogues, but a rank in the apparatus), " scientific workers," artists and various other more or less elevated employees whom the Party shared with these other institutions numbered over 90,000. Noting that the size of the Party apparatus seems to have risen since Khrushchev's attempts to cut it, 200,000 " responsible workers " seems a reasonable round figure for the present. If that number of persons averaged 300 R/mo., which seems low in the light of Matthews' evidence,'[8] the resulting wage bill would be 60 million R/mo. In any well-served bureaucracy two " technical workers " for each " responsible worker " seems rather minimal (the ratio was about at this level in the CPSU in the rather primitive days of 1930 according to the CRC report of that year). An estimate of 400,000 such workers seems quite plausible in the light of the 1970 census figures on the

[7] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Moscow, 1973), Tables 2 and 34.
[8] Matthews, " Top Incomes in the USSR ", op. cit. p. 7.

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more than one million book-keepers, clerks, chauffeurs, janitors, office cleaners and related personnel that the party shared with certain other employers. If these people averaged only 125 R/mo, their wage bill would be 50 million rubles.

This figure does not include the stipends for students in Party schools, nor the supplementary payments for secretaries of primary organizations who have been released from their ordinary responsibilities while carrying this responsibility. In 1957 these released workers were eligible to receive up to 70 R/mo, a sum that must be greater now. There is clear evidence that the higher Party authorities have attempted—with only limited success—to restrict the number of such semi-*apparatchiks*, and one may assume that the ceiling on their pay has risen over the years. An estimate of 200,000 released secretaries is modest in a Party with about 600,000 primary organizations and shop groups having the rights of a primary organization. (In 1955 a single textile factory in Kalinin had 4 released secretaries in its primary organization.)[9] Assuming that their pay has kept pace with the national average, one can calculate a total bill of about 28 million R/mo in this sector and a total Party wage bill (excluding the publishing industry and students in Party schools) of 138 million R/mo, which is substantially more than the "generous" estimate of all Party revenue (105 million R/mo). But even if one can visualize Party revenues adequate to meet the wage bill, it is unlikely that wages constitute much more than half of all Party (non-publishing) expenses. Other expenses include:

1. Buildings. Office buildings, museums, research institutes, schools, living quarters for employees, and such miscellaneous services as special shops and nurseries for its employees.[10] In addition to the central bureaucracy of the Party there are 14 union republic central committees, 10 *okrug* committees, 164 *oblast* and *krai* committees and 4,243 city and *raion* committees not to mention primary organizations, all of which translate into office space on a greater or lesser scale. Apparently the Brezhnev administration has been attempting to secure support in the Party apparatus by improving its working conditions without, however, arousing jealousy by calling much attention to this process. A handsome, high-rise office and meeting building for the Central Committee arose in the first half of the seventies in the courtyard of the rather dowdy office buildings of the Committee on Old Square, Moscow, without any fanfare. Sizov, in his report to 25th Party congress, credited Brezhnev "personally" with concern for such needs and referred to "the plan of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the construction of office

[9] *Pervichnaia partiinaia organizatsiia. Dokumenty KPSS. Posleoktiabr'skoi period* (Moscow, 1970), p. 321.

[10] It is clear from various CRC reports that these fall into the Party budget. However, some auxiliary facilities used exclusively by the Party are not. In 1930 the CRC report stated that the expenses of the Central Committee medical sector had been transferred to the Commissariat of Health. This may be the case with such facilities as special shops.

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buildings for Party organs, Party institutions, printing plants of Party publishing houses, living quarters. . . . Expenditures of the Party budget for this purpose in only the present five-year period increased by comparison with the previous five-year period by almost 50%." Granted, it was not always so. Khrushchev engaged in a budget-cutting attack on both the Soviet and Party administrative system, and at the 23rd Party congress (1966) the CRC admitted heavy expenses in replacing 439 buildings that the Party had given away (without acknowledged return) during this interlude of frugality. On the other hand, these 439 buildings represented only a minor part of the Party's holdings.

2. " Post-telegraph, telephone, chancery, travel (*komandirovochnyi*) and administrative (*khoziaistvennyi*) accounts." Despite repeated exhortations by the CRC, " violations of budgetary discipline " continue to occur in this area, a few examples of which are exposed to each Party congress. In 1971 it was revealed that the Georgian union republic had increased its overspending of these accounts from 7,000 rubles in 1969 to 23,000 in 1970, while the 25th Party congress learned that in Kursk *oblast* 10 out of 26 city and rural *raion* committees had overspent these accounts, by how much it was not revealed. Incidentally, the 1939 CRC report noted that one of the special budgetary needs of the Central Committee was funds for the *komandirovki* of Party workers summoned to the Central Committee," though one would think that in the previous several years a considerable economy was achieved by making these only one-way trips (or rather the expense of taking many such persons out of Moscow was carried by the NKVD).

3. Conferences. The Party congress is of course the largest and most expensive example, but it seems likely that lower level gatherings, which meet more often and collectively involve more delegates, cost more. Party committees on the city, rural *raion, oblast, krai, okrug* and republic level are supposed to hold conferences at least every two years (except for four union republics which have a longer interval). In addition there are various special conferences, such as short meetings of the *aktiv* of an area. In the aggregate the travel expenses, lodging, food and other overhead expenses of these gatherings must be substantial.[11]

4. Agitation and propaganda. Apart from its periodical press, the Party maintains a regular programme of ideological work, the highest level of which consists of the three-year professional programme of the Academy of Social Sciences, followed by the Higher Party School, which has both intramural and correspondence courses. Sizov did not provide any figures on the scope of these activities for 1971–76, but previous CRC reports indicate that 32,000 to 40,000 persons completed courses on this relatively expensive level every five years. Almost half of these students

[11] The 1939 CRC report indicates that, at least in those days, the expense of travel, food and lodging of delegates to all conferences was carried by the Party budget, and not passed off to hotels and so forth as an unrenumerated service that they were expected to render the Party.

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took an intramural course, which meant that they drew a stipend for as much as three years. On a broader level there were 200,000 students in retraining courses for secretaries and the like in 1966–71, and below that half a million students in "Evening Universities of Marxism-Leninism," which in that period played a major role in the consumption of 50,000,000 copies of textbook material printed for *agitprop*. Sizov did not offer comparable figures for 1971–76, although he did claim a 41 per cent increase for the *agitprop* sector of the budget (apart from schools, which gained only 24 per cent). So ample were the resources assigned for *agitprop*, that some organizations had trouble disbursing them, according to Sizov, who reproached the Lipetsk *oblast* committee for finishing 1975 with a surplus of 15,000 rubles in this account.

IF the foregoing survey of Party expenses has not done justice to the subject, omitting, for example, the question of pensions and *dachas*, it still should suffice to indicate that the expense side of the budget seems likely to outstrip any reasonable projection of the revenue side by an enormous margin. How then does the CPSU continue to operate, and even complain that its organizations have trouble spending their allocations for *agitprop*? Apparently there is some form of massive subsidy from the Soviet state. Just how this is handled one cannot say, though the fact that all dues revenue goes into an account with the State Bank suggests that the Party may simply have some kind of special drawing rights there. In any case it is clear that the Party is the kind of interest that has the authority to take what it needs and that it would not tolerate control of its purse by some external authority. This consideration may underlie the rejection by the Party of indirect subsidies by state enterprises. For example, a 1957 edict of the Central Committee castigated a Kalinin textile plant for paying the wages of four party secretaries who were released from their regular jobs in the factory. Such personnel should be on the Party's own payroll, according to this statement, which omitted to point out that any other arrangement could lead to infringement of the independence of the Party.[12]

Finally, what can one say about the general import of the Party's peculiar financial situation for the whole Soviet system? One perspective is to say that the Party obviously exacts a sizeable tribute, like the *yarlyk* of the Mongol Khanate. A measure of the Party's sovereignty as an institution is its ability to collect this tribute, as much as it thinks it needs, and to collect it without audible protest from Soviet state interests, much less from the populace at large. Another perspective, which does not contradict the first, is that the Party is an important part of the total system of government in the Soviet Union. The services of the Party in terms of *raison d'état* are truly beyond estimation. Why should anyone expect that such services should be provided to the state free of charge,

[12] See note 9 above.

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that is, paid for out of its members' dues and its publishing revenues? With the exception of similar Communist Parties, where in the world are there such important political institutions that are not supported openly by tax revenues? In a sense the Party could easily make a case that it is a comparatively cost-effective administrative institution and well worth its subsidy, but in practice the old myths of voluntary, idealistic service to the people by the Communist Party do not permit such forthrightness.

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Measuring Science in the USSR: Uses and Expectations

Yakov M. Rabkin

A COMPREHENSIVE assessment of the role of knowledge in the exercise of power is never an easy task. In the Soviet Union this is particularly true in view of the notorious secretiveness of the decision-making process. There is considerable evidence for believing that unpublished, classified statistical data occupy a major place in the bulk of expertise that the Soviet government uses in its policy-making. Science policy does not seem to be an exception in this respect. The discussion in this paper will, however, be confined to the openly available sources published in the Soviet Union.

Besides this qualification there is another concerning the use of the term "science indicators." This term will be used interchangeably with "science statistics" and will designate any of the quantitative parameters relevant to the description of scientific activity. The difference should be emphasized here between social and economic indicators and science indicators. However underdeveloped the domain of social indicators may appear, social scientists have become sensitive about the distinction between an indicator and a raw statistic. Such a distinction would be, in our view, premature in the case of science indicators.

This paper consists of three parts. In the beginning we will survey the existing science indicators. Such a survey seems to be appropriate in this paper devoted to uses of the indicators. Whereas econometrics, for example, could rely almost since its incipience on a bulk of quantitative data already in existence, the quantitative study of science has yet to build a body of evidence. This is partly because measurement has been intrinsic to economic activity, while measuring science still evokes academic as well as sociopolitical controversies.

In order to understand the uses of statistics in planning and its place in Soviet bureaucracy, it is necessary to look at the political issues involved in the collection and use of quantified data and in the Soviet ideology of planning and forecasting. Generally, one would perceive the movement towards the collection of hard data as an attempt to provide empirical information helpful for social choice and social planning. Ideally, it represents an endeavour aimed at minimization of extraneous influences such as personality or political pressure and encourages the assessment of alternatives. In the Soviet Union, the concept and role of statistics are perceived somewhat differently. According to a recent monograph on social statistics published in Novosibirsk:

> In a class society social statistics has a class character, and its content is defined by the interests of the ruling classes. In socialist society social statistics serves the interests of the working class and

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> all workers. . . . Bourgeois statistics executes the will, and serves the interests of capitalists.[1]

Thus the normative and ideological aspects of statistics are considered crucial. That is why, in the second part of the paper we will attempt to present an historical and political perspective of the development of science indicators in the USSR, a nation with over 50 years' experience of direct state involvement in science affairs.

Finally, after having depicted political and ideological background, we will proceed to a review of actual uses that science indicators serve in the Soviet Union.

Survey of Sources

There are two major sources of science statistics in the USSR: publications of the Central Statistical Directorate with its regional branches and bureaux in the various Soviet Republics, and research literature devoted to scientometrics.

Data from the Central Statistical Directorate can in turn be divided into three distinct groups. The first comprises yearly accounts of national economic and cultural data. Perhaps the most comprehensive annual for science indicators is *The National Economy of the USSR*.[2] It is based on statistical summaries prepared every year by each unit of the hierarchically structured Central Statistical Directorate. These data have been collected, since 1919, on a continuous basis by field offices of the Directorate, and are channelled to the respective superior bureaux. The original statistical accounts of individual research institutions are kept at the field offices and are not published as such.

The data on science are presented in this yearbook exclusively in the form of aggregates and concern primarily scientific manpower. One finds several breakdowns by field (20 fields altogether in the 1974 edition), by Soviet Republic, sex, and type of research institution. Interestingly, since the early 1970s these science statistics are brought together in the same chapter with the indicators of "technological progress," whereas previously this data was part of the chapter entitled Culture and Public Education. This shift from a "non-productive" to a "productive" sector was to symbolize the increase of governmental interest in rationalizing science policy. In terms of actual data this shift meant little. Whereas science is described in terms of numbers of scientists employed, the inventive activities and innovations are presented in monetary terms as well as numbers of inventions implemented, aggregates of state R & D expenditures being given in a different chapter devoted to the state budget. Thus one sees some input parameters of research juxtaposed with the output characteristics of development. Part of the information one finds in this Russian language annual is reprinted in English and French in the *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook*.

[1] I. P. Suslov and E. D. Grazhdannikov, *Osnovy Sotsialnoi Statistiki* (Novosibirsk, 1973), p. 27.

[2] *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1974 godu* (Moscow, 1975).

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As to comparisons between countries, of science and technological innovation statistics, none can be found in the yearbook *National Economy of the USSR*. However, attempts to undertake transnational comparisons are under way in at least two organizations. One is the Joint Working Group in the Field of Science Policy which operates under the auspices of the Soviet American agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. The other is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon, or CMEA) which is the economic organization of most of the socialist countries. Following the example set by the OECD, the CMEA found "it imperative to elaborate and introduce into practice a uniform system of comparable statistical indices characterizing the state and development of scientific research at the national and international levels." The CMEA distinguishes between basic research, applied research and design work, between "autonomous" and "non-autonomous" institutions, and contains two component groups of basic indices:

> [a] indices of personnel engaged in research and design organizations;
>
> [b] indices of input into scientific research and design activities. . . . The total number of personnel engaged in research organizations is classified according to national economic branches, education (higher, secondary special), branches of science (natural, technical, medical, etc.), scientific degrees, age and sex.[3]

The other group of Soviet sources of official science statistics consists of census reports. These cover only data on scientific personnel and do not contain information on other aspects of the national science enterprise. The census reports furnish data on numbers of research and teaching personnel, proportion of women, breakdown by nationalities of the USSR, educational characteristics of scientific personnel, and other related parameters.[4] Besides the census, which now seems to be conducted every 10 years, the Central Statistical Directorate may undertake surveys of specialized populations. These differ little from the census data, perhaps the major single change being the date on which the survey was conducted.

Finally, the third group of sources published by the Central Statistical Directorate consists of irregular special statistical volumes of the Directorate's periodical *Vestnik Statistiki*. The specific volumes are devoted to a particular branch of social or economic activity. One of the recent reports relevant to our subject, for example, was published in 1971,[5] and contained information on education, culture and science. In it, science statistics are somewhat more comprehensive than in the

[3] P. G. Podyachikh, *Naselenye SSSR* (Moscow, 1961).

[4] The System of Statistical Indices . . . , CES/SEM.7/8; SC. TECH/SEM.4/8; UNESCO/ECECOM.76/CONS.711/8, 23 Dec. 1975.

[5] *Narodnoe Obrazovanye, Nauka i Kultura v SSSR* (Moscow, 1971).

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yearbook on the national economy. They consist exclusively in the number of physical persons rather than averages. Among the few advantages of these data over those contained in the yearbook is the distinction made between full-time and part-time researchers and graduate students, which makes the picture slightly clearer. Another advantage is the more detailed breakdown of data on specialities by individual Soviet Republics and the nationalities. Thus one can find, for example, the proportion over the years of Ukrainians, Jews or Uzbeks among graduate students and research personnel of the Soviet Union. The sources are obviously the same as those used for compilation of the yearbook, although some statistics can be found only in such special volumes. The periodical *Vestnik Statistiki* contains theoretical and methodological discussions as well as some empirical data put out by the Directorate. Recently a statistical account of the development of science in the country was published in the journal on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences.[6]

However varied the releases of the Central Statistical Directorate may be, these represent but a tip of the statistical iceberg. The bulk of the data is collected and stored at different levels of the Directorate's structure, and parts of this core of science statistics occasionally become available to individual science policy students. It is the publications stemming from their research that constitute the alternative and complementary source of data on science. These scholarly publications have, however, some peculiarities. The most conspicuous is the frequent absence of references to the source of the data presented. One has to wonder whether these statistical indicators were borrowed or adapted from other published sources, or produced on their own. Most of these works demand that one take for granted the methodological soundness and documentary accuracy of the authors.[7]

Another particular trait is the often concurrent discussion of American and Soviet data. Since the American data is referenced and the Soviet often is not, the interspersed quantitative information leads the reader to confusion as to whether the authors seek to throw light on the Soviet science, attempt cross national comparisons, or discuss the data in a sort of extranational framework. Lately, however, one can notice a new trend. Recent publications contain at least references to the institution whence the data was obtained.[8]

Whatever shortcomings the Soviet scientometrical literature may have, it does represent an important source of science indicators. These data, just as those put out by the Central Statistical Directorate, require attention to their definitional bases and provenance before their meaningful interpretation can be attempted.

The Soviet concept of scientometrics also comprises data on publica-

[6] " K 250-letyu Akademii Nauk SSSR," *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 4 (1974), pp. 85–95.
[7] See, e.g. G. M. Dobrov, *Nauchnyi Potentsial* (Kiev, 1969).
[8] See, e.g. D. M. Gvishiani et al., *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaya Revolutsia i Izmenenye Struktury Nauchniykh Kadrov* (Moscow, 1973).

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tions and citations. Although the data basis used by Soviet authors writing on quantitative aspects of scientific information flows is mainly of ISI [9] origin, some works contain indicators computed in the USSR. Most of them could largely be described in terms of bibliometric aspects of library science. We will return to this and other sources of scientometric data when discussing uses of indicators.

Historical Development of Science Statistics

The official and general attitudes towards collecting and publishing statistics underwent important changes during Soviet history. Two circumstances distinguish Soviet science statistics in this respect. First, detailed science statistics appeared in the USSR in the 1920s, before their appearance in any other country. Second, they were the last to be dumped as a result of growing Stalinization in the 1930s, and the first to be revived in the 1950s among other social and economic statistics in the USSR. We shall try to understand why this happened.

Lenin and his immediate circle perceived social and economic statistics as a means of rationalization of management of the new, i.e. "scientific" society. Lenin was himself a good statistician who made extensive use of economic and political indicators in his pre-revolutionary works,[10] and he apparently was inclined to use them as well in the process of administration. This explains his insistence on the direct subordination of the Central Statistical Directorate to the Council of People's Commissars. Since the society to be built was based on the allegedly scientific forecast made by Marx, science and rationality had a major role to play in Soviet development. Explicit government desire to influence science affairs seems to have started with Lenin's *Sketch on the planning of R & D* in early 1918.[11] This work of symbolic rather than actual importance could date the first attempt to construe a national science policy in the USSR. Thus science had to become a measurable entity.

Science statistics emerged, and a discipline called science of science, or *naukovedenie*, made its appearance in the 1920s. This new field aspired to the status of an "exact science" and saw its *raison d'être* in providing data for rational science management.[12] The scenario started changing by the end of the first post-revolutionary decade. The inherent contradiction between the drive for rationalization and the pursuit of politically defined goals became too obvious. Statistics were largely suppressed as a "mere game of figures" [13] so far as they did not

[9] Institute of Scientific Information, Philadelphia, Pa., publishes various directories including *Current Contents*, *Science Citation Index*.

[10] See, e.g. I. P. Suslov, *Politicheskaya Statistika v Rabotakh v V. I. Lenina* (Moscow, 1968); I. G. Malyi, *Voprosy Statistiki Naselenya v Trudakh V. I. Lenina* (Moscow, 1969).

[11] V. I. Lenin, "Nabrosok Plana Nauchno-Tekhnicheskikh Rabot," *Sochinenya* (Moscow, 1950), Vol. 27, pp. 288–89.

[12] P. V. Borichevski, "Naukovedenye Kak Tochnaya Nauka," *Vestnik Znanya*, No. 12 (1926), pp. 777–88.

[13] This expression of Stalin is quoted from: M. Ellman, *Planning Problems in the USSR* (Cambridge, 1973), p. 1.

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provide arguments for Stalin's policies. Then, as now, there were no political forces in the country which could require the government to collect and release the pertinent data. Hopes for "scientization" were acquiring the hue of firm and personal rule.

Science statistics could not avoid the fate of other statistical data in the country, although some particularities could be observed in that process. First, science did not represent as "hot" an issue as industry or agriculture. Its results were not immediate, its relative importance for the national economy was limited. Secondly, science statistics did provide arguments for Stalin's policies.

1929, "the year of the great break," signalled the start of the heavy industrialization of the country, which under Soviet conditions represented a political rather than a professional challenge to the country's scientific and technical personnel. It was at this time that major purges and trials of engineers began. Political loyalty was put before professional competence. Hastily trained "red specialists" i.e. Communist Party recruits, were to supplant the old specialists. Similar events started in the scientific establishment, although in a different way. While Party newcomers challenged individual engineers of the old generation, in science the rivalry took place on an institutional level. The recently created Communist Academy competed with the National (formerly the Imperial) Academy of Sciences, which came almost intact through the turmoil of the Revolution. It was in these circumstances that science statistics were used as a political instrument.

A volume entitled *Scientific Cadres of the Bolshevik Communist Party* appeared in 1930. The book contained extensive statistics on the Soviet scientific manpower: breakdowns by discipline, sex, political affiliation before and after the Revolution, responsibilities in the party, social origin, professional functions, knowledge of foreign languages, etc. To our knowledge it was not only the first but until now the most detailed collection of science indicators published in the USSR. One of the reasons for having this data published was apparently to serve as a legitimization for the purges, particularly in the Academy of Sciences:

> The situation with the scientific cadres is grave. That is what is shown by the facts on the number of party members in the scientific sector. [. . .] For example, until recently, before the last elections and the purges in the *apparat* of the National Academy of Sciences there was only one party member, a second-grade scientific worker, among 600 researchers; whereas in abundance were men of the *ancien regime* evidently alien to the Soviet order.[14]

The events did not lead, however, to the dismemberment of the old Academy: the two merged, and the struggle passed from the public inter-institutional to the confidential in-house level.[15] The science

[14] G. Krovitskii and B. Revskii, *Nauchnye Kadry VKP (b)* (Moscow, 1930), p. 34.

[15] For a history of this period see: L. Graham, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932* (Princeton, 1967).

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statistics had performed one of their functions, the political one. Nothing would then prevent their following the fate of the other statistical information. They shrank to almost nonexistence.

After Stalin died, the belief in the scientific character of Soviet society emerged as one of the important factors in the legitimization of power. The hitherto forbidden fields of cybernetics and sociology were called upon to improve and scientize the management of Soviet society. Prevision and forecasting became the catchwords.

A wide range of Soviet social sciences was affected. For instance, on the wave of destalinization, mathematical economics won official recognition and publication was allowed of an authoritative treatise written a decade earlier by L. Kantorovich who was to become a Nobel laureate in 1975.[16] Major ideas in quantification of social phenomena were brought out in a volume of translations prudently entitled *Mathematical Methods in Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology.*[17] Computerized management received the highest approval as a tool to further the "building of communism." Hard data thus became a prerequisite of decision-making.

The national scientific enterprise became one of the first sectors where rational management was urged. The science of science, or quantitative study of science, was imported into the country mainly through the writings of Derek De Solla Price of Yale University. Those who became active in the Soviet scientometrics were mainly natural scientists and exact scientists. It was precisely the quantitative image of the field created by Price that made possible almost direct borrowing of a field of knowledge from the West.

These propitious political conditions were at least partly responsible for the quite rapid development of scientometrics in the USSR, and its recognition both by the authorities and by the scientific community. The scientists, conscious of politically based cases of intrusion in the scientific process in the past, saw in scientometrics a means of depolitization of science management. They hoped for a separation of science and the Party. Professionalization of the new field of science of science might reduce the role of non-scientists in science administration. "Any state risks floundering without a theory of science, without qualified and competent management of science," admonished the proponents of the new field in the mid-1960s. "Science of science," according to them, "was becoming an essential condition of the competitive standing in the struggle of the two political systems."[18] More liberal in outlook than their counterparts in the so-called "ideological disciplines," the scientists were thus willing to use scientometrics to rationalize that sector of Soviet society which for them and, in their opinion for most

[16] L. V. Kantorovich, *Ekonomicheskii Raschet Nailuchshevo Ispolzovanya Resursov* (Moscow, 1959).

[17] *Matematicheskiye Metody v Sovremennoi Burzhuaznoi Sotsiologii* (Moscow, 1966).

[18] M. Petrov and A. Potemkin, "Nauka Poznaet Sebya," *Novyi Mir*, No. 6 (1968), p. 250.

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people, was of primary importance. On the other hand, the government, progressively dependent on the success of the scientific enterprise, made considerable concessions increasing the autonomy of the scientific community in the 1960s.[19] In this context science indicators came to enjoy a particular political status. Whereas all social indicators are stated to have three functions in Soviet society—cognitive, managerial and ideological—the last is entirely omitted when the same authors discuss science indicators.[20]

In practice scientometrics publications in the USSR are remarkably open. Although the comparison some observers[21] make with the *samizdat* (unofficial underground) writings may appear somewhat far-fetched, clear criticism of such traits of Soviet life as censorship or restriction on foreign travel can hardly be found elsewhere than in scientometric literature.[22] As we noted above, officially, accounts of science statistics are tacitly deprived of their "ideological function." This absence of "propagandistic presentation—a form of art in which lies of various dimensions may enter—"[23] tends to increase the reliability of Soviet science statistics. Against this background we shall proceed to discuss the uses of science indicators.

Uses of Science Indicators

Despite the obvious difficulty of penetrating the decision-making process in the USSR we attempted to identify some cases when science indicators appeared to have been used in policy formation. These cases can hardly be unified in a single framework, theoretical or other. We have chosen them as illustrations, examples rather than evidence supporting a model or a structured hypothesis. Indeed, none of these is suggested in this paper. When and if more individual cases become known (or at least deduced from indirect data), these cases could ultimately be sorted out to present a more coherent picture. Not unlike adepts of scientometrics, we are short of hard data. Fully aware of that limitation, we think it is better to present individual raw cases than not to present any at all while waiting for more information to seep through. What we shall try *not* to do, however, is to draw conclusions and generalizations incommensurate with the quantity and quality of the data used.

One of the recurrent problems of Soviet science administration is the inadequate supply of scientific information. Two obvious contradictions can be seen here. First, the desire to increase in quantity and speed the

[19] For details see: L. Graham, "The development of science policy in the Soviet Union," in T. D. Long and C. Wright, eds., *Science Policies of Industrialized Nations* (New York, 1975), pp. 12–58.

[20] I. P. Suslov and E. D. Grazhdannikov, op. cit. pp. 22–26 and 264–88.

[21] A. J. Longrigg, "Soviet science and the closed society," *The World Today*, No. 5 (1972), pp. 216–28.

[22] For a more elaborate discussion of political issues involved in scientometric writings in the USSR see Y. M. Rabkin, "*Naukovedenie . . .*," *Minerva* (Spring 1976).

[23] S. A. Rice, "Statistics in the Soviet Union," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 8, No. 5 (1952), p. 159.

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inflow of science data from abroad, goes against the long-standing tradition of banning any information from the country unless specifically authorized. Here we see a conflict between scientists' need for rapid and free communication and a basic feature of Soviet information policy. The second contradiction is also caused by censorship. This time it is applied to publications within the country. The lengthy process of censorship affects the flow of domestic scientific information, undermining the immedicy of any new articles.

In 1966 these contradictions were unambiguously analysed by Nalimov, of the University of Moscow. In his article [24] and later in a book entitled *Scientometrics* [25] he used quantified empirical data to indicate "the unacceptably long delays in the movement of new ideas." Moreover, Nalimov used scientometric evidence to show the virtual impossibility of "invisible colleges," then considered a promising form of scientific organization, to function in the Soviet Union. Among the obstacles he enumerated was "the absence of direct regular contacts with scholars abroad." Nalimov's paper appeared during the period of important changes in science organization in the country. In the same year as the article, a decree by the State Committee for Science and Technology emphasized the severity of the problem of the scientific information supply in the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, a vice-president of the State Committee referred to the national scientific information system as "deplorable," while those directly responsible for scientific information expressed hope for a solution in "research on the laws of distribution and aging of scientific publications and in establishing information systems based on bibliographic associations of the documents." [26] It appears as if Nalimov's article in 1966 sensitized science administrators and scientists to the problem while the later book served as an argument for further changes in the information system. The role that science indicators played was multifold. They rendered basic criticism acceptable to the authorities, clearly pinpointed the shortcomings and, furthermore, became a medium of continuous feedback from the users to the managers of scientific information.

A more unusual case of the use of science statistics concerns international scientific cooperation. There is evidence that the 1973 Soviet-American agreement on oceanological research was at least partly supported by the results of citation analysis. A paper delivered at a scientometrics symposium in Kiev in 1974 said:

> It was intended to investigate the existing situation in the field of oceanology research and to evaluate prerequisites of a fruitful cooperation between Soviet and American scientists. An analysis

[24] V. V. Nalimov, "Kolichestvennyie Metody Issledovanya Protsessa Razvitya Nauki, *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12 (1966), pp. 38–47.

[25] V. V. Nalimov and Z. M. Mulchenko, *Naukometria* (Moscow, 1969).

[26] *Vsesoyuznaya Konferentsia po Informatsionno-Poiskovym Sistemam i Obrabotke Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoi Informatsii* (Moscow, 1966), Vol. 1, p. 515.

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> of Soviet and American oceanographic periodicals was undertaken in order to reveal their respective characteristics.[27]

Citation networks and publication patterns of the two scientific communities were studied and the effects of the language barrier on the two sides assessed. The conclusion drawn was that the two national oceanographical communities are compatible, and that benefit can be mutually derived from this cooperation. One should not exaggerate the input that study had provided to the decision concerning the international accord. It could have been at most of very marginal value. The very fact, however, of justifying, even *ex post facto*, an international cooperation agreement via a reasonably technical analysis is a new feature in the USSR. Publication of these results at a professional scientometrics conference may be taken as evidence either that citation indicators are being used in decision making concerning science diplomacy, or that they constitute a secondary range of justifications for policy makers.

Efforts to use science indicators can be seen on the level of national government as well as that of individual institutions. Institutional objectives are often linked with forecasting of the numbers and qualifications of research personnel. Such is the case of the Department of Chemistry of Moscow University. A recent study sponsored by the administration of the department concentrates on current supply and demand trends regarding scientific manpower and the evolution of the research front as reflected in citation networks. The findings, rather approximate of course, encourage the authors to say that

> It is only one-half of the problem to investigate the research front. The other, perhaps a more important half, is to apply the acquired knowledge in the forecasting of research personnel.[28]

The desire to increase efficiency of chemical research and chemical training is more than explicitly stated. Citation analysis is also advocated as a routine procedure to evaluate performance of individual researchers. An important characteristic of this approach is the belief in the imminent forces of the development of scientific disciplines as the main factor of the growth of scientific enterprise, and thus that indicators linked to information flows constitute a basis for managerial applications.

Among the indicators which appear to have been used in Soviet science policy-making we could also identify some economic indicators, e.g. distribution of R & D funds by source. The evidence comes from a volume edited by D. M. Gvishiani, a vice-chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, a strong promoter of science studies.[29]

[27] M. K. Luchnik and V. D. Osetrov, "Sravnitelnyi Naukometricheskii Analiz Sovetskikh i Amerikanskikh Zhurnalov po Okeanologi," *V. Kievskii Symposium po Naukovedeniyu i Naukno-Tekhnicheskomu Prognozirovaniyu* (Kiev, 1973), Pt. 3, p. 61.

[28] *Naukometricheskiye Issledovanya v Khimii* (Moscow, 1974).

[29] D. M. Gvishiani (ed.), *Osnovnye Printsipy i Obshiye Problemy Upravlenya Naukoi* (Moscow, 1973).

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The fact that between 1966 and 1970 the role of the state budget as a source of R & D funds showed a decrease while the proportion of contracts in the research done in the Academy of Sciences went up was used as evidence of the administrative decentralization process started in the Soviet Union in the mid-sixties.[30] The second indicator is also interpreted as a sign of increased ties between science and industry. Similarly, it was shown that an average of 36 per cent of the national science budget was spent on salaries, reaching in some cases 43 per cent. This was considered evidence of the low rate of investment in equipment and the low capital intensity of the Soviet scientific enterprise and led to changes in salary policies as well as the relative slowdown of the growth of scientific personnel.[31] This last case is based mainly on the assumption that the indicators used to describe the results of the implementation of a given policy are the same as those used in the formulation of that policy.

From the cases just examined one can conclude that there exist a number of uses of science indicators in the Soviet Union. It is difficult to assess the extent to which science indicators are integrated into the decision-making process. Nor is it clear how regularly and continuously science indicators are produced and applied.

Besides the above uses, there is a larger variety of other uses. They are suggested in Soviet science policy literature, but no proof exists of their implementation. These uses are mainly of two kinds. The first is linked with the establishment of laws and regularities of the development of science. The second one concerns methods of evaluation of research. Both are seen as having managerial importance.

Most of the indicators are aimed at improving the art of forecasting the development of science. If, according to Bell, "a high degree of rationality on the part of men who influence events" is a prerequisite of forecasting,[32] in the USSR a claim is made for the rationality and scientific character of the sociopolitical system at large. In these conditions forecasting is claimed as "a prerogative of the Soviet system." In many respects science forecasting resembles similar activities in the economic field with the notable difference that science indicators are relatively underdeveloped compared to the existing econometric tools.[33]

Conclusion

We found that science indicators command relatively strong support both among scientists and in Soviet governmental circles. This can be explained by the belief the two groups share, in scientific rationality and its uses for managerial purposes. Science indicators fit well with what can be called the mode of thinking of Soviet elites. They reached important

[30] Ibid. p. 146.
[31] G. Segal, "Soviet R & D in quest for efficiency," *New Scientist*, 6 July 1972, pp. 21–22.
[32] D. Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1973), p. 4.
[33] Cf. M. Ellman, op. cit., Ch. 3.

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development in the decade following the Revolution. Their subsequent oblivion under Stalin only invigorated the enthusiasm they evoke today. A striking difference can be noticed in the attitudes with which Soviet and Western scientists perceive managerial applications of science indicators. In the USSR the attempts to scientize science policies on the basis of science indicators are viewed as a welcome change from the times of arbitrary governmental interference in science affairs. In the West even less persistent effort towards the use of science indicators is perceived rather as infringement on the autonomy of science.

Finally, science measurement performs a specific function in the Soviet Union. It represents a form of feedback from the scientific community to the government, as far as science management is concerned. This feedback is worth noticing, since the heavily centralized pattern of government usually discourages *independent* feedback from the groups involved. This link is often provided by writings on scientometrics, a field enjoying an unusual position between the social and the exact sciences. Whereas economic science and even econometrics have been continually reminded of their *partiynost'*, or party character, this has not, at least openly, been done to scientometrics and the science of science in general.

The development that the science indicators have enjoyed in the USSR is likely to continue. The current decrease in the growth rate of science and the ensuing necessity to emphasize the efficiency of scientific enterprice may lead, perhaps more than elsewhere, to a strengthening of the role of science indicators as a medium to rationalize the organization of science in the USSR.

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"Socialist Internationalism": Part II

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone[1]

THE Soviet policy aiming at the integration of Eastern Europe into the WTO-COMECON system under Soviet hegemony, continued with undiminished vigour in 1975 and in the first part of 1976. The signposts on the road towards the implementation of the theory of socialist internationalism and the ties of the new type, were the provisions of the USSR-GDR Treaty, relating to a unified foreign policy between the two countries, and the amendments to the Polish Constitution introduced in January 1976. The latter officially described Poland as a "socialist" state and explicitly endowed the PUWP with the leading role in the state and society, thus falling in line with the avowed aim of the unification of political and social systems of the socialist states. It also included an unprecedented provision that Polish foreign policy will be pursued on the basis of "unbreakable fraternal ties" with the USSR. The amendments caused a strong negative reaction in Poland and the provision was subsequently softened.[2] The proletarian (socialist) internationalism, in its Soviet definition, formed the keynote of the discussion of socialist states' relations at the 25th Congress of the CPSU in Moscow (28 February–3 March 1976), and at the congresses of the Hungarian, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech and East German Communist Parties preceding and following the CPSU Congress.[3] The main integration themes also continued to be stressed in authoritative Soviet sources,[4] and the pressure for the introduction of supranational features into the COMECON not only continued but intensified.

At the same time the integration issue and particularly the Soviet leading role in the "socialist world system" has been caught in the cross-currents of Soviet relations with communist parties outside the bloc, marked by an increasingly articulated rejection of Soviet hegemony

1 This is the concluding part of the article which has appeared in the previous issue of *Survey* (No. 98, Winter 1976).

2 As initially reported to the Sejm by Edward Babiuch, member of the PUWP Politbureau on 18 January, the proposed amendment provided that Polish foreign policy will be determined by People's Poland's "adherence to the world socialist system and its unbreakable fraternal ties with the Soviet Union" *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw, 19 January 1976). The new wording actually adopted reads (Article 3): "People's Poland foreign policy is—first, guided by the interests of the Polish nation, its sovereignty, independence and security, and the will for peace and cooperation among nations—secondly, it follows the high traditions of solidarity with the forces of freedom and progress, and strengthens friendship and cooperation with the USSR and with the other socialist countries—thirdly, it bases the relationship with the countries of different social systems on the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation,"

3 Also at the congress (first) of the Cuban Communist Party and at the congress of the Mongolian Communist Party. Cuba has now become a full-fledged member of the "world socialist system."

4 For example the editorial and an article by E. Bagramov in *Kommunist*, No. 6, April 1976, and an article by I. Ivanov in *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn*, No. 3, 1976.

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by the major West European communist parties. The Italian, French and Spanish parties have joined Yugoslavia in denying the existence of one directing centre of world communism. The Soviet Union has tried in vain since 1969 to convene an international conference of communist parties which would restore, under its aegis, a semblance of unity to the movement; in 1975 efforts to convey a European conference of communist parties came to a virtual standstill because of the Soviet insistence on other parties' acceptance of a programme of joint policy,[5] and it became clear that proletarian internationalism, as defined by the CPSU, is not acceptable to a growing number of foreign parties. The concept of national communism, on the other hand, which allows each party to pursue policies best suited to its own particular requirements, gains an ever-wider acceptance.[6]

THE rejection of Soviet hegemony by the Yugoslavs and major West European parties has probably been a major factor in the Rumanian leadership's ability to maintain its defiance of integration efforts within the bloc despite mounting pressures.[7] The Yugoslav presence in the negotiations between parties and in some COMECON councils (where Yugoslavia has an observer status) has been invaluable to the Rumanians.[8] Thus the Rumanian Communist Party has steadfastly maintained that Rumania's participation in the WTO-COMECON system is based on full independence and sovereignty of the Rumanian state and Party, their decisions determined solely by Rumanian *raison d'état*. As repeatedly stressed to the author in personal interviews in Bucharest,[9] the Rumanian leadership is absolutely opposed to any transformations in the two organizations which might lead to their acquiring a supranational character [10] and rejects a conception of a " coordinating centre " or a " father " party as these are embodied in the Soviet definition of proletarian internationalism. An assumption that Soviet domestic experience is transferable to relations among the socialist states is also explicitly rejected, because the two sets of relationships are " in essence "

5 The preparatory conference in East Berlin in May 1975 split over disagreements over a draft of a joint declaration. *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 May 1975.

6 The author was repeatedly told in Yugoslavia and in Rumania that the Russians " are unable to grasp the fact that they can no longer run other communist parties."

7 Rumours of a Soviet mobilization on the Rumanian border and a Rumanian mobilization accompanied CPSU Secretary Katushev's visit to Bucharest in May 1976. The rumours were circulated in Bucharest; see also German press for the period.

8 A revealing comment was made to the author at the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade in May 1976: " We would just as well not participate in the parties' meetings, but the Rumanians are anxious to have us there and we do not want to leave them alone."

9 At the Institute of Party History and at the Institute of Political Sciences, 24–25 May 1976.

10 Rumanians are particularly bitter about efforts to institutionalize various aspects of multi-party contacts. An example given concerned meetings of institutes of party history. A clear distinction is made between joint publication of articles prepared by each individual party on its own and jointly written monographs. Rumanians are prepared to participate in the first type of endeavour but not the second, because then their point of view is invariably submerged.

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totally different. In its relations with socialist states Rumania makes no distinction between the "fraternal" parties (in Soviet definition) and the others, such as China or Yugoslavia, and pursues friendly relations with capitalist and Third World countries, as dictated by its national interest. In international relations Rumania favors non-alignment (defined in terms similar to those of the Yugoslavs), and an eventual disappearance of power blocs. While it cannot help being a member of WTO it considers itself more of an "observer" there, and participates in the organization's activities only if compatible with its national interests, viz. the refusal to participate in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia.[11] In its cooperation within the COMECON Rumania opposes an integration based on the "socialist division of labour" which assigns to Rumania a role of an agricultural partner and a producer of raw materials. Instead it pursues an ambitious plan of industrial development through commercial relations within and outside the bloc, views East European integration solely in terms of voluntary cooperation among member states on the basis of full equality, and opposes any supranational economic mechanisms and supranational planning. Within the international workers' movement, the Rumanian Communist Party favours a "historical reconciliation" with social-democratic parties, a formula which seems to go a step beyond even the Italian Communist Party's "historic compromise".

WHETHER the Rumanians will be able to continue to resist the pressure for integration on Soviet terms depends on the dynamics of interaction between pressures of polycentrism in the international communist movement and the inroads it is making in Eastern Europe, and the priorities as well as the feasibility in Soviet policy making and requirements. With all its stress on proletarian internationalism the 25th CPSU Congress witnessed also an unprecedented expression of dissident views by foreign party leaders, notably Dolanc of Yugoslavia, Berlinguer of Italy and Plissonier of France, as well as Ceausescu's dissonant note in the pro-Soviet East European chorus: a considerable loss of face for the Soviet leadership.[12] The long-stymied negotiations preparatory to conveying a conference of European parties finally resulted in the 29–30 June 1976, Conference of 29 European Communist and Workers' Parties in East Berlin, but at the price of significant concessions made by Moscow. The joint declaration made no mention of proletarian internationalism and recognized the right of each party to pursue its own road to socialism and to determine its own policies, the latter point made explicit by all the major spokesmen for polycentrism: Marshal Tito, in an unprecedented attendance at a formal parties' conference, Berlinguer, Marchais, Carillo of the Spanish party and others.[13]

[11] It was put to the author that "we shall never repeat the mistake we made in 1948 in the case of Yugoslavia."

[12] *Pravda* (Moscow), *Politika* (Belgrade), and *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 28 February–3 March 1976.

[13] As reported by *Politika*, 1 July 1976.

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Apart from Ceausescu, Hungary's Janos Kadar was the only East European leader reported to have stated that there is neither a common centre nor a leading party in the international workers' movement at the present time.[14] It may be noted that the Soviet delegation headed by Leonid Brezhnev did not include Mikhail Suslov, for many years the CC CPSU Secretary in over-all charge of International Communist movement, who has always been the party's ideological spokesman and an adherent of "hard-line" policies.[15]

The Conference was hailed in Moscow as a "full success," but in the reports, offending passages in foreign leaders' speeches were censored.[16] The Western (and Yugoslav) reaction has been that the Conference marks a victory for the national communism and a defeat for the Soviet leadership in its efforts to impose its will on the European and international communist movement.[17] The full assessment of its significance has to await further developments. There is no doubt, however, that, in ideological terms, it has legitimized the right of the national parties to pursue independent policies, a development that undermines Soviet claims to primacy in the communist movement not only in the international arena but also within the bloc and even on the domestic scene. But there also seems little doubt that to the CPSU the concession represents only a tactical retreat, dictated by the paramount importance it attaches to the need to restore an image of unity to the communist movement in Europe in the current international setting,[18] a retreat that has apparently been judged to be acceptable in view of the real balance of political and economic power within the movement. In this context the concessions, despite their ideological significance, may prove to be more apparent than real. In terms of ideological semantics the gap between the lip service paid to individual parties' autonomy (as illustrated in a quotation in the first part of this article),[19] and the formulations of the June Berlin Conference is not so wide that it cannot be bridged by skilful propagandists.

CERTAINLY there are no signs that any concessions are intended in the application of proletarian internationalism in Eastern Europe or in the slackening of the integration drive there. At a meeting of the COMECON in Berlin immediately following the June Conference, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin called for the setting up of long term

14 Ibid.

15 B. Ponomarev and K. Katushev, the two CC CPSU Secretaries in charge, respectively, of relations with non-ruling and ruling parties, accompanied the General Secretary.

16 *The Times* (London), an editorial, 7 July 1976. Speeches were also censored in most East European countries except in Rumania and the host country, the GDR.

17 See for example Roger Garaudy in *Le Monde*, 9 July 1976.

18 As conveyed to the author, the feeling in Belgrade in May was that the Russians were so anxious to recreate the image of unity in the European communist movement (to compensate for the lack of success in state-to-state relations despite *détente* and Helsinki) that they were judged to be ready to make concessions.

19 *Survey* (Winter 1976), p. 39.

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planned targets in key industrial sectors [20] and thus, in effect, for supranational planning, and Soviet sources have begun to refer to COMECON integration in terms of a 1976–1980 "*piatiletka.*" [21] At the same time the legitimization of countries' "own road to socialism" has supplied much needed ammunition to those East European leaders who are lukewarm towards integration. *The Times* of London has reported that the Hungarian delegation to the COMECON meeting "went on record stating that integration excludes the setting up of supranational planning bodies as well as any interference in the way COMECON member countries run their own economies," and the East Germans were apparently also "cool" towards the "deepening socialist economic integration." [22]

In the light of past East European experience the task of implementing the policy of economic integration, let alone the political one, may well prove to be an arduous struggle which in the end may prove impossible. But there are at present all the indications that the Soviet Union is determined to pursue the goal as stated. The direction aims at the transformation of existing WTO-COMECON institutions into supranational arrangements. As it is beginning to shape up in the Soviet pronouncements such a system would share a common principle of the leading role of the Communist Party in each member state—the parties increasingly integrated with the CPSU—a Soviet-determined common foreign policy, common social and institutional arrangements and an integrated economy based on the "socialist division of labour" and integrated long-range economic planning; the new features to be gradually grafted on the existing multilateral agencies for political, military and economic cooperation, with the whole arrangement closely modelled on the Soviet "national in form—socialist in content" formula. The pronouncements also imply that the pressure on the bloc mavericks to fall in line will gradually increase, be it in foreign policy, as in the case of Rumania, or in the realm of economic planning and management, as in the case of Hungary. There is also much talk on the need to improve agricultural management and productivity on a common basis, an implied threat to Poland, the one member of the bloc with no collectivized agriculture.

THE theory of socialist relations of the new type and the accelerated drive by the Soviet Union to carry out the integration in all of its aspects, place the East Europeans in a situation where an eventual political merger with the Soviet Union looms as a distinct possibility. The CPSU decision to proceed with the integration has obviously been taken because conditions were deemed to be right. A secure Eastern Europe has always been the cornerstone of Soviet European policy and in the current international climate it may well have appeared feasible

20 *The Times* (London), 8 July 1976.
21 *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn*, op. cit.
22 Paul Neuburg, "Tension Over East European Integration," *The Times*, 6 July 1976.

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to Soviet leaders to effect the "organic relationship" with the region—to use Mr Sonnenfeldt's phrase—beyond the point of return.[23]

Even as the momentum behind integration accelerates one may well ask why it should be considered a desirable goal. The conflict of national interests that has emerged among ruling parties and within the world communist movement argues against such a policy as does a potential negative impact within the Soviet Union with its restive non-Russian population. Adding East Europeans to the "Soviet family of nations" would increase the potential for instability. In terms of Western common sense it seems counterproductive to proceed with an expansion of the Soviet state system, the course that is likely to stimulate the latent explosive potential of nationalism within. But Western common sense does not account for the internal dynamics of an ideological system that seeks a solution to internal problems through expansion in a belief that their urgency will diminish in a broader setting and they will "wither away" in the very process of historically predetermined progression. Ideologically conditioned perceptions of their state's and party's power interests have clearly led Soviet leaders to view the integration as desirable as well as feasible.

The theory of proletarian internationalism serves a double purpose. It confers respectability, indeed glamour, on the expansion that, if cast in terms of the Russian state's national requirements, would be non-acceptable and geographically circumscribed. Proceeding from an assumption of an eventual establishment of communism the world over it lends legitimacy to the global extension of Soviet influence, as well as to its relations with the world communist and "progressive forces," and with the "national liberation movements." Along with legitimacy it also lends a dynamic quality to Soviet policies by orienting them to wider goals.

The problem which the Soviet leadership will eventually have to face, is whether the concept of proletarian internationalism is in fact workable. Experience so far indicates—notwithstanding Karl Marx's original assertions—that an assumption of class loyalty superseding all other loyalties in the post-industrialized world has proved to be a myth. World trends clearly indicate that in the communist world as much as elsewhere nationalism is in the ascendant, the most powerful and at the same time the most disruptive force of the twentieth century. The artificial character of class-based internationalism, especially as it is used to disguise the pursuit of national interests by a Superpower, can do little to reverse the trend or to reduce the centrifugal forces it is increasingly facing.

[23] The principle of inviolability of the post-second world war frontiers as well as pledges of non-interference approved by the Helsinki CSCE, supplied the finishing touch to the Soviet grand design in Eastern Europe. In the light of recent Soviet policies in Eastern Europe Western signatures meant more than just the recognition of *status quo ante*. They legitimized Soviet hegemony in the area. The Soviet drive to convene the conference and their insistence on the inviolability of frontiers provision (frontiers that have long been *de facto* secure), puzzled some Western observers. Seen in the context of intra-bloc relations these moves were designed to gain international approval for the integration of Eastern Europe.

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The Bridgman Delegates

Harvey Klehr

THE Communist Party of the United States of America, like other American political parties, has held conventions to transact the party's business, discuss its strategy and approve a platform. While studies have been made of the delegates who have attended other party conventions, however, the CPUSA's gatherings have gone relatively unanalysed by scholars. Delegates to Communist conventions have frequently not been anxious to reveal their identities. Party conventions have had an inconsequential effect on American politics. Personal interviewing has been either impossible or unavoidably unsystematic.

For the first time, however, it has now become possible to examine in some detail the delegates to a party convention, albeit an unusual one. In the early 1920s, the Communist Party, badly scarred by incessant internal factionalism since its formation in 1919, was operating underground as a result of severe repression and raids conducted against the party by the Justice Department. In August 1922, the third convention of the Communist Party of America met in secret on a guest farm near the town of Bridgman, Michigan. The convention was attended by virtually all the leading party figures and by three representatives of the Communist International, sent to mediate between the opposing factions. Only four days after beginning its deliberations the Convention was raided by the FBI, Michigan state police, local police and a band of hastily recruited local citizens.[1]

The raid did not catch the delegates unprepared. The day before it took place, one of the FBI men was recognized reconnoitring the farmhouse: hasty preparations were made to enable most of the conventioneers to flee and the convention's records to be buried in two wooden barrels. A number of native-born Communists remained behind to be arrested. One of them, Francis Morrow, alias Francis Ashworth, alias Comrade Day turned out to have another alias, Agent K-97 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Morrow was a regularly elected delegate from the Philadelphia district: he had been an informer ever since he joined the party in 1919. On his way to the convention site Morrow had managed to evade his comrades' tight security and inform his employers of the general site of the convention.

Morrow obligingly directed the raiders to the buried treasure of documents. In addition to revealing information about party membership, finances and programmes, the seized documents included question-

[1] This account is pieced together from several sources: Jacob Spolansky, *The Communist Trail in America* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1951), Theodore Draper, *The Roots of American Communism* (New York: The Viking Press, 1967) and a chapter from an as-yet unpublished autobiography by Bertram Wolfe, which he graciously let me read.

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naires filled out by all the delegates. These questionnaires asked for a number of biographical details and information about the individual's career. One of the delegates called the seized dossiers a "Who's Who" of the communist movement.[2] Several people who have written about American communism have mentioned these dossiers but they have never been employed outside law enforcement circles.[3]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, with the agreement of the Berrieu County (Michigan) Prosecutor released these dossiers under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act. The dossiers I have seen are photographs of the seized documents. Several dossiers are not included—whether because some delegates failed to fill them out or the FBI lost them or deliberately withheld them is not known. Nevertheless, the 65 available dossiers provide an untapped resource of information about the leadership of the infant Communist movement.

THERE were 43 delegates from the party's various districts, ranging from nine from New York to two each from such outposts as California and Minnesota. Two delegates represented the Communist Youth League and three were representatives of the Communist International. Nine more were members of the Central Executive Committee. Nine people were fraternal delegates, two represented the women's section, one, William Z. Foster, was from the Trade Union Education League, one was a disputed delegate and three were stenographers—a total of 73 people. Seven of the delegate dossiers, including that of Morrow, the government informer, are missing. The other missing dossier belongs to Henryk Walecki, alias Ward Brooks, who was the Comintern's chief representative to the conclave. Thus, 65 questionnaires are available.

Identification of all the individuals has been very difficult. All the delegates to the convention, even those known to everyone else, used aliases. The rules of the Grounds Committee forbade addressing anyone by his correct name. The dossiers had only numbers on them. Morrow's report on the convention listed many of the real names of delegates along with their aliases and the districts from which they came. Other delegates, however, stumped him and he was able only to list their assumed names. Employing Morrow's report, testimony from the trials for criminal syndicalism which several of those arrested underwent and the details of the questionnaire themselves, I was able to identify all but 11 of the 65 dossiers. Two of the unidentified 11 were stenographers. Of the eight missing dossiers, we know the identity of four. (See Appendix.)

The information the delegates supplied about themselves ranged from their age and marital status to the languages they spoke and the number of times they had been arrested. The emphasis of the questions was towards practical skills which would be at the disposal of the revolutionary movement—military experience, labour organizing, language facility.

[2] Bertram Wolfe.

[3] R. M. Whitney, *Reds in America* (Belmont, Mass: Western Islands, 1970), originally published in 1924, apparently was given limited access to the seized documents: several are printed in his book.

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THE single most agreed-upon fact about the young Communist party is that it was a party of the foreign-born. Historians have documented that the vast bulk of the party was attached to the foreign-language federations which provided a comfortable old-country ambience for radical immigrants. Some of the party membership figures which were seized at Bridgman give added documentation to the party's foreign-born character. In the April–June period of 1922, only 17 per cent of all party members were enrolled in English-speaking sections. Enrolment in an English-speaking branch of the party did not, however, necessarily mean that one was native-born, only that one spoke English, however haltingly. One report, breaking down the membership of the New England district, gave only 43 English-speaking members out of 673 in July 1922.

The delegates to the convention were not nearly so heavily foreign-born. Nevertheless, two-thirds of the 65 respondents were born outside the United States. The 22 who were American-born, while a substantially larger percentage than the native-born in the general party membership, were outnumbered nearly two-to-one. The missing dossiers are probably men more likely to be foreign-born. Morrow was native-born and Walecki, the Comintern representative was a foreigner. Of the other six, five were adherents of the Goose caucus, a group hoping to keep the party an underground organization and drawing much of its support from the foreign language federations. Of the three stenographers two were American-born and one came from Russia, so the regular and fraternal delegates were more heavily foreign-born than is immediately apparent.

The foreign-born came from a multitude of countries. (See Table I.) The foreign-born party membership in the early 1920s was primarily from the areas of the old Tsarist empire. While the largest single federation in the middle of 1922 was the Finnish, the Russian, Polish, Lettish, Lithuanian and Ukranian sections enrolled 36 per cent of the membership while the Jewish federation, composed almost entirely of people from these regions, had an additional 7 per cent. The distribution of the delegates was rather different. The largest number, 14—13 if the stenographers are excluded—were born in Russia while three others were from Lithuania. The Russian Empire, source of more than 40 per cent of the party membership, contributed only a little more than a quarter of the leadership—about 40 per cent of all the foreign-born leadership. Walecki was a Pole—the other six missing delegates could have been from Eastern Europe.

The other large representation was from Central Europe—four Germans and four Austrians, several Hungarians, Czechoslovaks and Bohemians. The Finnish Federation was for years during the 1920s the largest single group within the party but only three delegates were born in Finland. Three others came from Sweden, even though Swedes never played a prominent role in the party. The party convention had a

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TABLE I

Country of Origin

	Number	*Percentage*		*Number*	*Percentage*
USA	22	34	Sweden	3	5
Russia	14	22	Czechoslovakia	2	3
Lithuania	3	5	Bohemia	1	2
Rumania	1	2	Hungary	2	3
Finland	3	5	Germany	4	6
Austria	4	6	England	2	3
Belgium	1	2	Ireland	1	2
Italy	2	3			

cosmopolitan cast—people born in 14 foreign countries—all finding their way into the leadership of the American Communist movement.

In spite of the large number of foreign-born, this was a convention of an American political party, or at least a party which hoped to make an impact on American life. While many of the members of the party spoke little or no English and were isolated from much contact with American life, the conference delegates were different. Although it is speculation, it is at least likely that many of the delegates were chosen precisely because they were more assimilated—at least to the extent of being able to speak English and, hence, to converse with other delegates. Only two delegates failed to list English as either their main language or a language they spoke. One was John Greisinger, a delegate from Philadelphia, who had lived in the United States for over 20 years. It seems likely that he simply failed to list English. The other was John Pepper, a Hungarian emissary from the Comintern, who had been in the United States for only a few months.

More significant is that 53 people listed English as their main language. Thus, 31 of the 43 foreign-born no longer considered their native language their everyday tongue. Two of the three Lithuanians, all three Finns, both Hungarians and one of the two Slovaks still clung to the language of their birth. There were two people whose main language was Russian, one Yiddish and one German. Thus, a very large percentage of those born in Russia no longer used Russian as their major language. Only 12 of the 43 foreign-born—less than 30 per cent —had not adopted English as their medium of communication.

A somewhat larger number of the foreign-born had not become citizens. Of the 65 delegates, 47 were citizens, 17 were not and one had his application pending. Twenty-six of the 43 foreign-born, or just more than 60 per cent, had either obtained or were in the process of obtaining American citizenship. While this is a considerable number, it is not large considering the length of time the foreign-born had spent in America. Only two people had been in the country for fewer than seven years—one of them the recently arrived Pepper. Fully half of the 43 had been in the United States for 15 years or more and 75 per cent of the foreign-

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born had been there for more than 10 years. The mean number of years in America was 17.

The foreign-born attending the Bridgman convention, if not totally assimilated into American life, were a long distance from being greenhorns. Most had lived in that country for years, virtually all spoke English, a strong majority using it as their major language and a somewhat smaller majority had obtained citizenship. Although the foreign-born dominated at the convention, most were Americanized and far removed from Europe.

IF there has been general agreement on the foreign antecedents of most of the early communists, there has been little but disagreement about the extent to which American communism was the heir of the left-wing socialist tradition. In his definitive and superb history of the party, Theodore Draper argued that the Communist Party emerged out of the Socialist Party left wing. Max Shachtman, himself a veteran of the early days of American communism, insisted that the Communist Party was not a continuation of the Socialist left wing, but a new force, largely brought into being by the Bolshevik revolution.[4] One of the points of contention was over how many of the CP leaders had been members of previous radical groups or prominent in them. The Bridgman questionnaires provide some insight into the revolutionary past of the delegates. Not only were they asked to list their past party affiliations, they were also asked about the length of time they had spent in both the communist and the revolutionary movements.

Easily the most popular former party affiliation of the delegates was the Socialist Party. Fifty-four, or 83 per cent, of the dossiers cited the SP. Two of the three stenographers reported no other radical affiliations, so only nine of the delegates had not belonged at some point to the party of Eugene Debs. Of these nine, virtually all had been members of some other radical group. Two had belonged to foreign organizations, three had been members of Daniel de Leon's Socialist Labour Party, one was an IWW member and one an anarchist. Two delegates had no radical affiliation pre-dating the American Communist movement.

The second most popular radical group was the Industrial Workers of the World or Wobblies. Nine delegates had belonged to that militant group. Although the question did not ask for only past radical party affiliations, no one admitted to ever having been a member of either the Democratic or Republican parties.

Two of the questions provide some opportunity to assess the importance and the durability of the delegates' involvement with the Socialist Party. First, they were asked "how long have you been active in the revolutionary movement?" A few questions later was a query about

[4] Max Shachtman, "American Communism: A Re-examination of the Past," *The New International* (XXIII, Fall, 1957), pp. 207–45 and the exchange between Draper and Shachtman in *The New International* in the Winter 1958 issue.

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activity in the "C movement," clearly meaning communist movement. Thus, answers to this first question indicate whether the delegates had been attracted to the Socialist left wing as a result of the Russian revolution or had been socialists prior to it.

The convention was held in 1922: the Russian Revolution took place in 1917. Thus, those delegates who had been active in the revolutionary movement for five years or less could be presumed to have been drawn into that movement under the influence of that cataclysmic event. Only 12 of the 65, or 18 per cent, had become radicals in 1917 or thereafter. Three of the 12 were the stenographers. The mean number of years the delegates had been active radicals was 12·8—meaning that the average one had been active since 1909. A full one-fifth of the respondents dated back 18 years and one veteran—Comintern representative Boris Reinstein—claimed 38 years of activity and another, J. Wilenkin, noted 37 years. On the basis of the responses to this question, it appears that this group of communists had been radicals prior to the Russian Revolution.

Shachtman would not have felt that this necessarily invalidated his thesis: he insisted that some American radicals had been transfixed by the Revolution and that Russian events, rather than the old Left-Wing socialist tradition, were the driving force behind the new Communist Party. Thus, for Shachtman, decisive evidence for his view was that very few of the communists had been at all prominent in the pre-war radical movement. Several of the people he discusses—Charles Ruthenberg, Ludwig Katterfield, Caleb Harrison and Boris Reinstein—were present at Bridgman. What of the others? We can examine some evidence to test Shachtman's argument by looking at the responses to the question asking the respondent to list the offices held in the radical movement.

Only nine of the 65 had held no offices at all in the radical movement. Very few of the others, however, had been in significant positions. Most were vague about the positions they had held—organizer and secretary responses indicating fairly low-level offices. A number of the individuals noted offices only in the communist movement. Aside from a scattering of individuals mentioned by Shachtman who were nationally prominent in the SP and the SLP, there were a few delegates—Rose Pastor Stokes, Mother Bloor, Olive Carlson, Ben Gitlow, and Martin Abern—in middle-level socialist offices such as state secretary, national organizer or national secretary of the Young People's Socialist League. Thus, while most delegates had been socialists, very few had been important or influential party figures.

AMERICAN communism during the 1920s was a small, isolated sect. To what extent were the delegates involved with other working-class organizations? Several questions asked what labour unions the individual was a member of, what unions he had belonged to, how many years he had been a member, what offices he had held and whether he was a paid labour union official. Answers to these questions will provide an indication of the involvement of party leaders in the largest and most

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important organizations to which most of the people the party wished to attract were affiliated.

Only one individual was a paid union official—Bert Wolfe who was an editor for a union paper. Forty-one, or 63 per cent, were union members at the time of the convention. Only 12, or 18 per cent, had never been a member of a union. Although most of the delegates were union members, relatively few held positions of leadership within their unions. First, only 10 people, or 15 per cent, were holding any kind of union office. Secondly, only 26 delegates had been union members for more than five years, suggesting that many had become unionists because they were first communists.

How did the delegates earn their livings? Were they part and parcel of the working class whose vanguard they claimed to be or were they a group of declassed intellectuals seeking an outlet for their ideological fantasies? A slight majority gave as their occupation a blue-collar job—55 per cent. There were five clothing workers, an equal number of carpenters, several painters, machinists and printers and a scattering of others ranging from farmer to barber to labourer. Among the white-collar workers, there were eight office workers and six journalists, a scattering of accountants and such others as a musician and a dentist. For a proletarian party there were a lot of bourgeois occupations. Very few delegates came from heavy industry: most of the blue-collar delegates were craftsmen.

A more revealing statistic about how the delegates earned their livings is found, however, in the responses to the question of whether one was "a paid employee of the party at present?" Forty-two people—65 per cent—were on the communist payroll. This figure gives some sense of the large number of jobs controlled by the party and its affiliated organizations—language federations, newspapers and front groups. It also emphasizes the extent to which party influentials were party functionaries and had abandoned their earlier occupations and work to devote their lives to the party. Additionally, those who made their living from the party would presumably be more susceptible to party demands and orders than those whose whole lives were not tied to the movement.

RADICAL movements have always proved attractive to the young. Whether their youthful idealism impels them to radicalism or older, more settled people stay away from movements seeking massive change or cannot afford to risk families and careers, young men and women have been in the forefront of socialist movements of all sorts in the last 100 years. While this group was relatively young, it was not youthful. The mean age was 33, pulled down somewhat by the young trio of stenographers. A quarter of the group was under 26, another quarter was over 39. Only three delegates were in their 50s. Most of the group was people in their late 20s to early 40s—hardly old but not rumbustious students or irresponsible youths either. Moreover, 57 per cent of the group was married, suggesting even more personal stability. On the other hand, a

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substantial number had been arrested at least once. Although reasons were not asked for or given, a safe surmise is that many of the arrests were connected with labour activities. In any event, only 27 people reported no arrest record. Twenty-three had faced charges from one to three times and five hardy souls had more than 10 arrests to their revolutionary credit.

THE net results of the Bridgman convention was that a score of the delegates had one more arrest to add to their *curricula vitae.* Although the state of Michigan pressed criminal syndicalism charges against several people, the convictions obtained were eventually dismissed and the cases dropped. Never again were a Communist Party convention delegates to expose their backgrounds so thoroughly and frankly. And what of the delegates? What happened to them?

Their future careers varied enormously. Eighteen never left the party: they either died in harness—like Charles Ruthenberg and William Z. Foster—or remain dedicated communists today—like William Weinstone. At least one, John Pepper, was eventually recalled to Russia and vanished in Stalin's purges. Several—notably Schachno Epstein—worked for the Soviet secret police. Nineteen left the party, some like Martin Abern to become a Trotskyite, others like Jay Lovestone to become a dedicated anti-communist. Bertram Wolfe is now a well-known writer. The 28 others simply disappeared. They were not to be prominent in party affairs afterwards or else they were active under different names. If they remained in the Communist Party they were minor figures: if they dropped out they did so quietly and anonymously.

APPENDIX

List of Delegates to the Bridgman Convention
—— shows name missing, * dossier missing, aliases in brackets

District Delegates

New England: —— * (Frank), —— (Mossig), —— (Procuroff), Elis Sulkanen (Riley), —— (Edwards).

New York: Abraham Jakira (Dubner), Israel Amter (Ford), Ed Lindgren (Smith), —— * (Leon), Martin Abein (Pamell), J. Brahdy (Erhart), Louis Katterfield (Elk), Ben Gitlow (Low), Harry Winitsky (Brand).

Philadelphia: Francis Morrow * (Day), John Greisinger (Label), Alex Bail (Flint).

Ohio: Walter Brustor (Logan), W. Greffenson (Green), Caleb Harrison (Kennedy), Savarino (Verno).

Chicago: Edgar Owens (Jones), J. Fisher * (Henry), H. Johnston * (Davis), Phil Aronberg (Huron), Anthony Bimba (Mason), M. Backal (Bohak), —— * (Jackson), —— (Novak).

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Detroit: Cyril Lambkin (Ames), William Reynolds (Palmer).
Missouri: T. Sullivan (Page), Elmer McMillian (Wilson), Norman Tallentire (Travies), Mihelic (Long).
California: Bertram Wolfe (Shays), Mrs. Wolfe (Tunler).
Northwest: Seth Nordling (Allen), Max Lerner (Milne).
Pittsburgh: —— (Bruce), —— (Greeley).
Minnesota: —— (Kulanik), —— * (Kesbeck).

Organization Delegates

Communist Youth League: J. Clark (Morton), Oliver Carlson (Edwards).
Comintern: H. Walecki * (Brooks), J. Pepper (Lang), Boris Reinstein (Davidson).
Central Committee: Jay Lovestone (Wheat), Charles Ruthenberg (Damon), Robert Minor (Ballister), J. Wilenkin (Paul), Rayfield (Ray), Alfred Wagenknecht (Duffy), Earl Browder (Ward), Tom O'Flaherty (Ganly), Max Bedacht (Marshall).
Fraternal Delegates: Charles Krumbein (Burke), William Dunne (Driscoll), John Ballam (Moore), K. Suvanto (Jussberg), Schachno Epstein (Stebey), William Weinstone (Lewis), Joe Zack (Collins), Meyer Loonin (Goyer), —— (Dante).
Stenographers: Eugene Bechtold (Johnson), —— (Richards), —— (Keller).
Women's Section: Rose Pastor Stokes (Mack), Ella Reeve Bloor (Strong).
Trade Union Education League: William Z. Foster (Borden).
Disputed Delegate: —— (Skate).

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The Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia and the French Communist Press

Peter Deli

THE explanation of French Communist attitudes and their evolution between January 1968 and September 1969 must be seen in terms of the conflicting demands put on the PCF by its obligations in the International Communist movement, by its interests in French domestic politics, and also through a consideration of what the whole Czechoslovakian drama signified. Czechoslovakia represented a new form of crisis in the Communist world. The Czech Communist Party had placed itself at the head of a powerful movement of liberalization, and unlike its counterpart in Hungary in 1956, did not seem in any real danger of losing control. Thus the Soviet invasion in August highlighted the military interference of one Communist Party in the internal affairs of a fraternal Party and weakened and embarrassed the whole Communist movement.

On a more specific level the Czech crisis was directly relevant to France. Both Communist Parties existed in industrialized countries and by preventing the Czechs from freely developing their own kind of socialism, the Russians were indirectly threatening the " French road to Socialism."

Even before the Russians snuffed out the Czech experiment, the French Communist Party had become a little more independent of Moscow. This could be seen after the death of Thorez and the fall of Khrushchev (the French Communists had been taken by surprise by the sudden change of Soviet leaders). Moreover, by the mid-1960s it had become possible for intellectuals in the Party to criticize developments in the Soviet Union on select occasions without being chastised by the PCF's Central Committee. One example of this was Louis Aragon's text, published in *L'Humanité*, protesting against Moscow's condemnation of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel. Yet, for the most part, the French Communist Party continued its loyal support of Moscow, there were very few prospects of internal change within the PCF and the structure of the Party remained completely unaltered. The Party's " French road to Socialism " seems to have been basically an electoral device for French consumption and when the Czechs really attempted to transform socialism, developments in that country were not unreservedly welcomed by the French Communist Party.[1]

[1] According to Roger Garaudy, Waldeck Rochet was not entirely opposed to the Czech experiment. He certainly did everything he could to promote a peaceful solution between Prague and Moscow and to forestall Soviet military intervention. He had only reluctantly become leader of the PCF and the upset occasioned him by Soviet intervention affected his health.

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Czech attempts to give "Socialism a Human Face" exposed the limitations of the PCF's "French road to Socialism." Understandably, the reactions of the PCF leaders were unenthusiastic. But when the Warsaw Pact countries actually invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the French Communists were faced with a brutal dilemma. Considering its policies and position within the International Communist movement, the Party could not afford to condemn unconditionally the Soviet invasion, which would adversely affect fraternal relations with the Russians, and part of the PCF's *raison d'être*. A total break with Soviet Communism would have meant the rejection of the Russian Revolution and a whole series of symbols and slogans built up over the past 50 years. Moreover in the last few years both the French and the Soviet Communist Parties had reacted in an essentially conservative way, trying to preserve as much of the *status quo* as possible, in the face of parallel problems—the "polycentric decomposition" of International Communism and the mushrooming of new ideological heresies in France. Thus in the French domestic framework the PCF had stood as one of the pillars of stability during the May crisis and declined the *gauchiste* invitation to leave the path of legality and indulge in revolutionary adventures. However, the PCF's defeat in the June elections showed that its image was still not respectable enough for large sections of the French electorate. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia following shortly after the elections further endangered the PCF's image with the Socialists and other Left Wing groups which accepted the parliamentary system. It jeopardized the whole PCF policy of electoral unity within the Left. The Party would not afford to disassociate itself completely from the Dubček experiment when it had been trying to convince the Socialists that there was a distinctive French path to Communism and that the unity of the French Left would not involve a repetition of those sinister developments in the "Popular Democracies" after the war when the Communists had eliminated the non-communist Left. Thus when the Russians denied their "Czech comrades" the right to determine their own route to Socialism the French Communists were faced with a difficult dilemma. The PCF's solution to this dilemma was one of compromise—compromise that evolved at different stages of the crisis.

L'HUMANITÉ gave only meagre coverage to Czech affairs between Dubček's assumption of power in January and the beginning of the prolonged crisis that erupted in July. Its two correspondents, Philippa Hentges and Antoine Acquaviva, confined themselves to dry factual reports accompanied by very little interpretation or analysis. These reports were usually tucked away on the third page—the front page was often reserved for news from Vietnam. Moreover the reports tended to minimize the novelty and originality of the Czechoslovak experiment, to stress and to quote from those speeches of Czech leaders that were orthodox and which reaffirmed traditional loyalties to the Soviet Union,

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and to neglect the more radical pronouncements of the writers and intellectuals and the revelations of the crimes committed in the Novotny era.

The first article of any weight devoted to Czechoslovakia was a summary of Waldeck Rochet's report " on the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland " at a meeting of the Central Committee held at *La Courneuve* on 19 April.[2] The Polish and Czech Party leaders had chosen diametrically opposed solutions to parallel sets of problems. Gomulka had used mass repression against dissident elements and turned out the " workers' militia " against the students. On the other hand the Dubček leadership had attempted to broaden the popular base of the Party's appeal.

At first, Waldeck Rochet's speech appeared to be well balanced and sympathetic to the Czech leaders and yet his expressions of confidence in the Czech leaders were always accompanied by an implicit condemnation of other features of the Czech experiment. This double-edged approach became a regular feature of PCF commentaries on Czechoslovakia and was repeated with changing emphasis after the invasion. In his speech at *La Courneuve*, Waldeck Rochet continued in this ambiguous vein. He stated an important principle by stressing the right of " *chaque parti communiste de déterminer sa propre politique en fonction de la situation et des conditions concrètes du pays concerné* " [3] and then substantially modified the principle by indicating limits to this independence. This was in contrast to Waldeck Rochet's attitude to Poland which was entirely unambiguous and merely followed Gomulka's line. In the last section of this April speech, Waldeck Rochet justified the PCF's apparent approval of two mutually opposed interpretations of socialism under the heading:

Un même objectif—des situations différentes.[4]

L'Humanité largely ignored the ideological ferment created by the " 2,000 word " manifesto published on 27 June by progressive Czech intellectuals. But by mid-July it had become impossible for the French Communist Press to continue to minimize Czech developments in the face of constant Soviet and Warsaw Pact troop manoeuvres. The tension created by the Conference of the Warsaw Pact Powers resulting in the " Letter of the Five " on 15 July with its extensive criticism of Czech developments implicitly threatened military intervention. As the main French papers gave full coverage to this crisis the whole tone of *L'Humanité's* articles suddenly changed. Czechoslovakian developments were now published in large headlines on the front page of the journal. The French Communist leadership was becoming concerned about the international implications of the Czech crisis.

[2] *L'Humanité*, 20 Apr. 1968, pp. 4–5.
[3] *Ibid.*, p .4.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

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L'Humanité covered the conference of the Five at Warsaw.[5] The Czechs favoured bilateral conferences. On 17 July *L'Humanité's* correspondent had quoted from the speech of the Czech Minister of Defence who had asserted that Czechoslovakia had always considered its political and military ties with the Socialist countries as a guarantee of its independence and its socialist development. Other headlines in that same issue indicated that the Czechs intended to reply in the near future to the Letter of the Five. On 18 July *L'Humanité* also printed an important communiqué of the French Communist *Bureau Politique*:

> *En raison de l'évolution de la situation en Tchécoslovaquie et des problèmes qui en découlent, le Parti Communiste Français a décidé de proposer une rencontre des Partis Communistes et Ouvriers des pays d'Europe, dans les tout prochains jours.*[6]

This communiqué revealed that Waldeck Rochet had been in Moscow for talks with the Soviet leaders on 15–16 July. He had briefly returned to Paris to preside over the meeting of the *Bureau Politique* and was then scheduled to appear in Prague for a conference with the Czech leaders on 19 July. Readers of *L'Humanité* were left completely uninformed as to the reasons for this sudden spate of activity. The communiqué's reference to *l'évolution de la situation en Tchécoslovaquie et des problèmes qui en découlent*[7] implied that the situation had taken a grave turn for the worse, particularly as *L'Humanité* had hitherto devoted so little space to Czech affairs. Furthermore it was clear that the French Communists themselves were putting pressure on the Czechs by advocating a meeting of all the communist parties—acting either on their own initiative or on behalf of Moscow.

When the Czechs finally accepted the idea of bilateral conversations with the Soviets, the PCF followed the Russian line in abandoning the pressure for a multilaterial meeting. In the words of the Central Committee of the PCF:

> *Elles ont permis au Parti Communiste Français d'exprimer son souci de voir régler les problèmes existants entre Partis frères par la négociation, à la fois dans le respect de la libre détermination de chaque Parti et dans l'esprit de l'internationalisme prolétarien afin de préserver et de renforcer la coopération fraternelle entre pays socialistes, entre Partis Communistes et Ouvriers dans la lutte commune contre l'impérialisme, pour le socialisme.*[8]

By this time it had become clear that whilst the PCF leadership had not approved of the Czech experiment, its principal preoccupation was to avoid direct Soviet military intervention. It is noticeable that the terminology employed by *L'Humanité* at this stage of the Czech crisis, when the PCF experienced difficulty in defining its exact position, lacked much of the vigour of that used in 1956.

[5] *L'Humanité*, 18 July 1968, contained a summary of the Letter of the Five, p. 3.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[8] Resolution of 27 July 1968. *L'Humanité*, 29 July 1968, p. 1.

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During the ensuing Cierna negotiations, *L'Humanité* reported, with large headlines, every prospect of agreement between the contending parties and on 1 August a large photo of the Czech and Soviet delegations was reproduced. The Bratislava agreement appeared to signify the end of the military crisis and the theme of unity in the International Communist movement was predominant, as for example in the declaration of the *Bureau Politique*:

> *Il considère que la rencontre de Bratislave a créé des conditions favorables au renforcement de cette coopération des pays socialistes, de l'unité de tout le mouvement communiste international et, du même coup, au renforcement de la lutte contre l'impérialisme, pour la paix, la démocratie et le socialisme.*[9]

Two themes emerge from *L'Humanité* before the military intervention on 20/21 August. The French Communist leadership clearly disapproved of the new form of socialism that was being created in Czechoslovakia and it feared at the same time that possible Soviet intervention to suppress this experiment might adversely affect its strategy in France.

AT 10 a.m. on 21 August the *Bureau Politique* of the French Communist Party published a brief statement referring to the *très graves événements* that had taken place the preceding night. Soviet, Bulgarian, Polish, Hungarian and East German troops had entered Czech territory:

> *Le Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Français . . . exprime sa surprise et sa réprobation à la suite de l'intervention militaire en Tchécoslovaquie.*[10]

The Declaration concluded that the French Communist Party *n'a cessé de lutter en faisant connaître son opposition à toute intervention militaire venant de l'extérieur.*[11] In the light of these events the *Bureau Politique* had decided to convoke an extraordinary session of the *Comité Central.*

The Resolution of the *Comité Central* appeared the following day, 22 August, and was far more detailed than the Declaration of the *Bureau Politique.* Moreover it began with a criticism of certain aspects of the Czech experiment:

> *Dans la dernière période, notre Parti n'a pas dissimulé ses préoccupations devant certains aspects de la situation en Tchécoslovaquie. A la faveur des justes efforts du Parti Communiste de Tchécoslovaquie pour développer la démocratie socialiste, pour améliorer le style et les méthodes du travail du Parti et de l'Etat, des forces hostiles au socialisme déployaient leurs activités. L'action de ces éléments ne rencontrait pas toute la riposte politique et idéologique nécessaire.*[12]

[9] *L'Humanité*, 6 Aug. 1968, p. 1.
[10] *L'Humanité*, 22 Aug. 1968, p. 1.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[12] *L'Humanité*, 23 Aug. 1968, p. 1.

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"*L'action de ces éléments ne rencontrait pas toute la riposte politique et idéologique nécessaire*" was a sentence of key importance and represented a very strong criticism of the Czech leaders, an implicit condemnation of the Czech experiment and indirectly provided a pretext justifying the Soviet intervention. The Resolution continued by describing how "world reaction" attempted to profit from these developments in Czechoslovakia. The PCF, according to the Resolution, had made its point of view known before Bratislava and it had welcomed the *Bratislava Accords* as creating favourable conditions for the reinforcement of cooperation between socialist countries on a basis of equality and national independence. The principles consecrated at Bratislava formed the basis of the PCF's condemnation of Soviet interference in the affairs of a fraternal party:

> *. . . notre parti considère que les problèmes surgissant entre les partis communistes doivent être examinés et résolus par des discussions fraternelles lors de rencontres bilatérales et multilatérales, à la fois dans le respect de la souveraineté de chaque pays, la libre détermination de chaque Parti et dans l'esprit de l'internationalisme prolétarien. Il est résolument attaché au principe selon lequel chaque parti communiste doit déterminer sa politique, ses formes d'action, ses méthodes de lutte en toute indépendance sur la base du marxisme-léninisime et en tenant compte à la fois des conditions concrètes dans lesquelles il mène son combat, des intérêts de la classe ouvrière et de son peuple, des intérêts du mouvement démocratique et révolutionnaire mondial.*
> *Il se prononce en conséquence contre toute ingérence dans les affairs intérieures d'un parti frère.*[13]

These principles had been defined by the *Déclaration des 81 partis communistes et ouvriers* in 1960. The Resolution stressed that in its past the PCF had made known its opposition to any form of military intervention:

> *C'est pourquoi le Comité Central, faisant sienne la Déclaration du Bureau Politique du 21 août 1968, désapprouve l'intervention militaire en Tchécoslovaquie. C'est au Parti Communiste de Tchécoslovaquie qu'il appartient, compte tenu de ses obligations internationales, de trouver en lui-même, dans la classe ouvrière et le peuple tchécoslovaques, dans le soutien des pays socialistes et de l'ensemble des Partis frères, les forces nécessaires pour sauvegarder et développer le socialisme en Tchécoslovaquie.*[14]

After thus explicitly disapproving of the military intervention and asserting that it was for the Czech, and not the Soviet Communist Party to put its house in order, the Resolution switched emphasis by pointing to the need for unity in the International Communist movement and the strong traditional ties of fraternity that had always united the French and Soviet Communist Parties:

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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> *Le Parti Communiste Français ne relâchera pas ses efforts en faveur de l'unité du mouvement communiste international en faveur du renforcement de ses rapports de solidarité et de coopération avec tous les Partis Communistes et Ouvriers et particulièrement des liens d'amitié fraternelle qui l'unissent depuis toujours au Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique.*[15]

Finally the Resolution concluded by calling on French Communists, workers and democrats to combat anti-Soviet and anti-Communist provocations:

> *Il appelle tous les communistes, tous les travailleurs et démocrates à combattre les spéculations et provocations anticommunistes et antisoviétiques auxquels les ennemis du socialisme en France et dans le monde ne manqueront pas de se livrer à la faveur des événements.*[16]

The PCF was one of the first of the French left organizations to disassociate itself from the intervention, albeit in a relatively mild form. The next day the Resolution of the *Comité Central* appeared, a far more balanced and skilfully constructed document. It elaborated on and justified the PCF's disapproval of the intervention. At the same time it attempted to reassure the Party's rank and file by criticizing certain aspects of the Czech experiment and reasserted traditional PCF-Soviet ties and it also criticized the "professional anticommunists." However, the significance of the PCF's "declaration of independence" should not be underestimated. The Party had come a long way since Hungary 1956 through publicly disassociating itself from the Soviet intervention. Above all, the Resolution represented an attempt by the PCF to find its equilibrium in an unstable situation. Moreover the Resolution left the Party with some room to manoeuvre.

TWO distinct trends emerge from the Party documents published in the weeks immediately following the invasion. The first reflected the hesitations and ambiguities within the Party itself as it attempted to define its new position. By eliminating the Czech way to Socialism, the Russians had also indirectly threatened the French way, and the PCF leadership, for the first time in its history had been forced to publicly disassociate itself from an important Soviet action. The *Moscow Accords* were to provide the PCF with the means of coming to terms with the Soviet Communist Party again. This represented the second trend—the desire of the PCF leaders to come to terms with the Soviet Communist Party and to repair the breach occasioned by their divergence over Czechoslovakia through emphasizing the themes of traditional friendship and unity in the common struggle against imperialism. This could only be possible if the Soviet Communist Party was willing to reach a *modus vivendi* and did not demand too much

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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from the PCF. Moreover there was another limiting factor involved—the attitudes of the SFIO and other Left Wing groups to the PCF's stance on the Czech crisis.

Before the *Moscow Accords* were signed articles in *L'Humanité* were hesitant and indecisive. Every possible line was to be provided for so that the Party should have room to manoeuvre. This had become apparent as early as 22 August. *L'Humanité* contained the Resolution of the *Comité Central* and published photos of Soviet trucks and tanks in Prague. Czech reactions to the intervention were discussed and the official declarations issued from Moscow, Warsaw, East Berlin, Budapest and Sofia, summarized. This edition also contained the CGT's condemnation of the intervention, couched in language stronger than the *Bureau Politique*. The same edition also contained other articles with very different themes. One author expressed indignation at the "hypocritical" reactions in Washington and Bonn. Another article took to task the PCF's enemies on the Left.

On 23 August, *L'Humanité* published an account of the extraordinary congress of the Czech Communist Party which confirmed Dubček in his function of General Secretary. This, however, was "balanced" by a summary of a *Pravda* article justifying the invasion and in the same issue an article entitled *Pêche en Eau Troublé* was devoted to polemics against those French journals of the Right which had been over-critical of the Soviet Union. Three days later *L'Humanité* reproduced a Declaration of the *Bureau Politique* entitled *pour une solution politique positive* referring to conversations taking place in Moscow between Soviet and Czech Party leaders. No mention was made of the mistreatment of the Czech leaders. Nevertheless in demanding a "positive solution" that specified the retreat of foreign troops, the resolution did adopt a firmer tone:

> *Le Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Français souhaite vivement que ces conversations aboutissent à une solution politique positive de la grave situation créée par l'intervention militaire en Tchécoslovaquie. Par solution positive, le Bureau Politique entend un accord comportant avant tout la normalisation de la situation en Tchécoslovaquie dans le cadre de la souveraineté du gouvernement et du Parti communiste tchécoslovaque, ainsi que de leurs obligations internationales—ce qui implique le retrait des forces d'intervention.*[17]

On 27 August, *L'Humanité* printed an account of an interview with Waldeck Rochet on Radio Luxemburg. This contained a condemnation of the Soviet intervention. Waldeck Rochet stressed that the PCF's disassociation from the Soviet intervention was based on principles; the respect of the sovereignty and independence of each country and the free determination of each communist party in implementing its own policies. These principles, and not tactical considerations, he

[17] *L'Humanité*, 26 Aug. 1968, p. 1.

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asserted, had motivated the Party to undertake its " initiatives " before the intervention. Finally, when asked to describe his feelings as a communist who had hitherto considered the USSR the " Fatherland of Socialism," Waldeck Rochet replied:

> *Je ne cacherai pas que ce n'est pas sans amertume et un certain déchirement que nous constatons notre grave désaccord avec le Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique au sujet de l'intervention militaire en Tchécoslovaquie.*[18]

Whilst the PCF was no longer motivated by blind obedience to Soviet policies, Waldeck Rochet was careful to distinguish the stance of the PCF from the *excitations* of " professional anti-Soviets and anti-Communists." He also referred to traditional ties of solidarity with the Soviet Union and repeated the old Party line that the October Revolution had been the first breach in the capitalist system and had opened the world to socialism. Yet the interview concluded with a declaration of semi-independence from the Soviet Party:

> *Mais le Parti Communiste Français défend et défendra, dans le Mouvement communiste international, les positions qu'il considère justes. Nous pensons que l'intervention militaire en Tchécoslovaquie est une faute grave, nous le disons.*[19]

THE *Moscow Accords,* signed on 27 August, represented an apparent compromise—the Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia in exchange for a policy of " normalization " where tighter censorship was to be imposed. The original Czech leadership was to remain in power. It was an agreement forced on the Czechs by military pressure. However, Soviet troops were not withdrawn and in the following year Dubček was replaced by the more compliant Husak after a series of riots possibly engineered by Soviet agents. " Normalization " under Husak, due to pressure from the Russians and from members of Novotny's Old Guard brought about a degree of neo-Stalinism which gave indications of being as repressive and intolerant as the Novotny regime. Nevertheless *L'Humanité* welcomed the *Accords* without mentioning the circumstances in which they were negotiated.

L'Humanité published on its front page the official statement of the *Bureau Politique* welcoming the *Accords*:

> *Le Parti Communiste Français, son Comité Central et son Bureau Politique, ayant désapprouvé l'intervention militaire et s'étant prononcés pour une solution comportant la normalisation de la situation en Tchécoslovaquie dans le cadre de la souveraineté du gouvernement et du Parti Communiste Tchécoslovaques, ainsi que de leurs obligations internationales, le Bureau Politique enregistre comme un fait positif qu'un accord soit intervenu.*[20]

[18] *L'Humanité*, 27 Aug. 1968, p. 2.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[20] *L'Humanité*, 28 Aug. 1968, p. 1.

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The same edition of *L'Humanité* contained an important attack on Roger Garaudy.[21] Garaudy had been interviewed by a correspondent of a Czech agency (CTK) and in his speech he went further in the defence of the Czech experiment and his criticisms of the Soviet intervention than was consistent with the official line of the PCF. Garaudy thought that France had much to learn from the Czech experiment and he criticized the Soviet leaders for having *porté un coup redoutable au mouvement communiste et ouvrier.*[22] Garaudy's statement was not reproduced in *L'Humanité* which did, however, publish a reply attacking it:

> *Le Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Français juge nécessaire de préciser que cette interview n'engage que son auteur. Certaines appréciations de Roger Garaudy ne concordent pas avec celles que le Comité Central du Parti et son Bureau Politique ont formulées à l'unanimité dans leurs résolutions et déclarations. Elles constituent une ingérence inadmissible dans les affaires intérieurs des partis frères.*
> *En conséquence le Bureau Politique désapprouve l'interview de Roger Garaudy.*[23]

It is clear that this issue of *L'Humanité* marked a new stage in the evolution of French Communist attitudes. After having declared as late as 26 August that it was in favour of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the PCF now welcomed an agreement extracted by force as *un fait positif.*

On 3 September, *L'Humanité* published a new declaration by the *Bureau Politique* on the *Moscow Accords.* Once again the *Accords* were praised and were seen as embodying the principles of Bratislava. What then had been the reason for the invasion? The declaration completely avoided dealing with this question and resorted to repeating the old formulas and platitudes.

By this time PCF acceptance of the Moscow agreements stimulated a crisis of conscience in the non-communist French Left. Initially Guy Mollet and the Socialists had welcomed the apparent fact that the French Communists *se soient rangés du côté de la liberté,*[24] and Mollet stated: " *un obstacle est levé entre nos voisins communistes et nous.*" [25] Similarly spokesmen for the " Federation of the Left " seemed satisfied by the Party's stand although leaders of the PSU were somewhat more

[21] Garaudy had joined the Party in 1933 and had been a member of the *Bureau Politique* since 1956. He was one of the main Party philosophers and had directed *Le Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Marxistes.* When Roger Garaudy diverged from the official Party line over Czechoslovakia it proved impossible to expel such a prominent intellectual overnight, partially because the Party, in its search for an alliance with the Socialists for the " French Road to Socialism," could not afford to destroy its image of respectability. Thus Garaudy, although publicly disciplined, remained in the Party until February 1970 and up to the last six months entertained hopes of bringing the remainder of the Party leadership around to his views.

[22] *Le Monde*, 28 Aug. 1968, p. 7.

[23] *L'Humanité*, 28 Aug. 1968, p. 3.

[24] *Le Monde*, 23 Aug. 1968, p. 9.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

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critical.[26] However, by 5 September the SFIO invited the PCF to choose between the USSR and the unity of the French Left. The main part of the resolution read:

> *Il ne saurait considérer le pseudo-accord de Moscou et la mise au pas du peuple tchécoslovaque qui en est la conséquence comme des actes positifs selon la formule employée par le parti communiste français formule dans laquelle il voit un recul regrettable par rapport à la réaction primitive. Si ce recul devait signifier le retour à une obédience de principe à l'égard des décisions du Kremlin, il mettrait un terme aux espoirs de la réalisation de l'unité de la gauche française.*[27]

Mitterand also pointed to difficulties in undertaking an alliance with the French Communists:

> *Si le Parti communiste ne devait que du bout des lèvres condamner l'intervention soviétique, il serait difficile pour un parti démocrate et socialiste d'avoir avec lui un compagnonnage ou une association politique.*[28]

The Saturday edition of *L'Humanité* reproduced Mitterand's declaration and in reply the PCF pointed to its clear stand against military intervention and stated that it had advocated a political solution *impliquant le retrait des troupes d'intervention.* The PCF hoped that the application of the Soviet-Czech agreement would "open the way to such a solution." Finally the Party also utilized the argument that the unity of the French Left was in danger:

> *Notre position est donc parfaitement claire. Nous faire un procès d'intention à ce sujet serait donc injustifiable. Persister dans cette voie et revenir à l'antisoviétisme ne pourrait que compromettre l'union indispensable de toutes les forces de gauche, de tous les démocrates dans la lutte contre le pouvoir personnel et pour l'avènement d'une véritable démocratie.*[29]

Meanwhile Guy Mollet (interviewed on Radio Luxemburg) made the position of the SFIO more clear. Pointing to the contradictions in the positions of the PCF, he said:

> *On ne peut pas à la fois avoir demandé le retrait des troupes soviétiques, avoir protesté contre l'agression et considérer comme positif l'acte même de négocier ce qu'on appelle un accord et les conclusions de cet acte.*[30]

Mollet described the agreements as dictatorial and emphasized that all the Czech participants, with the exception of Svoboda, had been prisoners. Moreover he continued to criticize the PCF for daring to talk of "socialism" without mentioning "liberty" and condemned it for not going as far as the Italian Communist Party in its protests.

[26] *Le Monde*, 1–2 Sept. 1968, p. 4.
[27] *Le Monde*, 7 Sept. 1968, p. 4.
[28] *Le Monde*, 8–9 Sept. 1968, p. 3.
[29] *L'Humanité*, 7 Sept. 1968, p. 3.
[30] *Le Monde*, 8–9 Sept. 1968, p. 3.

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Waldeck Rochet attempted to answer his socialist critics. He reiterated the stand of the PCF over Bratislava and the Intervention and then justified the PCF's acceptance of the *Accords* by attacking Left Wing critics of the Party:

> *La presse réactionnaire et les adversaires du socialisme cherchent à déformer notre position et ils nous attaquent, parce que nous avons apprécié la conclusion de cet accord comme un fait susceptible d'ouvrir la voie à un règlement pacifique et juste.*[31]

For Waldeck Rochet the " adversaries of socialism " were still opposed to any agreement in Czechoslovakia because they longed for " an aggravation of the situation resulting in a bloody confrontation." It had become clear after the signing of the *Moscow Accords* that the position of the PCF had hardened and its polemics with the Socialists and the " Federation of the Left " showed that pressures from within France were unlikely to change this.

THROUGHOUT the year September 1968–September 1969 the PCF attempted to adjust its position to the Soviet line—the theme of unity and the common ties of friendship between the two parties was increasingly emphasized and the problem of Czechoslovakia was continually pushed into the background. However whilst this process, commencing with the PCF's ready acceptance of the *Moscow Accords* and foreshadowed by certain ambiguities in the *Comité Central's* resolution of 22 August, became more marked, there were also important pressures from within the Party. By the time of the Congress of Ivry, the Party leadership was forced to adopt a tough line with dissidents within the Party. Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch (Maurice Thorez's widow) took an ultra pro-Soviet line and could not accept the PCF's *réprobation* at the time of the intervention. Roger Garaudy, on the other hand, was against all compromise with Moscow over the Czech experiment which he believed offered France many rich guidelines for a socialist future. He continually protested over the Party's lukewarm attitudes and its readiness to come to terms with the Russians after the invasion. Coming under fire from two sides, the group around Waldeck Rochet was forced to clarify and define its attitudes over Czechoslovakia at the very moment when it wanted to push the crisis into the background. This can be seen in the lengthy speeches at the Ivry Congress although the new official line was most clearly defined after the important November meeting between representatives of the Soviet and French Communist Parties. Moreover the Czech crisis, from the point of view of the PCF leadership, was rekindled—by Jan Palach's suicide in January 1969. The changes in the Czech Party leadership in April brought the whole issue to the fore again, provoking further comments from Garaudy within the Party, and Socialist critics from

[31] *L'Humanité*, 16 Sept. 1968, p. 4.

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the outside. The PCF, in its answer to these criticisms, reaffirmed its support for Moscow in its bid to impose unity on the International Communist movement.

Throughout late September and the first three weeks of October, the tone of many articles in *L'Humanité* was non-committal. However when the Central Committee of the PCF met at Ivry on 20–21 October detailed consideration was paid to the new divergences in the Party over its Czech policy.[32] The final resolution of the *Comité Central* entirely subordinated Czech developments (which had received detailed consideration in the preceding speeches) which were described as *une divergence*, to the common struggle of the French and Soviet Communist Parties against imperialism. Full support was given to Soviet proposals for an International Communist Conference:

> *Le Parti communiste français estime qu'une divergence entre Partis frères ne doit pas entraver leur lutte commune pour les grands objectifs qui sont les leurs. . . .*[33]

The speeches of Plissonnier and Waldeck Rochet that preceded this declaration should be viewed primarily as an introductory explanation of the Resolution adopted by the *Comité Central.* However they are also of interest in so far as they explain preceding Party policies and resolutions in terms of the Party's clear desire for unity in the International movement. They also emphasized the new divergences within the Party. Finally there was a slight difference of emphasis between the two sets of speeches. Both were concerned with keeping on good terms with the Russians and at the same time preserving something of the "French way to Socialism." Thus there were considerable ambiguities in both speeches. Yet Plissonnier's discourse contained something of the tone of the PCF resolutions before the signing of the *Moscow Accords* whilst Waldeck Rochet's speech rather stressed agreement with the Soviet Union. Perhaps these ambiguities and inconsistencies were deliberate and designed to supplement each other in order to keep the Party's options open.

In his speech Plissonnier admitted that anti-socialist forces had been strong in Czechoslovakia before the intervention but emphasized that the Czech Government had remained in control and was capable of dealing with the dissident elements. This implicit condemnation of the Soviet intervention was heightened by his rejection of some of Moscow's propaganda. For example, the standard Soviet argument that Czechoslovakia was menaced by West German imperialism, was completely dismissed. Moreover Plissonnier implied that had the proposition of the French Communist Party on 17 July been adopted —the proposition advocating a conference of European communist parties—it might have been possible to reach a political solution and

[32] The speeches and resolutions were published in part in *L'Humanité* and reproduced in full in *Cahiers du Communisme*.
[33] *Cahiers du Communisme*, No. 10, Oct. 1968, p. 42.

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avoid the military intervention and the ensuing difficulties for the International Communist movement.

In the following section of his speech there was a switch of emphasis. Under the title *Les conséquences de l'intervention* Plissonnier chose to condemn the French socialist criticisms of the Party. He repudiated the idea that the PCF could ever break with the Soviet Communist Party.

Following an attack on the non-communist Left, Plissonnier again changed his tone by remonstrating with those comrades within the Party who disapproved of the PCF's condemnation of the intervention. He also stressed that no Communist Party was infallible:

> *Des camarades ont l'opinion que toute divergence avec le PCUS est inadmissible et met en cause la solidarité fondamentale de nos Partis. Cela révèle une conception erronée des rapports d'amitié entre Partis frères. Aucun Parti n'est infaillible, aucun n'est donc à l'abri d'une erreur de méthode ou d'analyse.*[34]

He next turned to the *désaccord dans le bureau politique* and spoke in some detail about the Party's difficulties with Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch. He stated that when she voted for the resolution disapproving the Soviet intervention, she did so reluctantly and that serious divergences had emerged from the discussion that followed. In referring to Thorex-Vermeersch's criticism of the Party for partially condemning the Soviet intervention he replied by stating that no one member of the Party leadership could claim a monopoly of friendship with the USSR. Finally Thorez-Vermeersch was warned against losing sight of the fact that whilst the Party had disassociated itself from the intervention, it had always clearly reaffirmed its wish to maintain and reinforce its friendly ties with the Soviet Communist Party.

During the course of his reply to Thorez-Vermeersch's criticisms, Plissonnier embarked on an interesting digression. Whilst referring to the necessity of avoiding polemics with the Soviet Communist Party *qui une fois engagée, risque de connaître l'escalade*[35] he provided evidence of Soviet attempts to put pressure on the French Communist Party:

> *presque quotidiennement, un abondant matériel de propagande en provenance de l'U.R.S.S. et de la R.D.A. visant à justifier l'intervention est diffusé à travers la France. Il est juste de souligner que si la polémique reste limitée, nous y sommes pour beaucoup.*[36]

One example cited by Plissonnier was the short reply to *L'Humanité* in an article by Koralev which appeared in *Pravda* and was reprinted in *Les Nouvelles de Moscou* and *Etudes Soviétiques*. This article,

> *qui citait un texte de Lénine polémiquant en 1920 avec les longuettistes, nous accusait de capitulation. . . .*[37]

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

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Plissonnier also added:

> *on ne pouvait pas non plus ne rien dire après la publication dans* Le Monde *de l'article du journaliste de l'agence* Novosti.[38]

Under the title of *une divergence n'empêche pas l'unité du mouvement* Plissonnier continued his discussion of the problems raised by the case of Thorez-Vermeersch. He argued that diversity in the International Communist movement in a period of unequal development of capitalism bore tribute to the richness of the Socialist movements. Whilst attempts to overcome divergences between the Parties were valuable, the fact that a divergence existed over Czechoslovakia did not signify the end of the International Communist movement. Plissonnier saw the refusal to recognize divergences as retrogressive. Furthermore he rejected the concept of the "party guide"—the leadership of one communist party or faction in the International movement:

> *On ne peut accepter, dans le mouvement communiste, des conceptions qui aboutiraient à un alignement, à une unité factice aussi dangereuse que paralysante, et qui, poussée jusqu'au bout, pourrait conduire à l'idée qu'il peut y avoir un "parti guide." De telles conceptions n'ont rien à voir avec les thèses communes adoptées dans les conférences de 1957 et de 1960. L'activité indépendante est pour chaque Parti une des conditions indispensables lui permettant de déterminer une juste politique, de gagner à cette politique l'appui de la classe ouvrière et des masses populaires.*[39]

The last section of Plissonnier's report was entitled *respecter le centralisme démocratique* and here he considered the problem posed by Roger Garaudy. Plissonnier outlined Garaudy's divergences from the position of the *Comité Central* in the past and concluded:

> *Ainsi, le camarade Roger Garaudy mène une activité parallèle à celle du Parti. Il prend de nombreuses initiatives politiques sans en référer au Parti, et en violation du centralisme démocratique. Roger Garaudy doit ici, devant le Comité Central, prendre l'engagement de cesser cette activité nuisible à l'unité du Parti, il doit prendre l'engagement de respecter le centralisme démocratique.*[40]

Waldeck Rochet in his lengthy speech covered much the same ground as Plissonnier. The need for unity in the international Communist movement was continually emphasized and he also attempted to define the Party's position in the context of the criticisms of Thorez-Vermeersch and Garaudy.

It is interesting to note that Waldeck Rochet played up the "activities" of West German imperialists far more than Plissonnier who had been rather sceptical about this point. Waldeck Rochet also greatly emphasized the need for unity in the International Communist movement and two sections of his speech were devoted to the dangers from

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24.

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imperialism and the role played by the USSR in combating them. The danger from imperialism was so great that divergences in the International Communist movement, brought about by the Czech crisis, had to be subordinated to the common struggle for unity.

Finally Waldeck Rochet turned to the divergences within the Party. To begin with he listed the same charges that Plissonnier had outlined against Roger Garaudy and then disclosed that on that very morning (21 October)

> *Le Bureau politique a décidé de demander au Comité central d'infliger un " blâme public " au camarade Garaudy et d'exiger de celui-ci qu'il observe strictement les règles du Parti.*[41]

Concerning Thorez-Vermeersch, Waldeck Rochet emphasized that he had done everything he could to convince her that it was not in the interests of the Party for her to resign. He attacked her tendency to link all criticism of the military intervention with anti-Sovietism.

In his conclusion Waldeck Rochet pointed to two dangers facing the Party. He saw the first danger as one which:

> *réside dans l'attitude qui n'admet pas que des désaccords puissent s'exprimer dans le mouvement communiste international, ce qui reviendrait à exiger l'alignement automatique sur n'importe quelle initiative.*[42]

and he described the second as residing:

> *dans l'attitude qui, à partir d'une divergence précise, voudrait tout mettre en cause, y compris le rôle décisif de l'Union soviétique dans la lutte de classe à l'échelle mondiale.*[43]

He then concluded his speech with a statement of the compromise that the PCF hoped to maintain:

> *Nous écartons ces deux attitudes en considérant que dans la situation actuelle, la sagesse consiste à faire en sorte que la divergence à propos de la Tchécoslovaquie n'entrave pas l'action commune et les efforts commune en vue de raffermir les liens de solidarité avec le PCUS et de réaliser l'unité du mouvement communiste international dans la lutte contre l'impérialisme, pour la paix, pour le socialisme. Nous devons plus que jamais lutter sur les deux fronts: contre l'opportunisme de droite en contre l'opportunisme de gauche. Je crois que c'est en agissant ainsi que nous servons le mieux notre Parti et le mouvement communiste et ouvrier international.*[44]

Whilst the Resolution of the *Comité Central* indicated that the French Communist Party leadership was determined that its divergence with the Soviet Communist Party over Czechoslovakia should be pushed into the background and should not be allowed to damage the unity of the International Communist movement, the speeches of Plissonnier

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

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and Waldeck Rochet indicated that the Party was still undecided on *how* to suppress the problems created by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The will to come to terms with the Soviet Union, as indicated by the PCF's continual advocacy of the International Conference, was evident, but there was a certain amount of ideological confusion created by a diversity of pressures—Socialist criticism of the stance of the PCF, the propaganda of the Warsaw Pact countries, and dissensions from within the Party itself. The differences of emphasis in the speeches of Plissonnier and Waldeck Rochet indicated that the PCF was still a little disorientated by the Czech crisis. Perhaps the two speeches were designed to supplement each other and to cover all possible evolutions.

On a more mundane level, however, the positive conclusions that emerged from these speeches were the advocacy of talks with representatives of the Soviet Communist Party on 4 November and measures taken to deal with the dissidents Thorez-Vermeersch and Garaudy. A communiqué was issued by the Central Committee dealing with the resignation of Thorez-Vermeersch (who had not been present at the meeting on 21 October) and the public reproach to Garaudy. On 23 October, *L'Humanité* printed Thorez-Vermeersch's letter of resignation and the declaration of Roger Garaudy—a declaration that still showed a certain defiance and indicated that the affair was far from over. He stated that no one had asked him to renounce his ideas but only the method and the form with which they were made public.

The Congress of Ivry had officially admitted the existence of important dissensions within the Party. However, on 24 October *L'Humanité* published on its front page a bitter indictment attacking those who interpreted the Congress as an indication of disunity and weakness in the ranks of the PCF:

> *Les professionnels de l'anticommunisme ont été déçus par le Comité Central d'Ivry, par le contenu de ses résolutions et l'unanimité de ses membres. Dès lors, ils prennent prétexte du fait que Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch a démissionné du Comité Central pour se livrer, dans les colonnes de la presse réactionnaire, à une débauche d'inventions et de calomnies contre notre camarade et contre les dirigeants du Parti. Ils vont jusqu'à outrager grossièrement la mémoire de Maurice Thorez. Ils utilisent pour leur sale besogne les écrits de personnages aussi discrédités que le renégat Lecoeur.*
>
> *Nos militants, nos lecteurs, tous les honnêtes gens sans distinction d'opinion, réserveront à ces élucubrations le seul accueil qu'elles méritent, le mépris.*[45]

AFTER the noise of the Ivry Conference had died down, the repercussions of the Czech crisis also appeared to recede and the French Communist Party felt free to strengthen its ties with the Soviet

[45] *L'Humanité*, 24 Oct. 1968, p. 1.

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Union. The position adopted by the Party after the Moscow meeting on 4–5 November illustrated this. Czechoslovakia was mentioned only in one paragraph in the official communiqué published on 7 November:

> *Les deux délégations, après avoir échangé leurs points de vue respectifs sur les événements de Tchécoslovaquie, ont exprimé le souci que, dans le cadre des accords conclus et mis en oeuvre par le Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique et le Parti Communiste de Tchécoslovaquie, la situation se normalise sur la base du marxisme-léninisme, que se renforce et s'épanouisse le socialisme dans ce pays.*[46]

This represented a harder pro-Soviet line than that put forward at Ivry although it was clearly foreshadowed by the emphasis on unity throughout Waldeck Rochet's and some of Plissonnier's speeches. The right of each Party to determine its own way to socialism, briefly mentioned in Plissonnier's speech, had been abandoned in this declaration of 4 November. Moreover some terminological changes were also noticeable; *échangé leurs points de vue respectifs* had supplanted *divergences.*

An article in the November edition of *Le Nouvel Observateur* published under the pseudonym of Frederic Duchamps referred to the November Agreement as a "remarriage of reason." Both parties had clearly agreed to cooperate on the basis of their mutual interests. The divergences created by the Czech crisis had been allowed to die quietly away. The French Communist Party fully supported the Soviet Party in its desire for an International Communist conference and was faithfully to follow the Soviet line there. The Russian invasion had for the first time forced the PCF to disassociate itself publicly from a major Soviet initiative and in the process precedents had been created for further declarations of independence should the need arise. On the other hand the PCF had always desired to bridge the gap between the two Parties after the Czech crisis. By November 1968 the new line had been clearly defined.

January 1969 saw the appearance of further heresies in the French Communist Party brought about by the Czech crisis. On 18 January, *L'Humanité* published the Declaration of the *Bureau Politique* criticizing the first edition of the new revue *Politique Aujourd'hui* that had appeared that month. This journal was a forum for communist and non-communist intellectuals, sympathetic to the Czechs. The Declaration of the *Bureau Politique* criticized the articles as containing "anti-Soviet biases that could only enfeeble the communist parties in their mutual solidarity and their struggle against imperialism." The participation of communist intellectuals in this journal was strongly condemned.

A few days later Czechoslovakia was back in the news after the

[46] *L'Humanité*, 7 Nov. 1968, p. 1.

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suicide of the student Jan Palach. A wave of protest swept over Czechoslovakia culminating in the huge funeral procession. *L'Humanité* played down these events and, as in the first half of 1968, contented itself with brief reports. It was not until 27 January that Philippa Hentges presented her readers with some information on the size and scope of Palach's funeral procession. The same edition carried a bitter attack on those in France who had tried to organize a demonstration in sympathy with the Czechs:

> *. . . Une manifestation anti-communiste, organisée par un organisme qui prétend s'intituler " Comité de Soutien au peuple tchécoslovaque," s'est déroulée vendredi après-midi, rue de Prague à Paris. Elle a réuni quelques dizaines de personnes. Bref, un fiasco.*[47]

At the beginning of April, *L'Humanité* minimized the importance of the riots following the Czech ice hockey victory. On 18 April, *L'Humanité* announced on its third page that Dubček had been replaced by Husak. By 21 April, Antoine Acquaviva presented the first official French Communist interpretation of this important change. The tone of his article expressed approval for the changes, viewing them as part of the need to find a new equilibrium in Czechoslovakia. This was interpreted as being inherent in the natural process of " normalization " and not seen as a product of direct Soviet pressures and manipulations.

Le Monde commented on the changes in Czechoslovakia in rather more detail than *L'Humanité*. The effect of these changes on the French Left was also considered. One commentator, Raymond Barrillon, who referred to some lively polemics between Georges Marchais and Guy Mollet, wrote " *le fossé se creuse entre le PCF et la SFIO.*" [48] Mollet's comments on recent developments were quoted in detail. Georges Marchais replied to Mollet's speech by accusing him of rendering service to the Gaullists and blamed the Socialists for refusing agreements with the PCF in June 1968, well before the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.[49]

The broad lines of an International Conference of Communist Parties had been anticipated at a bilateral conference in November between the French and Russian Communist Parties. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had not solved basic problems which the Soviet Communist Party faced before 1968 in its relations with fraternal parties.

Cahiers du Communisme reproduced the main documents pertaining to the role of the PCF at this conference. Waldeck Rochet's speech at the conference in the name of the French delegation basically consisted of analysis of the evolution of imperialism and the situation in Europe in completely orthodox terms virtually identical to the Soviet position. Referring to domestic affairs he emphasized the Party's struggles against

[47] *L'Humanité*, 27 Jan. 1969, p. 2.
[48] *Le Monde*, 20–21 Apr. 1969, pp. 1–3.
[49] *L'Humanité*, 24 Apr. 1969, p. 4.

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deviations of both Right and Left and also attacked the Socialists for their refusal to work with the PCF. Unity was the predominant theme both within France and within the International Communist movement. Czechoslovakia was not mentioned in Waldeck Rochet's speech.[50]

It is worth considering a report in *Le Monde* giving an account of Georges Marchais's press interview where he was asked why the French delegation had not spoken of Czechoslovakia at the International Conference. His reply showed how much the PCF now followed the Soviet line:

> *Pourquoi n'en avons nous pas parlé à la conférence ? Tout d'abord, nous avons tenu compte de l'orientation qu'en commun les partis communistes et ouvriers avaient fixée lors de la première réunion consultative à Budapest.*[51]

Marchaic also referred to the wishes of the new Czech leadership that there should be no interference in their internal affairs:

> *C'est à partir de cette position que la délégation tchécoslovaque a indiqué qu'elle considérait que si ce problème était débattu, ce serait une ingérence dans les affaires intérieures du parti communisite tchécoslovaque.*[52]

Marchais had almost explicitly repudiated all that the Dubček regime had stood for by citing current Czech leaders' views on their relations with the Soviet Union. In his report to the *Comité Central* he continued in the same manner as Waldeck Rochet, subordinating all the problems created by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia to the requirements of unity in the international Communist movement.

By the end of September events in Czechoslovakia had turned a full circle. The demonstration on the anniversary of the invasion had provoked emergency measures in Prague. Both the demonstrations and the new measures were only briefly mentioned in *L'Humanité*. On 29 September, Husak justified and approved of the Soviet invasion of the preceding year. *L'Humanité* reported this dramatic event in the following manner:

> *Le Comité Central du PCT a Défini Les Tâches Politiques Dans La Situation Actuelle. Il a annulé sa résolution du 21 août 1968 et procédé à un profond remaniement des organismes dirigeants.*[53]

THE initial PCF reactions to the " springtime in Czechoslovakia " were not over enthusiastic. However, by the end of July there had been a distinct possibility of Soviet military intervention and French Communist leaders feared that this could increase the internal difficulties of their Party and aggravate problems that had been pressing since the events of May and the disastrous elections of July. Thus the Bratislava Agreement was welcomed by the PCF with evident relief and the Soviet military

[50] *Cahiers du Communisme*, Nos. 7-8, July-Aug. 1969.
[51] *Le Monde*, 12 June 1969, p. 10.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[53] *L'Humanité*, 29 Sept. 1969, p. 1.

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intervention only two weeks later came as an unpleasant surprise. The *Bureau Politique* rapidly issued a declaration and this was followed by the more elaborate resolution of the *Comité Central* expressing the French Communist Party's disapproval of the intervention, without defining the lines of PCF policy too sharply. The Soviet Union, by so clearly placing its own interests above those of the Western communist parties, had forced a new form of independence on to the PCF. Thus the PCF disassociated itself from the Soviet intervention whilst reaffirming its traditional loyalty to the Soviet Communist Party. The image of the Czech experiment within the PCF had not been changed, rather the Party was temporarily obliged to assert the right of the Czech Communist Party to determine its own destiny. In the period that followed the intervention, the Socialists and other groups on the Left in France at first wrongly interpreted the divergence between the French and Soviet Communist Parties as evidence of a fundamental change of heart within the PCF.

By the time of the *Moscow Accords* on 27 August, it had become clear that the PCF had not fundamentally changed but was merely trying to find its balance in a new and tricky situation, torn between its traditional loyalties to the Soviet Union and its desire for an alliance with the Socialists in France. By 2 September the new trend had become clear. The PCF was primarily concerned that a political solution should be reached "normalizing" the situation in Czechoslovakia as quickly as possible. It was not possible for the Party to retract its "disapproval" of the Soviet intervention—this would have resulted in a humiliating loss of face—but it was willing to reach a compromise, push the Czech question into the background and resume relations with the Soviet Communist Party on the old basis of fraternity and close cooperation. By 7 September the Socialists had taken note of the new PCF position. Relations between the French Socialists and Communists were marred by polemics over the Czechoslovak affair.

Whilst the *Moscow Accords* made it possible for the PCF to attempt an adjustment to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the position of the French Communist Party was still relatively uncertain and unstable. Within the Party itself, there were strong currents of dissatisfaction and the official line was attacked by both Thorez-Vermeersch and Roger Garaudy. Moreover the Soviet Communist Party was lukewarm to the French Communist stand and displayed little sympathy for the PCF in its endeavours to adjust to the new situation. The polemics against Aragon, the appearance of Soviet propaganda material in France justifying the intervention, and the public controversy between the Soviet and French Communist Parties bore witness to the uneasy relations that had temporarily developed between the two Parties. The discussions at Ivry indicated these divergences and implied that the PCF had not fully resolved these dilemmas. At Ivry, Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch's resignation was accepted and Roger Garaudy was subjected to public blame—it would have been

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difficult to expel him from the Party at this stage since toleration of his criticisms showed that the Party was still "liberal." Finally, Ivry opened up the possibilities of a new line. Waldeck Rochet had proposed a conference with top Soviet leaders scheduled in Moscow for 4–5 November.

The November conference in Moscow marked a new turning point. For the Soviet Union the Czech crisis had been embarrassingly prolonged. The Soviet Communist Party, interested in restoring the tattered threads of international communist unity, had proposed a world conference of communist parties. The French Communists were not asked to recant but, by mutual agreement, the divergences over the Czech crisis were permitted to recede into the background.

At the International Communist Conference in June 1969, the PCF loyally supported the orthodox Soviet line on every major international issue, particularly on the Sino-Soviet split. This fidelity was made possible by two circumstances. The Russians engineered the fall of Dubček and replaced him with the more pliant Husak who was willing to insist that the internal affairs of his country should not be on the agenda for discussion at the Conference. Thus the PCF was spared any embarrassment in this sphere. Secondly, the striking results of the French presidential elections, where the PCF gained at the Socialists' expense and where Duclos won more than double the total votes of his three Left Wing rivals, made the PCF in the short run less dependent on an alliance with the Socialists.

In the light of the overt dissensions of the Italians and Australians at this conference and the more cautious disapproval of the Rumanians the schisms in the movement were left unhealed. The presentation of a minority report created further precedents for divergence within the international movement. However, for the French Communists, the conference symbolized the "remarriage of reason" with the Soviet Communists begun in November. Further developments in Czechoslovakia did not seriously embarrass the French Communists. *L' Humanité* paid little attention to the riots there on the anniversary of the intervention. The new emergency regulations brought in in September, with all the chilling signs of a return to the worst features of the Novotny era, it passed over without much comment.

It is interesting to note that the PCF never directly challenged Brezhnev's doctrine of "limited socialist sovereignty" and throughout this whole period it supported the Soviet Union in its polemics against the Chinese. Moreover, the events of 20–21 August were never branded with the title of "invasion" in any of the official PCF documents. The term "intervention" was, from the beginning, a term symbolic of the PCF's circumscribed reactions to events in Czechoslovakia.

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A Conversation with Luigi Barzini

Dante, the Italians and the PCI *

George Urban

I

Urban—Is Communist rule compatible with the sentiments of a people as profoundly conscious of the novelty and precariousness of its national identity as the Italian?

The struggle for Italian unity and independence from foreign influence, which started in 1513 with Machiavelli's famous "Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians," and culminated, after many reversals and periods of quiescence, in the *Risorgimento* and the unification of Italy in 1861, was a bitterly contested and chaotic affair. The story need not be told here, for no part of the world identified its own hopes more fervently with the progress of the *Risorgimento* than the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

The point that needs stressing is that the nineteenth-century idea of revolutionary nationalism was both democratic and religious—in some cases, indeed, mystical. Nowhere was this more manifest than in the philosophy of the father of Italian nationalism, Mazzini. For Mazzini, the Italian people was the "Messiah people." "To Italy," he wrote, "belongs the high office of solemnly proclaiming European emancipation. . . . We cannot have Rome without giving Europe a new faith and without freeing Humanity from the incubus of the past. The destiny of Italy is that of the world."

Mazzini's idea of "democracy," too, is steeped in the mystic conception of nationhood. Democracy for him means the harmonious co-existence of nations—all equally necessary and equally accomplished in the eyes of God, with Italy just a little ahead of others in "spiritual authority"—rather than any democracy of the people, which he suspected of standing for rebellion and thus subversive of the perfect harmony he was seeking. It is a notion that is, of course, especially incompatible with the socialism of his time and ours.

In Fourier's system, for example, it is not the economic theories Mazzini criticizes; with these he is largely in agreement. But he asks:

> Do you believe that for man it is only a question of regulating his existence and setting his house in order? That the void that consumes his heart is merely caused by the absence of controlled production . . . and a lack of economic equilibrium? Do you believe that great revolutions are simply the outcome of a bad industrial order? . . . Disabuse your mind of such ideas. The void is far deeper, the needs of human nature and of the epoch in which we live are far more numerous and more spiritual than you think.

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> Man is a being that goes ever in search of the key to a great mystery. . . . Our faith has failed us. We feel the need to love and to believe; because loving and believing constitute life. To believe in what? To love what? . . . Every doctrine that does not begin by giving an answer to such questions, is false. . . .

The very notion of conflict between social classes is, for Mazzini, a characteristic of a backward stage in civilization which decreases and eventually disappears as mankind advances, according to a divine plan, to moral perfection. Class warfare, therefore, is not only unjust but in fact the worst crime against society.

Such, then, were some of the ideas that ministered at the birth of the united Italian nation-state: a high conception of the mission of the Italian nation as the "Messiah people," the "initiator people," running side by side with a conception of democracy that is in some ways very modern, because it takes issue with the narrow materialism of the socialist-communist doctrine for its failure to do justice to "the uneasiness, the anxieties, the febrile agitation by which men's minds are troubled today"—alienation, in fact, as it would be called in the 1970s.

If Mazzini's nationalism were the whole story of Italian nationhood it would, on the face of it, be difficult to explain the arrival of the Communist Party at the gates, and perhaps indeed in the corridors of power, for Communist doctrine denies the primacy of nationhood even though it may not be denied in Communist propaganda. Could a people which has suffered so much to attain its sovereignty as a nation sacrifice it on the altar of a social philosophy which regards the nation as a reactionary and transitional phenomenon? In other words, how is one to explain the acceptance by the people of Italy of the Communist Party as a national party and a parliamentary party?

Barzini—The first thing we must remember is that the idea of Italy—the idea that there is a country called Italy inhabited by people called Italians—is an aristocratic one. Since the end of the Roman Empire it was more or less confined to the idea of an Italian language which was kept alive by poets, artists, historians and philosophers rather than the people. To this day, Italy is divided into many provinces, each with its distinct dialect, and when I say "dialect" I am less than accurate, for these vernaculars are Romance languages in their own right, many of them unrelated to one another, and the regions where they are spoken have traditions and a character of their own. The Italian language, which is the acorn from which the nation grew, was invented by one man, Dante Alighieri, who did not call "Italian" the language in which his *Divina Commedia* was written, but *vulgare*—the common tongue, the language of the people—and he admitted that he coined it out of a basic Tuscan dialect, on which he superimposed expressions borrowed from Lombardy, Sicily and Provence.

It was the existence of Dante's national poem that first endowed Italy with a sense of unity—spiritual unity—of its own. For many centuries the language of Italian law, government, the church and the universities had, of course, been Latin. From Dante's poem, from the idea that an

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Italian language existed, many centuries later the Italian nation came into being.

But, as I say, Italian unity was an aristocratic idea. If we had had universal suffrage in the nineteenth century and a referendum had been held on the unification of Italy, I don't think the "unifiers," the "Italians," would have run to more than 5 per cent, and, as a matter of fact, when Italy was finally unified, the number of people who spoke Italian was about 5 per cent. A hundred years ago, spoken Italian, which is the language you hear everywhere in Italy today, was an artificial language, not unlike the Hebrew spoken in Israel today or the Erse taught in the schools in Ireland.

Some of the fathers of Italian unity could not even speak Italian. Cavour spoke French; he had three French aunts, his cousins lived in Geneva, he was in and out of London, Paris and Geneva but he never set foot in Rome. He acquired a strange Italian based on a French-Piedmontese dialect; his Italian was almost non-existent. Garibaldi was born in Nice and spoke Niçoise. From Latin America he had brought back Spanish; his Italian was primitive. He wrote some very bad books in bad Italian.

Italian was, therefore, a minority language which had been invented and preserved down the centuries more for moral and political purposes than for anything else.

Urban—"We have made Italy; now we have to make Italians," Massimo d'Azeglio (Prime Minister of Piedmont) said in 1871.

Barzini—That's right.

Italy, like Germany, was not born out of the matrix which had given birth to older nations such as the Spanish, the French and the English—feudalism giving way to absolute monarchy and then to constitutional government.

The idea of nationhood, that is, loyalty to one's own people, language, culture and national boundaries rather than to the Prince, was a new thing, imported into Italy and Germany in the wake of the Napoleonic armies. It was in the turmoil of the Napoleonic era that the Italians generated the ideology and found the allies for their political struggle from which national unity finally emerged, in large part, as you say, under the influence of Mazzini.

But national unity in Italy has always been a fragile thing. There are, to name only the most obvious, the differences between Northerners and Southerners—the former solid Alpine burghers in the Austrian and Bavarian mould, while the Southerners have the features and manners of Greeks, often with Saracen blood in their veins. Their respective ways of life are also different. The burgher in the North is a Middle-European who believes in the solution of his problems through industrious effort and the wealth it produces (the word for money in the Milanese dialect is "gei"—borrowed from the German *Geld*). In Southern Italy, on the other hand, the focus of man's wrestling with himself and society is not money but power. Hence politics and intrigue are the special art of the Southern Italians, while the North Italians are the founders of industry

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and the managers of large business organizations. What we have here are in effect two nations.

Italy's great fragility is well expressed in the popular phrase that it is a country of "a hundred cities." This is a meaningful expression when you consider that France has always been equated with Paris, and the first thing the Germans did after the unification of Germany was to enlarge and heap the insignia of a great capital on Berlin. The diffused character of Italy, the patchwork quality of its background and life-style, profoundly affected the solidity of its government.

But there were other influences, no less serious. We have one problem which no other country has: the existence within our boundaries of one of the oldest and morally most powerful institutions in the world—the Roman Catholic Church. It is bigger and more influential than any combination of multinational companies, if you will excuse a vulgar comparison. How could Italy become strong, how could a unified Italian government ask for the unreserved loyalty of the people, when stronger than the very government was the Church within its borders, a Church which had fought the unification of Italy, a Church which made it necessary for the Italian army to conquer Rome in 1870—or, to be precise, to go through the motions of conquering it, because there was no armed resistance and there were few casualties? Consider for a moment the abnormality of this state of affairs: to have this monstrous thing, this great, holy, centuries-old institution within Italy with its ancient claim on the bulk of the citizen's loyalties, leaving only a secondary type of loyalty—one of recent origin, more rational and artificial than the one the Church claims—to support the Italian nation-state. The fragility of Italy is written into its structure and history.

Coming to the problem of Italian Communism, I invite you to consider that while in Northern and North-Western Europe the industrial revolution was generated and maintained in a Protestant environment—even in France some of the leading industrialists were Protestant—in Italy industrialization was wholly imported and gave rise to none of that coherent social philosophy which made industrial civilization a less turbulent and less irresponsible affair in Northern Europe than it was in our country.

Urban—I assume you go along with Max Weber's thesis that there is a correlation between Protestantism and the spirit of thrift and capitalism?

Barzini—Not entirely; in fact, I should like not to believe what Weber says, but when I look around and see that the Irish are not noted for their business acumen or wealth, whereas the Scots are; that the Protestant cantons of Switzerland are more highly developed and richer than the Catholic ones, I have to assume that there is something to Weber's theory.

Industrialization in Italy was a transplant: the Italians imported know-how, the art of money-making and the rest, but all this was unaccompanied by that moral fermentation which produced, in England for example, not only capitalism, but, at the same time, a sense of middle-class moral responsibility which permitted widespread social legislation, early trade unionism and the rise of the Labour Party. The

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connexion between Protestantism, capitalism and socialism is really well established.

In Italy (as I say) we received industrialization late and badly. We exploited the proletariat and did nothing comparable to what the English and the Germans did to temper the effects of exploitation. Thus Italian socialism was a form of revolt against this brutal variant of capitalism. It was inevitable that it should come, and it was right that it did come.

The Italian Communist Party is a descendant of nineteenth-century Italian socialism. It split off from the main body of the Socialist Party in 1921, but the history of the Italian Communist Party is no shorter than that of the Italian workers' movement itself, so that our Communists can rightly claim that they are heirs to its heritage. This, of course, makes them uncomfortably Italian for Soviet tutelage.

Moreover, the Italian Communist Party has more paid-up members per capita than the Soviet Party; it is the largest party, not only in the Western world, but, in proportion to the population, in any country. It could not be that if it were not a genuinely Italian party. Undoubtedly, until a few years ago the Party was a tool of Soviet power, although, of course, this has always been denied. Whether it still is, or will be once again, I do not know, but I would hazard the judgment that if the Party has been able to be a highly effective ally of Soviet imperialism, as it has, this was largely due to the fact that it *was* a native-born political force, fully integrated into Italian reality. The Soviet Union and her allies have, in turn, given a great deal of moral and financial support to the Party, although the latter is, again, denied.

So what we have here is a very large and powerful party, but one that lacks ideological unity. Very few party members have read or care about Marx and Lenin. Even among the leadership the fathers of Communism are more often quoted as a concession to the demands of dogma than as practical guides to action. Very few Italian comrades go around with manual in hand trying to do what the book says they should. They are much too sophisticated for any such thing.

Urban—Is the party genuinely felt to be an Italian party, not only by those who have joined it and vote for it, but the country as a whole?

Barzini—Yes; I would say the Communists are the best socialist party we have. This is, in the circumstances, not very difficult, because in any competition for the title of worst socialist party in the world the Italian socialists would be certain winners.

But there is also another and more profound reason. The concept of liberty—individual liberty—is a predominantly North European and Protestant, and only partly a French, notion. We have, of course, our own concept of liberty. Machiavelli and Guicciardini talk of liberty, there was a famous polemic on liberty between the Republic of Venice and the Papal authorities, and so on, but the Italian concept of freedom is not that of the individual facing the state; it is, rather, restricted in its meaning to the liberty or autonomy of the city and the republic, or what used to be called the "universities," that is, any organized group which has won for itself certain corporate freedoms and privileges. The

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freedom of the individual, the freedom of life and the pursuit of happiness, are not native Italian notions.

And because personal liberty does not strike a chord in the Italian mind, its absence is not regarded as a tragedy. Therefore the Communist Party, with its lack of emphasis on the freedom of the individual, does not provoke the same sense of abhorrence and rejection as it does in some other countries. "Why (the Italian will say to himself), we have always had oppressors and tyrants, and we have always managed to beat them at their game by making friends in the right places, weaving connections and intrigues to outwit them." The Italian will accept the tyrant and he will put a good face on unjust laws, but secretly he will set about to make a mockery of the law and put down the tyrant. That is what has happened throughout the centuries, and that is how Fascism was paralysed. Followed to its monstrous consequences, this attitude has also produced the Mafia, which is, if you like, a rather special organization for the defence of group privileges.

Urban—I might add that the art of outwitting unpleasant governments is not an exclusively Italian characteristic. Czechs, Poles and Hungarians are past masters at this game. I don't think Josef Schweik was in need of lessons from Guicciardini.

Barzini—Of course not, only in Italy the game has a much longer history than it has in Central Europe and has become second nature, not only to the little man of the type of Schweik, but throughout society, very much including its upper reaches.

Well, we are facing in the world today some terrifying problems which are unsettling countries more advanced than ours: How to organize mass-industrial production without reducing man to slavery, how to maintain authority and discipline in society, how to produce wealth without destroying the environment, and so forth. One enticing method of solving these problems is by authoritarian rule, and that was the way it was done in Italy under Fascism. It was not a very efficient way of doing things, it didn't even industrialize the country properly, but it did give Italians the verisimilitude of success and a show they could enjoy. Most Italians today would not be truthful if they told you they wanted Communism, any more than they did Fascism, but many of them are, for the reasons I have just mentioned, not as reluctant to accept a Communist type of regime as other people might be.

Urban—The Fascists drained marshes and injected order into a chaotic society; the Communists might do the same—so would run their reasoning.

Barzini—Yes, but (they would add) the individual can always find his way through the maze by having friends in the right places and giving free play to the Italian's native bag of tricks.

But I would not be so simple-minded as to say that Fascism and Communism are the same thing. The two are vastly different—they have different philosophies, different conceptions of human nature, they

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come from different points of the historical compass and so on. All this is well known.

But from the practical point of view, from the point of view of the citizen who has to decide whether the man sitting on top of him with the power to lock him up if he says the wrong thing wears a black shirt or a red shirt, the difference is not very important. I am not saying this is right or wrong, but it is a fact.

There is yet another important factor. The Italian Communists did produce a great thinker—one of the best Marxist scholars of the contemporary world: Antonio Gramsci. I must confess to having a great weakness for him. Let me explain.

I am an Italian *liberale,* that is to say, I hail intellectually from Hegel and Benedetto Croce. My ancestors fought in the wars of the *Risorgimento*; two of them landed with Garibaldi at Marsala, one from my mother's and one from my father's side. One of my maternal grandmother's cousins was Daniele Manin, the last head of the ancient Republic of Venice at the time of its restoration in 1849. My brother was killed in the Resistance movement during the last war, and I was myself imprisoned by the Fascists. I am saying all these things merely to show that no one could accuse me of having a great liking for authoritarian regimes, either in terms of family history or the record of my own life. But I have great respect for Gramsci.

Gramsci was a disciple of both Marx and Croce, and to some extent a legatee of nineteenth-century liberalism with an instinctive understanding for individual liberty. He is, among Communist scholars (Lukács was much less concerned with the political policies of Marxism-Leninism), the only one who tried to find non-authoritarian and non-totalitarian answers to the questions asked by Communists of history and society. Whether his solutions would work or not, no one knows, but we must all admit that Gramsci has written convincingly and eloquently on these problems. Also, Gramsci was a great student of Machiavelli, and one of Gramsci's handles to popular fame was, as you know, his theory that the modern "Prince," *The New Prince,* that is, the seat of all power and self-conscious political organization, is the Communist Party.

Gramsci's analogy with The Prince has more than symbolic significance. Consider the machinery for succession in the Italian Communist Party. It is a strictly elitist affair which has proved highly successful. The disorder, the contradictions and doubts of the democratic process have all been eliminated. If you have ambitions of becoming a Communist leader you cultivate the friendship of the current leaders. You serve them loyally because you want to convince them that you are worthy of being made a member of the *apparat,* from where you may eventually emerge to become a leader. But you do not try to be clever in opposition to existing leaders or policies. A smart man does not join factions.

What I am trying to say is that the Italian Communist leadership works by cooptation, and the Party is, therefore, headed by a self-perpetuating priesthood. Gramsci chose Togliatti, and Togliatti chose some of the best brains in the Party to succeed him. Some of these people, and *their* chosen successors, are still in office, so that you may well say that Plato's idea that the philosophers should be kings and the kings philosophers, has here been put into effect. Thus, Italian Communism is run

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by an aristocracy—that is the secret of its power. It is the secret of Communist parties everywhere, but in Italy, thanks to the seminal policies of Gramsci, the aristocracy has perpetuated itself more successfully than elsewhere. Some of the Italian Communist leaders are truly brilliant men.

Urban—Is their acceptance by the public, then, due to the fact that they represent an undemocratic rather than a democratic selection process?

Barzini—It depends on what you mean by the word "democratic." The Catholic Church has a strikingly similar machinery for selecting cardinals and electing the Pope. The upper reaches of the Church's hierarchy are not at all unlike the Central Committee and the Politbureau of the Communist Party or, if you will, vice versa (we must give it to the Church that it has been much longer in business). Yet, in another sense, isn't the Catholic Church a very democratic organization where John XXIII, a simple peasant, could rise to be Pontiff?

I am saying all these things to show that the Italian Communist Party is not alien corn in Italy; it is not an artificial creation; it is, by the standards of the Italian political parties, not of recent origin. Its successes at the polls are in good part due to its own merits, but partly also, as in a game of tennis, to the fact that its opponents have made too many mistakes.

II

Urban—In your celebrated book *The Italians* you depict the character of the Italian people in terms of three main symbols: Casanova, Cagliostro and Guicciardini.

The feats of Casanova are too well known to need explanation. Cagliostro was a cross between a superior confidence trickster, magician, freemason and adventurer who claimed to be thousands of years old, remembered everything he had seen in his long life, would reminisce about the building of the pyramids and relate what Jesus had told him. He was a manufacturer of love potions, he turned lead into gold and foretold the future. In short, he was the perfect showman of the eighteenth century, a creator of make-believe where the present was too disappointing to bear. The Cagliostro streak in Italian nature is, if I may quote your own description of it, "a retaliation *all'Italiana* against a world that had made . . . [the Italians] poor, powerless, despised. . . . They live among *papier maché* reproductions of reality to avenge themselves on an unjust fate."

Guicciardini is, by contrast, a sixteenth-century symbol of the art of the possible. He is the man who knows how to cut corners, trim his sails to the prevailing winds, survive in a world of wars, revolution, foreign occupation, under the reign of tyrants and lacking protection by the law. "In the ordinary circumstances of life," Guicciardini wrote, "use truthfulness in such a way as to gain the reputation of a guileless man. . . . Deceit is the more fruitful and successful the more you enjoy the reputation of an honest and truthful man; you are more easily believed."

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Having cast myself in the role of " straight-man " in this dialogue, let me ask you: What are the chances that a party as austere, theoretical and unyielding as even the Italian Communist Party tends to be would prosper in an environment in which the lover, the trickster and the trimmer or, if you like, sex, illusion and low cunning are the principal landmarks? I would have thought the joyless rationalism and written indigestibilia of Communist dogma might agree with the tastes of Prussian intellectuals and Cartesian Frenchmen, but would not go down so well in Italy.

Barzini—The answer, of course, is that they don't. Italians don't read Hegel, they don't read Marx, and they don't follow nineteenth-century precedents. More important, the Casanovas, Cagliostros and Guicciardinis are within the Communist Party as well as outside it. The presence of the Casanova principle is exemplified by the fact that Communist Party supporters are practically in control of all Italian film-making, radio and television. Many of the best-known directors, writers, poets and conductors are Communists, or believe that they are Communists. They have embraced something that they think is Communism, not because they have read Marx or any other Communist literature, nor because they know what happened in St Petersburg in 1917, nor because they want to nationalize the means of production. They are, rather, gripped, as Majakovsky was gripped, by a vague and pleasing feeling that the dawn of a new era has arrived.

What the new era is going to look like, they don't know. You and I know what it is going to look like if it does come about, but these people don't. They are elated by the notion that the world is theirs, tomorrow will be a better, or, at any rate, a different, day, and that is enough. That they will end up killing each other, as you and I know, or if they don't, someone else will remember to do the killing for them, does not enter their calculations. Mind you, their political leaders do not, of course, go about proclaiming that the future is dedicated to concentration camps and mass executions. As a matter of fact, if you ask an Italian Communist: What about the concentration camps?—he will himself give you a very qualified answer. That, he would say, does not at all depend on us; it depends on what sort of resistance the reactionaries will put up. If they resist us, we'll be forced to do certain unpleasant things we'd be happier not to have to do, and so on.

Urban—I have always found it puzzling that men and women who fancy themselves as " intellectuals "—your academics, writers, journalists, film directors—should display such an appalling lack of intelligence when it comes to judging the character and record of Communism. Have these " intellectuals " heard of the name of Stalin? Have they heard of the revelations of Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Party congress? Of Hungary in 1956, of Czechoslovakia in 1968, of Gulag?

Barzini—This is a complicated question. Part of the answer is that many of them are simply stupid. A poet who can write a great poem but can't buy himself a railway ticket, catch the right plane, or check his bank account, is a commonplace example. He may possess intuitive intelli-

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gence which is not at all the kind of intelligence you are required to have in practical commerce with the world. The other day I talked to Antonioni, who thinks of himself as a Communist of sorts, and asked him about his political views. The consummate nonsense that poured out of his mouth was amazing. He said he was a "revolutionary" Communist, so I probed a little into his idea of liberty. Freedom, he pontificated, was the one panoramic moment on the barricades—the moment of truth, the moment of life. There was, he opined, no freedom before the barricades or after the barricades. This half-baked philosophy, which wouldn't make a sixth-former proud, was the best I could get from one of our most admired film directors. A great artist is not a thinker. If he were a thinker he would not be a great artist.

Urban—I realize that poets and musicians may be unworldly people, but most of the people we are talking about are writers and intellectuals —the literate and numerate estate of society—whose business it *is* to be intelligent. Or should one go along with Eugène Ionesco: "It is not his fault if he doesn't understand. He's an intellectual"?

Barzini—Let me offer some explanations. Many of these people joined the Party when they were very young. Now they are middle-aged; they have a position, a career behind them, and a moral place in the left-wing *costellazione* of Italian society—all built on their association with the Party. Can they resign at this stage of their life because they no longer share the Utopian vision of their youth? It is as if you joined the army as a young fellow because you felt military service was the greatest thing on earth, but when you reached the rank of colonel you discovered that you were a pacifist at heart. What do you do? Do you give up your career and your pension because you have changed your mind? It is a serious predicament, but you don't resign, because you have, really, no choice.

Another explanation I would suggest is this: the tradition of the court artist in Italy is centuries old. Dante went from court to court, so did Ariosto, so did Torquato Tasso. Every great painter you care to mention in the history of Italian art was supported by the Pope, the Medicis, an Este or a Gonzaga, so that the habit of acquiring one's tranquillity and privacy to do one's work by joining the court of a powerful personage is second nature in Italy. The phenomenon we are examining fits in with this tradition. Why should an able philologist, or biologist, or whatever, not join the Communist Party if that leaves him absolutely free from all worries? The Party will see that he advances respectably in his career, he will become a full professor, he will have just about everything he could wish for professionally and socially *and* the time and peace of mind to do his own thing.

Urban—A man at the court of the "New Prince," in fact.

Barzini—A new prince, yes.

Urban—But your court artist is only free to pursue his fancies because his patron is not in power at the moment. As soon as the prince has

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attained power, the courtier will not be so free. Has this occurred to the Italian Communist intellectuals?

Barzini—If you are not a fool, when the prince mounts the throne you dedicate yourself to Byzantine studies, which is risk-free. Even the Russians are managing to get away with that. The Italians say: " Only a madman thinks of politics. The smart fellow ' navigates.' "

Urban—I think you still owe me an answer: Have these Communist intellectuals bothered to read the evidence—Lenin's orders on the use of terror (cleanse " the Russian land of all noxious insects, scoundrel fleas, bedbug rich "), the record of Stalin's show trials, the cultural tyranny of Zhdanov, and Khruschev's speech at the 20th congress?

Barzini—I have myself often brought this up with friends of mine in the Party. They have no real answer to it.

I was once trapped into a public debate with some left-wing Christian Democrats. It soon transpired that the audience was, in fact, solidly working-class Communist, so that one could not discuss things on an intellectual plane. I saw that I was the only one on the platform to defend the non-Communist record, therefore I got up and said that I had fought very hard to defeat the Communists in the 1948 elections, but I hadn't been fighting for myself alone; I was also fighting for you Communists, because in 1948 Stalin was alive and the sort of Communism he would have forced upon you if you had won those elections would not at all have been to your liking. They agreed.

You mentioned the Cagliostro side of the Italian character, and I said Cagliostro was inside the Communist Party. Well, what could be more Cagliostro than this design of the Communists to take power in Italy and at the same time to use NATO and the European Community, not only to protect them from Soviet control but, in fact, to make it possible for them to tell the Russians exactly where they get off? You use the West to enable you to claim that you are both Italians and Communists, you then tell Moscow that you are in no essentials erring from the faith, and you finally persuade the West that you do not at all belong to the bloodthirsty breed of Slavo-Communists. This is surely Cagliostro's prestidigitation at its best.

But let me also point to another element in the clever design of the Italian Communists: they are out to bring back the Pope alive. If they succeeded in creating a pro-Communist regime, which would obviously have to be content with implementing a less than fully Communist ideological programme, and to tolerate the Church, they would be showing the world that the Catholic Church can survive in symbiosis with a Communist or para-Communist regime. The moment this was demonstrated, the Communists would inherit the earth. They would conquer South America within a decade, capture Spain within a few years, and swing the next French elections.

Urban—This is what Kissinger suspects would happen and is trying to discourage. What you are describing is a European variant of the domino-theory.

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Barzini—Domino-theory or not, the fact is that many of the world's Catholic masses are so bewildered by the vast problems facing them that they can easily be bought by Communist flattery. Remember we are not talking about sophisticated people but poor and uneducated peasants and labourers. All you need is a small percentage of the Catholic vote going left, and the Communists have it. There are highly vulnerable Catholic masses in Latin America where Marxism has already made inroads both via the Communist parties and the left-wing Catholic clergy, and you have Catholic rebels in France and Spain and Portugal. A swing is very much on the cards, and the key to it all is in Italy.

Urban—It has been argued by people like George Kennan and Olaf Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, that a free-wheeling Italian or French Communist Party attaining power, or even a share in power, would harbour greater dangers for Moscow than it would for us, because the magnetism of alternative, West-European centres of Communism would destroy Moscow's tenuous hold on its satellites in Eastern Europe.

I do not myself think this is a reasonable supposition, because it takes no account of what we know of Soviet power and Moscow's willingness to use it. Yugoslavia has been, for Eastern Europe, a more powerful and more relevant alternative centre of attraction for over a quarter of a century than Italy could ever be, and although it is true that the Yugoslav heresy has had a powerful influence in Eastern Europe, every time it showed signs of leading to active defection, it was stopped short by Russian tanks. Is the US, or NATO, or the SPD going to support the spread of Euro-communism?

The cards are hopelessly stacked against us: we cannot prevent any Western Communist Party from attaining power if the electors decide to vote it into power, but the Soviet Union can, and does, use *its* power to suppress any unwanted internal development in its empire, including, and especially, alternative conceptions of Communism. Kissinger's warnings seem to me to rest on a true assessment of the problems facing us.

Barzini—The Soviet leaders are perfectly conscious that Euro-communism represents a danger for them. To mention a trivial example, until a few years ago you could find all the Italian Communist publications at the Moscow news stalls; you can no longer. If you demand to read *Unità* in your hotel, they will produce a copy for you, but it is not on sale. The Russians understand perfectly well that the Italian, or shall we say Western, variety of Communism is the only up-to-date and intelligent Communist programme. It is, in fact, so intelligent that, in order to gain the voters' confidence, the Western Communists have to show themselves to be something that is no longer Communist.

Urban—But the basic problem seems to me this: Communist participation in West European governments is very likely to destroy or weaken NATO, and absolutely certain to undermine its *raison d'être* no matter how shrewdly the Italian Communists navigate between trying to undo American hegemony in Europe and enjoying its protection. But the

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parallel disintegration of the Soviet system as a result of the magnetism of Euro-communism is no more than a hope on our part—ill-founded, as I see it, for all the evidence suggests that it cannot happen. In other words, we would be exchanging almost certain disaster for the possibility of a most unlikely gain. I don't think Machiavelli would approve.

Barzini—At this point we have to get down to fundamentals. Why do we call a development a " disaster "? What do we stand for? What is the kind of policy I'm ready to defend with my life? Is it the private ownership of public utilities? The private ownership of the banks? Clearly, no. The market economy? Perhaps, up to a point, because it has, by and large, provided a good self-adjusting mechanism for the conduct of our economic affairs. But most things we normally subsume under the word " disaster " or " dangerous " are of very secondary importance to me. I am a man, a writer, a student of human nature; the only thing I deeply care about is my personal liberty—the liberty of writing, of reading, of meeting people, of exchanging ideas. It is perhaps a minor, egotistic preoccupation to which only a very small percentage of the world's population—0·00001 per cent—is attached, but without this freedom, without the protection of the law, I could not live.

I remember talking about these matters to some American friends in New York lately. They asked me: But why are you so much against a Communist take-over in Italy when Berlinguer says he will respect this, that and the other thing?

But, of course, Berlinguer never mentions the word liberty; he talks of pluralism, which would mean a return to the kind of polity that existed under feudalism where power rested with the barons, and social stability was determined by the equilibrium of power among them. That is pluralism, not liberty, and we can all envisage a modern version of it being installed in Italy via the unions and other corporate organizations. What *I* want is my liberty guaranteed by the law and lawful institutions, and not by the good will of a Sardinian gentleman [Berlinguer]. I don't want to entrust my liberty to him, no matter how much good will he may personally possess.

This is what I'm fighting for, I suppose you are fighting for, and many of the people listening to us are ready to fight for. We are not fighting for the gross national product, for higher industrial production or productivity. Those things can be taken care of better and faster by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes than by a libertarian society.

Consider the Brazilian experiment. Here is an authoritarian regime producing more and more and giving the people a higher standard of living year after year. Is that what I want? Is that what you want? Is that what we're ready to make great sacrifices for? It isn't. Perhaps we are Don Quixotes fighting for something nobody else feels is desirable. . . .

Therefore my definition of what is " disastrous " becomes a very limited and a very personal one. It is my own definition and of some of the people I most respect. But are we enough? Are our preoccupations vital enough? In my heart of hearts I know that they are, because the future depends on our liberty and the ideas that can only emerge from liberty. But do millions of people understand our concern? Do they

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care? Or do they think of us as the ordinary Russians think of their dissident intellectuals, as gadflies, *Schoengeister* or latter-day aristocrats?

Urban—Let me come back to Cagliostro and Guicciardini—symbols of Italian showmanship and the high art of deceit. You have said the Cagliostros and Guicciardinis are thoroughly integrated in the Communist Party and to some extent determine its policies. But what about the Cagliostros and Guicciardinis outside the Communist Party? Would they not thwart and frustrate and make nonsense of the Communists' designs in the first place?

Barzini—Not in the first place, because the Cagliostros and Guicciardinis are never purposeful and strong enough to prevent any serious thing from happening, let alone the serious purpose of a large political party. But later on, the Italians will know how to outwit the Party, disobey the tyrants, frustrate their plans, and disorganize their lives. This happened under Fascism and it has always been the way in Italy. But it is no solution to the problems of Italian society. The Italians should really have what Machiavelli calls *virtù*—which is a little more than virtue—manly courage to defend their liberties. But I doubt if they have it.

Urban—Do you really feel that the Italian Communists, suffering as they are from all those factors of restraint and debilitation which you have described, would in the longer run nevertheless attempt to launch a serious attack on individual liberty?

Barzini—I can't give you an answer to that question. Personally, if the Communists came to power, I would get out of this country and watch from the outside whether they would keep their promises. My guess is that they might keep them to a considerable extent provided there was no international crisis. But if, after Tito's death, there was grave tension around Yugoslavia and Soviet troops arrived on the Italian border, or if there was a crisis in the Mediterranean, which is not inconceivable, I am not so sure that the Italian Party would live up to its present commitments. I am not even sure that the Party would be led by its present leaders. They might be discarded on the principle that they were good enough to conquer power in Italy, to win friends and influence voters, but useless, and indeed a menace, when in power. This is, incidentally, one of the reasons why the Italian Communists do not want to take power single-handed. The kind of policies they follow, the kind of ideas they bandy about, and the sort of party they have constructed are all made for use in opposition or in a coalition government where they need not keep faith with basic doctrinal commitments.

Urban—I heard Giorgio Napolitano make the point recently in London that the Party was fundamentally opposed to single party rule because it feared that a purely Communist government would unleash overwhelming and probably violent public reaction. But this is not your interpretation of the Communists' reluctance to go it alone.

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Barzini—This fear may play a part, but I believe the other fear is greater. I was talking about all this to a Communist the other day, and I rather underlined my puzzlement at seeing the Communists so anxious not to take power all by themselves. After all, this wasn't exactly Lenin's way. "You are vampires," I said to him, "you know that when the clock strikes 12 you will go around trying to suck people's blood. Therefore, to protect yourselves from yourselves, you want an ally to keep you on a leash."

You see, the Italian Communists are perfectly aware of it themselves that left to themselves the concentration camp is inevitable. Why is it inevitable? Because their basic programme to revolutionize society, to change the economy and the ways of men takes no account of human nature. There is no country where it has yet worked, and the Communists are never allowed to admit it for fear of destroying everything they stand for. The faults, the breakdowns in the economy, the repression are variously attributed to the class enemy, surviving bourgeois attitudes, traitors within the ranks, foreign agitation, psychological warfare, nationalism, whatever—never to the doctrine itself. Therefore, when the discontent of the people can no longer be contained by ordinary repression, a scapegoat has to be found, and that scapegoat cannot, of course, be the massive wrong of Marxism itself, but this or that group—an ever-widening group—of people, who are then put into the camps. The more poorly the Communist system works, the more concentration camps the Communist system needs.

Urban—There would, then, appear to be in Italy an intriguing coincidence of two evils: the inability of the Communists to run an efficient civil society, and the inability of the Italians to run an efficient civil society, and perhaps the two are two sides of the same coin. In the last five years or so the idea of an efficient Communist Party, as opposed to a corrupt Christian Democratic administration, has been the hope on which many Italians liked to fall back as one way out of Italy's troubles. But if the Communists are propelled into power and begin to tangle with Italy's national (as distinct from its much less daunting municipal) problems, disillusionment with the Communists will set in as surely as it did with the Christian Democrats, and the country will run out of political alternatives—with the single exception of the extreme Right. From the point of view of the survival of Italian democracy, it would, paradoxically, almost be better to allow the Communists to govern single-handed, and keep an iron reserve of uncommitted constitutional alternatives, than to have them in a coalition. But, of course, we are far from being sure that, once in power, the Communists would allow alternatives to exist, let alone rise to power.

Barzini—Whichever way one looks at it, we are entering dangerous country. What will the Communists do as partners in government? How will the Italian people react? My impression is that no party can last long in alliance with the Communists. It has never yet happened, nor, I think, is it likely to happen in future. The Italian Communists would destroy their allies, and therefore an underground opposition

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to Communist rule would create itself as soon as the Party gained access to power as part of a coalition government. Remember that during the last years of Fascist rule, Italian Fascism no longer really existed. It was a laughing matter; nobody believed in it. But it took a world war to get rid of something that had in fact already destroyed itself from the inside. If we are going to have the Communists in power, it might take a third world war to liberate us even from a weak Communist government.

III

Urban—Let me slightly change tack and ask you: Why should the Italians develop so strong a passion for orderly government, an efficient civil society, propriety and organization in their public affairs at a time when the fashionable thing throughout the world is to encourage decentralization, regional decision-making, co-determination in industry and a general loosening up of all rigid structures, bureaucracies and regulations? The Western world has chosen to move towards the kind of good-natured ungovernability that is, as you say, Italy's natural contribution to man's happiness: we are all aspiring to the state of Italy. Why should Italy now of all times aspire to the state of Prussia?

Barzini—Well, an expert ecologist, industrial psychologist, or demographer might agree with you that Italy's sweet disorder is a more humane and less alienating condition to live in than the work-ethic of Switzerland. The pleasantness of life in England, too, may be due to a similar, though I think less sweet, disorganization. The trouble is that the man in the street takes a different view of it; he complains that the trains run late, that there is no fresh bread in the shops, that telegrams are delivered three days late, and so forth. Everybody in this country wants to live like an Italian—to be as pleasantly independent, disorganized and disorderly as Italians are—but at the same time to live in Switzerland. And that is a little difficult.

But, of course, the decentralizers are really right; one of the facets of liberty is a certain disorder. Confronted with the all-powerful modern organization which depersonalizes and regiments the individual, one of the few ways in which he can resist is to live as the Italians do. The Italians talk a great deal of getting efficient through the medium of the Communist Party, of acquiring method and a new integrity, but I very much doubt that they will ever succeed in ruling themselves as Prussians. So if the world is, as you assume, aspiring to the state of Italy, I can assure the world that the Italian model is here to stay.

Urban—But there is, according to your reading of the Italian character, also another trait in the Italian mind which does not, on the face of it, sort well with the good-natured inefficiency of Italian society. You have written some very eloquent pages in *The Italians* on the Italian flair for systematization—the urge for cut-and-dried solutions, for elaborate laws and directives, for visual form as a way of repudiating the rank vegetation of nature and conquering the fear of the meaninglessness of life. By *sistemazione* the Italians reduce a hostile and contingent world to familiarity and manageable proportions. Isn't there a

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contradiction between this passion for orderly arrangements and the triad Casanova-Cagliostro-Guicciardini?

Barzini—Before answering this question, let me elaborate a little on the extent to which *sistemazione* is part of the Italian mind. I must refer you again to Dante's *Commedia* because (as I said earlier) without it Italy would not be Italy, and the only people who can really consider themselves to be Italians are those who have read this national poem.

Before you even start reading the *Commedia* you are given enormous maps showing the precise layout of the locus of action. There is a cross-section of Hell where the Unbaptized occupy the First Terrace, those guilty of Lust the Second, of Gluttony the Third, and so on, each of the Seven Deadly Sins being given an exact geographical reference point. You have a map of the Ptolemaic conception of the universe where Paradise is divided into nine concentric heavens which rotate round the earth, and Jerusalem, for example, is shown just north of Hell, Mount Purgatory just south of it between the Hemisphere of Water and the Hemisphere of Land, and so on. So, before you start becoming an Italian by reading the *Commedia*, you are exposed to the punctilious *sistemazione* of our national poet.

Urban—This side of the Italian character would, then, accord well with the, by now, old-fashioned, mechanistic scientism of Communist doctrine?

Barzini—Right. But the paradox you have mentioned isn't real. The love of system and the love of chaos can well go together. Many years ago, on my way back from America as a young man of 21, I was up for my military service. Someone came to my father and told him that I should look up a friend, General XYZ, not because it was thought that I should evade military service, but because we felt that I should serve in Milano to be trained as an officer in one corps rather than another. I went to the War Ministry (this must have been in 1930) and got into the elevator to go up to the floor where I had been told the General had his office. In the elevator there was a *regolamento*, about two feet long, in which it was laid down what category of person was allowed to use the lift going up, and who could use it both going up and coming down. Now, going up *and* down was a privileged thing reserved for the highest officers of state in the Kingdom of Italy. The common people had to walk down. But there was a paragraph stating that those who had certain disablements, lost a "lower limb" in the first world war etc., were also entitled to ride both up and down, and there were several other qualifications permitting or restricting the use of the elevator.

Well, anyone who sat down and wrote ten pages of rules and regulations on how the lift was to be used must have been mad. But the point is that nobody paid the slightest attention to these rules—people rode up and down in the elevator; there was no one to enforce the *regolamento*.

But, clearly, this fine table of rules, with its neat divisions and sub-

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divisions, satisfied the Italian's inner urge to believe that there was somewhere in the world a superior order which could be imposed on chaos, even if it was done only on paper.

Urban—The Italians are, in fact, playing, and outplaying, the system, much as the East Europeans have learned to do theirs.

Barzini—They are not always outplaying it, because the rules are there and cannot be totally ignored. The law can be brought out from retirement, dusted down and used against one's enemies at the right moment. You can always yank a man out of the elevator going down, and point to the rules forbidding him to do so if you think it is opportune to put him in the wrong. That the rules are ignored at all other times does not concern you if you think this is the time to catch your man out and get him into trouble. I suppose the East Europeans' fortunes in playing their system is similarly alternating between success and failure.

Urban—I am still not quite clear whether, in your view, the access to power or partial power of the Italian Communist Party would harm us more than it would harm the Soviet Union.

Barzini—A Neapolitan friend of mine who is a former leading member of the Communist Party but is no longer a Communist, was sent to an important meeting of Communist Party functionaries in Prague in 1948 or thereabouts. The main discussion was (according to his account which I have every reason to believe) devoted to the question: What would the various Communist parties do in case of a third world war. My friend made a speech spiced, as he thought, with a sense of irony and cynicism, in which he said that the best thing the Italian Communists could do was to exert their talents in the camp of the enemies of the Soviet Union because that was the surest way of undermining the Western side and helping the Soviets. Nobody thought this was a joke; the idea was given approval.

And I rather believe these Communist functionaries were expressing a realistic appreciation of what it means to have Italian Communists as your allies. Suppose they joined the opposite side. Could there be a worse punishment for the Soviet Union? The Italians would play havoc with Soviet Communism.

Urban—What you are saying is that the Italian Communists would wreck whichever side they decided to support, and this sounds neat and entertaining. But I'm a little worried about your earlier remark that, in an international crisis, the Berlinguers and Amendolas and Napolitanos of the Party would at once be jettisoned and the Muscovites elevated to leadership. In that case the music-hall quality of the Italian Party would quickly turn into tragedy—for the West and for non-Communist Italy.

Barzini—Yes, the moment there is severe tension in international affairs, Moscow will have to tighten up in Italy. It will need absolute loyalty from the Italian Communists.

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Urban—Would a radical change of this sort be supported or resisted by the Communist rank and file?

Barzini—It would be supported, because the rank and file are on the whole much more Stalinist than Dubcekian. In 1956, when many Party intellectuals revolted against what the Soviets had done in Budapest, the rank and file were firmly on the side of Soviet action: That is how you treat the class enemy (they said), that is the way to show strength, that is the way to destroy your opponents. And they are Stalinists to this day. Therefore the Italian Communist leaders have to think not only of the American point of view and the Soviet point of view, but also of these dyed-in-the-wool Stalinists at the grass roots of the Party, as well as the extra-Parliamentary extreme Left who are in many ways very influential. Veering too much towards Social Democracy, moderation, and ideological concessions would be playing into the hands of this bloodthirsty Left. I should not like to be one of the Italian Communist leaders—they are really walking a tightrope.

Urban—The more I listen to you the more I am confirmed in my opinion (and I have already briefly hinted at this) that Kissinger has correctly appreciated the danger-signals in the Italian situation. The only question is—and this has been much debated—whether Kissinger, as US Secretary of State, was right in telling the Italians (and French) what sort of repercussions a Communist participation in government would have on American opinion and American policies. He has been accused of interference and of using threats which would prove counter-productive. Would they?

Barzini—Not at all. Italy has, down the centuries, always had to play the game dictated by the interests of outside powers. There is a very old Italian proverb reflecting the wisdom the Italians have gleaned from the wars which the French and the Germans and the Austrians have fought on Italian soil since time immemorial: "We are the friends of the French or the Germans as long as we have enough to eat." While it is shocking for the French to discover that the American ambassador has said something that might sound as if he was trying to influence French internal politics, in Italy this kind of thing is taken for granted. Take the history of Italy during the last century. Look at the months preceding Italy's entry into the first world war: there was intrigue and pressure from the Germans, the Austrians, the English, the French to get Italy into the war on their side. Mussolini himself started *Popolo d'Italia*, a socialist paper, in favour of Italian intervention on the side of the Entente powers with money given him by the French ambassador. This sort of thing has always been considered quite normal in Italy. What would be considered abnormal would be for the Americans, with all their wealth and power, to keep their mouths shut and not tell the Italians what they ought to do. Even if the Americans put their message badly, it is expected of them to come forward and speak the lines which their role on the international scene imposes on them.

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Urban—I notice Admiral Azevedo, the Portuguese [ex-]Premier, has taken a similar attitude to American advice. It is up to the Americans, he said, to decide whether Communists could have a place in the Portuguese government. "As long as the United States remains intransigently opposed, I don't see how it's possible for the Communist Party to have a share in government."

Barzini—The trouble with American interference is not that it is too much but that it is too little. The Americans want results; they want the settlement of international problems according to their lights and interests, but all they want to do is talk about it. I remember I was in the Far East when the Japanese took Manchuria. All the Americans thought fit to undertake was to remind all parties to the conflict of the Open Doors Policy and the treaties signed at the beginning of the century. That was not good enough. Yet, today again that seems all the Americans are able to offer. I am not decrying proclamations and the expressions of noble sentiments—they can be effective within limits —but they are no substitute for a policy. As I say, nobody in Italy is shocked that Kissinger has said the lines which his part on the world stage requires him to speak. But nobody is going to be shocked either if his words prove entirely ineffective.

Urban—Are you saying that America's image in Italy is that of a giant with fine words but feet of clay?

Barzini—Without wanting to be unkind to America, that is what the ordinary Italian thinks of the US today. The public feel the Americans can always lend you some money—and that is undoubtedly what they are going to do in the coming weeks—but that is about the only thing they seem to be able and willing to do. Where they did take a different kind of action, as in Vietnam, they did it in the wrong place and in the wrong manner.

Urban—No opprobrium would attach to American monetary intervention in the Italian elections?

Barzini—None. This is, again, accepted practice, and the reasons for it are clear and simple—though not so clear and simple if you are in the grips of the American puritan conscience.

The practice was started by the Italian Communist Party after the war when it was entirely financed by the Soviet Union. We, the non-Communist parties, did not have the funds to organize ourselves to resist the threat of this Moscow-directed take-over, and the only way in which we could counter it was by accepting help from outside sources, both foreign and Italian. The early financing was done mainly through ENI, the Italian state oil monopoly, and the custom gradually established itself whereby one asked the big concerns for a percentage of their turnover. This is how the Christian Democrats and the other non-Communist parties were to some extent able to ward off Soviet interference. None of this was illegal at the time; the legislation making it

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illegal is only a few months old. Of course, the illegality comes in when you give money to a man who does not account for what he has received. But I cannot, in the light of the circumstances in which it came about, condemn the practice itself. It is easier to preach morality from Capitol Hill in Washington than to practise it on the Capitoline Hill in Rome.

Urban—We started this dialogue with a wordy introduction by myself on those lofty, universalistic sentiments, especially as expressed by Mazzini, which ministered at the cradle of Italian nationhood in the nineteenth century. And I was wondering how these sentiments, which invested Italy with a Messianic role among nations, and repudiated socialism and communism in the domestic organization of the nation-state, would accord with the rise of Communism in Italy in the 1970s.

Barzini—Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi and the other, less well-known leaders of Italy in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, worked in a world which was very limited. These men were the *optimati*—the elite—of their time, and their thinking appealed to a limited, though very influential, audience. Today we live in an age of universal suffrage and rapid emancipation in which the only ideas that matter are those that can inflame the passions of the masses. Fascism had this appeal, although it rested on an invented, unauthentic ideology but, nevertheless, the slogans of Fascism made people feel that they were marching forward to a better future, and equipped them with a sense of pride and self-respect. The appeal of Communism springs from similar sources.

I am, as you well know by now, an admirer and student of Benedetto Croce. But Croce's idea that progress can only mean the progress of man's freedom, that man is responsible for his history, for his fate, that "all history is contemporary history"—who is conscious of any of this? Who cares? Such ideas interest a very small number of Italians who, when they vote, represent perhaps 3 per cent of the electorate. We all suffer from a certain *deformation professionnel* when we imagine that history in our time is made by men of intellectual and moral distinction.

Urban—So when the chips are down, the Italian public will vote for whichever extremist party, whether Communist or Fascist, has the most catching slogans to offer and the bread to go with them?

Barzini—The Fascist party is out, of course; they have played their card and lost the game. The battle is between the Church and the Communist Party, two symmetrical, irrational constructions which have the key to the psychology of the Italian masses. They are both alien to me; I don't understand either.

I don't believe the blood of St. Januarius liquefies every April on the anniversary of his beheading. You are, as a matter of fact, not required by the Church to believe this for it is no more than a pious Neapolitan legend, but millions of Italians fervently go along with it, as they also

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believe in Communism, the coming of a classless society and the workers' paradise. The duel is between myth A and myth B. It is all very strange and depressing.

I simply watch and think and try to understand. But I'm not sure that I do. I feel as Dante did as he was approaching the gate of Hell:

> We've reached the place I told thee to expect,
> Where thou should'st see the miserable race,
> Those who have lost the good of intellect.[1]

[1] Hell, Canto III, lines 16–18.

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Papal-Communist Détente: Motivation

Dennis J. Dunn

THE Helsinki Conference or, as it was also called, the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, provides an excellent focal point to begin a study of recent Catholic-Communist relations. It represents a clear contrast with past relations and a pellucid indication of present trends. The Helsinki Conference which ended on 1 August 1975 was an event that the Kremlin had been trying for decades to realize. Its purpose was to have the West confirm the post-world war boundaries of the Soviet empire and, possibly, to disarm the West psychologically against fears of Soviet hegemony or expansion. For decades the Vatican opposed such a conference, yet in the late 1960s, after much politicking by Moscow, it not only endorsed the project but sent a representative, the peripatetic Archbishop Agostino Casaroli, to Helsinki.[1] Why? Why did the Papacy change its position on this issue and why did the Kremlin bother to take pains to convince Rome to back and send an emissary to the Conference? To fully appreciate the significance of those questions —and my essay will be basically an attempt to answer them—one must familiarize oneself with pre-1960 Soviet-Vatican relations.

IN a word, Communist-Catholic associations before 1960 were antagonistic. The reasons can be conveniently organized under three headings: ideology, historical memory, and totalitarianism.[2] Ideologically, for Rome, the Bolsheviks as atheists were incompatible. For Moscow, the Roman Catholic Church, like all religions, was likewise incongruous because it was deemed anti-scientific and exploitative.

Historically, the Papacy and the Kremlin harboured two *casus belli* against each other. For Rome, there was the traditional legacy of animosity resulting from centuries of competition and rivalry with the tsarist Orthodox Church. Secondly, the recent memory of Bolshevik persecution from the 1920s to the 1950s alienated the Church. Conversely, the Communists inherited the tsarist-Orthodox hatred for Catholicism and, secondly, remembered quite well that the Roman Catholic Church lined up with their internal and external opponents in 1917 and later. Rome and the Catholic hierarchs sympathized with the

1 For the Papacy's position on the Conference, see Archbishop Agostino Casaroli, " La Santa Sede e l'Europa, " *Civiltà Cattolica*, 19 Feb. 1972, pp. 367–381. For Soviet reaction, see F. Stephen Larrabee, " Initial Soviet Reaction to the Security Conference," *Radio Liberty Research* (RL 344/75), 18 Aug. 1975, pp. 1–7.

2 Bohdan R. Bociurkiw has provided an excellent analysis of Soviet religious policy in " The Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy," *Problems of Communism* (May–June 1973), pp. 38–44 ff. For the Catholic side, see Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (London, 1961) and this writer's *The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government, 1939–49* (Boulder, Colo.: forthcoming).

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Romanovs, with the White forces during the civil war, with the Poles during the Russo-Polish conflict, and, alas, with the Germans during the second world war.

Finally, Moscow's totalitarian aspirations grated on the Church. If the Roman Catholic Church stood for anything, it supported the supremacy of the spiritual over the political, of absolute principles over relative morality, and of a Church outside government control. In effect, the Church believed it could not subordinate itself to any regime in matters of faith and morals. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, demanded that all institutions and ideas serve the Party and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The Catholic Church not only refused such stipulations but preached a world view contrary to the one which the Party wanted for the new "Soviet man." As such, the Church was perceived as blocking the social and cultural evolution of a large group of Soviet citizens. In addition, the Church served as a backbone of nationalism for such minorities as Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, Poles, Latvians, Volga Germans and Armenians. It thus served as a prophylactic to the political assimilation of these groups.

The basic antagonism between Rome and Moscow up to the 1960s was reflected in a string of hostile recriminations and attacks. In 1937 Rome issued the encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*, which sweepingly condemned Marxism-Leninism. During the second world war, the Vatican took an adamant anti-Communist position, but, it should be pointed out, never endorsed the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.[3] In 1949 Pius XII issued the famous decree which prohibited Catholics from joining or participating with Communist parties. In the postwar period, finally, the Papacy identified itself strongly with the Western side in the Cold War and vigorously supported such developments as the Marshall Plan and NATO. Moscow, for its part, did all it could to terminate the life of the Catholic Church in the USSR. Persecution was incessant and brutal. By the end of the 1930s, the Catholic leadership in the Soviet Union was non-existent. All the bishops and most of the clergy had either been imprisoned, exiled, or, in the case of some, like Monsignor Constantine Budkiewicz of Leningrad, executed.[4] After the war, when the Soviet empire stretched out to the Oder-Neisse rivers, persecution continued. Between 1946 and 1949 the Ukrainian Uniate Catholic Church in Galicia and Transcarpathia was forcibly merged with the Russian Orthodox Church.[5] By 1948 a massive persecution of the Catholic Church com-

[3] See this writer's "Stalinism and the Catholic Church During the Era of World War II," *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. LIX, No. 3 (1973), 404–28.

[4] Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, pp. 198–99. Also see Francis McCullaugh, *The Bolshevik Persecution of Christianity* (New York, 1924) and this writer's "Pre-World War II Relations Between Stalin and the Catholic Church," *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. XV, No. 2 (1973), 193–204.

[5] For the best study of these events, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. VII (1965), pp. 89–113.

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menced throughout the Soviet empire, including the satellites of Eastern Europe, although nowhere was the earlier Soviet model followed precisely.

THE Vatican and the Kremlin were the bitterest of foes through the 1950s. From the advent of Pope John XXIII, however, a change began to develop in Soviet-Vatican relations. The *sine qua non* of the new relationship was, in fact, the personality of John XXIII.[6] Nikita Khrushchev, because of the unrest in Eastern Europe following the death of Stalin and the inception of de-Stalinization, was presumably open to a new agreement by the middle 1950s but had been frustrated by Pius XII's intransigent anti-Communism. Naturally, once the leading Communist state aspired to an improvement, all other Communist powers, whether Soviet pawns or not, had to re-evaluate their ties with the Catholic Church. *Détente*, as the Communist-Catholic encounter has been called, is a continually evolving process. So far, it has not led to any earth-shaking changes and, inevitably, it has its critics within the respective Catholic and Communist folds.[7] But there have been some important alterations and they could signal a profound change; on the other hand, they could lead to nothing. In general the new relationship has been characterized by (1) an improvement in the treatment of the Catholic Church, in comparison with the Stalin and Khrushchev periods, by the Communist governments of Eastern Europe with the exception of the Soviet Union, Albania, and, possibly, Czechoslovakia; (2) dialogues and exchanges between Papal and Communist officials; (3) a diminution in the Vatican's anti-Communist propaganda; (4) the agreement on at least two general international goals: stability in Eastern Europe and avoidance of nuclear war; (5) finally, the release of some imprisoned clerics, including Cardinal Joseph Slipyi from the USSR in 1963, Cardinal Joseph Beran from Czechoslovakia in 1965, and Bishop James Walsh from China in 1970.[8] I propose to try to explain why the new relationship was initiated and what sustains it.

[6] For an interesting evaluation of Pope John's personality and *Ostpolitik*, see Giancarlo Zizola, *L'Utopia di Papa Giovanni* (Assisi, 1973). Cf. Benedict Lomax, "Pope John's *Ostpolitik*," *The Month* (London, Sept. 1974), pp. 691–96. Also see Norman Cousins, *The Improbable Triumvirate* (New York, 1972). For a Soviet evaluation see the entire issue of *Nauka i religiia*, No. 6 (1963).

[7] See this writer's "Communist-Catholic Détente: Its Origins and Evolution," in Bernard Eissenstat, ed., *The Soviet Union in the 70s and Beyond* (Boston, 1975); *Nauka i religia*, No. 4 (1972), 63–65, No. 6 (1972), 81–84; Anatoli Levitin-Krasnov, "The Situation of the Russian Orthodox Church," in *Religion in Communist Dominated Lands* (Oct. 1970), pp. 151–57 (Russian in *Vestnik Russkogo studencheskogo khristiankogo dvizheniia*, Nos. 95–96 (Paris, 1970), 75–92); Vladimir Maximov, "Wir leben am Vorabend," *Deutsche Zeitung*, 28 June 1974; Peter Hebblethwaite, "The Vatican Power Game," *The Observer* (London, 22 Dec. 1974).

[8] For recent surveys of Catholic-Communist relations in Eastern Europe, see Dunn, ibid.; Trevor Beeson, *Discretion and Valour* (London, 1974); Hansjakob Stehle, *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans* (Munich, 1975); Wilfried Daim, *The Vatican and Eastern Europe* (New York, 1970; Munich, 1967); Gerhard Simon, "The Catholic Church and the Communist State in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," in Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

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FROM the Vatican's point of view, a major advantage in seeking a *modus vivendi* with the Communist states is that good relations seem to be the best means available for maintaining and enhancing the status of Catholicism in the Communist sphere. Quantitatively, over 90 per cent of the population in Poland and Cuba, 80 per cent in Lithuania, 78 per cent in Hungary, 68 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 35 per cent in Yugoslavia, 25 per cent in Latvia, and 10 per cent in Romania are, at least nominally, Catholic. In addition, the Church has influence in Ukraine, Belorussia, Armenia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Albania, North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and China. Qualitatively, the Catholic Church is more vigorous in Communist East Europe than anywhere else in the world. Poland, for example, today sends missionaries to Africa and Latin America.[9] Catholicism, in other words, in the Communist world of the 1970s, is an egregious factor and the Vatican has evidently decided that *Ostpolitik* would protect and, possibly, improve that significance.[10] It must also be considered, however, that its present vitality in some Communist societies is partly the result of the Church's persecuted existence. Tertullian and Arnold Toynbee, among others, made the point that religion thrives in a forbidding environment and the Polish bishops feel quite strongly that an amelioration of the *status quo* would do more harm than good.[11]

Another factor for détente is that the Vatican has perceived that the "winds of change," to borrow a phrase from Harold Macmillan, are clearly blowing in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and that these gales are howling, despite the Allende setback, in a leftish direction.[12] The Catholic Church predominates in Latin America and has a credible presence in Africa and Asia. The Papacy seems to feel that if it wants to hold its position and, more importantly, given the priorities of a Church which believes itself to be the true faith, expand its influence, it must address itself to the "have nots" of the Third World, where the vast majority of mankind toils. Some Catholic clergy in Latin America are leading and working with socialist movements without incurring the censure of the Vatican.[13] Certainly the Catholic Church has not embraced socialism or even publicly modified its 1937 and 1949 condemnations of Communism, but does seem to be willing to countenance

and John W. Strong, eds., *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe* (London, 1975), pp. 190–221; Knut Walf, "The Vatican's Eastern Policy," *Aussen Politik* (April 1973), pp. 416–26.

9 Simon, ibid. pp. 214–16; Vincent Chrypinski, "Polish Catholicism and Social Change," in Bociurkiw and Strong, pp. 241–55.

10 See Archibishop Agostino Casaroli, "La Santa Sede e l'Europa," *Civiltà Cattolica*, 19 Feb. 1972, pp. 368–72; *L'Osservatore Romano*, 19 Jan. 1974; see also Hervé Leclerc, "L' 'Ostpolitik' du Vatican: Le point de vue de Rome," *Est & Ouest* (16–31 Dec. 1971), pp. 507–9.

11 Hansjakob Stehle, "Vatican Policy Towards Eastern Europe," *Survey*, No. 65 (Jan. 1968), p. 115.

12 Leclerc, "L' 'Ostpolitik,' " pp. 508–9.

13 *New York Times*, 19 Sept. 1969; Peter Hebblethwaite, *The Runaway Church* (London, 1975), pp. 157–160.

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the possibility of socialism holding an answer to the problem of inequality in the distribution of the world's wealth.[14] In addition, the strong socialist currents in some developed countries, particularly Italy, reinforce the Vatican's trend. Given the apparent ascendency of socialism, it undoubtedly seems reasonable to the Vatican to establish *rapport* with the Communist world in order to examine more closely and attempt to understand, without passion, the various brands of socialism.[15] But if the Church is haunted by the memory of having repudiated the Copernican theory and of having imprisoned Galileo, its leaders should recall, among other things, that the Soviet government, because of its obscurantist ideology, refused to accept quantum mechanics during the *Zhdanovshchina* and harboured the charlatan theories of pseudogeneticist Lysenko until 1965.

Of course, it must be emphasized that the Vatican has not opened to the point of tolerating a Communist regime in Italy, and some national churches, such as the one in Portugal, continue to see Communism as their *bête noire*.[16] One might even argue that the Church's expansion is only a temporizing tactic, geared to halt or, at minimum, dilute with Christianity some of the socialist inroads in Catholic countries until more acceptable leaders can emerge.

An additional mainspring for better ties is that the Vatican appears to have grasped, probably in the wake of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, that Soviet control of Eastern Europe is a long-term reality. Since the 1960s and especially in recent years, furthermore, it became obvious that Soviet military strength, despite the fissiparous tendencies in the Communist camp, was growing and, perhaps, equalling that of the United States. In addition, the recent Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and Soviet influence with some Middle Eastern countries have been quite marked and could be manipulated, within bounds, to serve Soviet goals. Under these circumstances, the ability of Western Europe to conduct an unfettered foreign policy, that is, one without regard for Soviet interests, appeared to be in jeopardy by the 1970s. The Soviet Union, in other words, was the dominant European power and its status, whether in Eastern or Western Europe, was ostensibily not about to dwindle, but, if anything, would be enhanced. To remain impervious to that reality undoubtedly seemed naïve to Vatican diplomats.[17] Throughout the centuries of its existence, the Catholic Church has always been quite fluid in adjusting to man's sundry political systems. As long as the state would permit the Church to perform its spiritual mission of stalking souls, the Church could and has accepted polities that vary from democracies to dictator-

[14] Hebblethwaite, ibid. pp. 160–162; *New York Times*, 29 Mar. 1967.
[15] Stehle, *Die Ostpolitik*, p. 402; Leclerc, " L' ' Ostpolitik,' " pp. 508–09; Casaroli, " Santa Sede," pp. 370–4.
[16] *The Times* (London), 21 Oct., 10 Nov. 1975.
[17] *L'Osservatore Romano*, 19 Jan. 1974; Leclerc, " L' ' Ostpolitik,' " p. 507; Stehle, *Die Ostpolitik*, p. 402 ff.

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ships.[18] It is noteworthy, however, that the Communists have not allowed the Church to perform its mission without obstruction and, thus, one must conclude that the Vatican, for the moment, is sacrificing principle to *realpolitik*. Furthermore, the Soviet military increase might be, in part, because of widespread religious-political unrest in its Empire and Church détente is a measure to undermine that disapprobation, particularly in the Ukraine and Lithuania.[19]

A further argument for the Papacy's symbiosis with the Communists is that the Church, especially in the nuclear age, is interested in preventing war.[20] Its motives are both humanitarian and utilitarian. In the first case, its acquaintance with the ravages of past war moves it to spare mankind that catastrophe. In the second case, peace and security are the ideal circumstances under which the Church can carry out its spiritual mission. Because of the Papacy's propensity for tranquillity, the Church wished to seek an end to the Cold War and, at the same time, to bring China out of its isolation. These policies addressed themselves to the two probabilities which have the most likelihood of hurling the world into a nuclear holocaust: war between the West and the Soviet bloc and war between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples' Republic. Perhaps Rome believes that the Soviet leaders really want peaceful coexistence. Perhaps the Papacy is also convinced that the Kremlin has abandoned its traditional expansion and the policy, à la Lenin, of inflaming the "weak links" in the capitalist world order despite the record of Soviet foreign policy in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America since the end of the second world war and, particularly in recent days, in Portugal and Angola. If the Vatican has not been persuaded, its policy of détente with the Soviet Union is inconsistent with its desire for peace.

The Church's *rapprochement* with the Communist regimes is also linked to the occasional byproduct of cooperation: character assimilation. The Vatican knows only too well that the Communists have ruthlessly persecuted religion and, in most cases, persist in harassing believers in one fashion or another. Through collaboration, however, the Church evidently hopes to end the persecution and even to gain a foothold for proselytism.[21] The Papacy is banking upon, at least, toleration, but it certainly plans for more through a *modus vivendi*, including conversion. Certainly everyone, especially the Soviets, is familiar with Our Lady of Fatima's predictions about the conversion of Russia to Catholicism.[22]

[18] Leclerc, ibid. p. 506; Casaroli, "Santa Sede," p. 370.

[19] On religious-political dissent, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Religious Dissent and the Soviet State," in Bociurkiw and Strong, pp. 58–90.

[20] See Casaroli's interview with Otto Schulmeister, *Die Presse* (Vienna), 21 Dec. 1974. For Soviet evaluations of the Church's position on peace, see I. I. Kravchenko, "Katolicheskaia traktovka sotsial'nyx otnoshenii razvitykh kapitalisticheskikh stranakh," *Voprosy nauchnogotateizma*, No. 6 (Moscow, 1966), 270–306; L. N. Velikovich, "Voina i mir viotsenke sobora," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, No. 6 (Moscow, 1968), 307–25; I. Iastrebov, "Pacem in terris: katolicheskaia tserkov' o mire i voine," *Nauka i religiia*, No. 1 (1970), 49–50.

[21] Leclerc, "L' 'Ostpolitik,'" pp. 506–09.

[22] *Nauka i religiia*, No. 3 (1971), 28–32.

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The process of conversion is a gradual one and, in the case of the Communists, the basis would be the abandonment of official atheism. Will the Communists abandon atheism? If they do, they forsake their ideology and legitimacy. They could no more give up atheism as a tenet than the Pope could give up Christianity. On the other hand, the Soviets are politicians who have more than once sacrificed ideology for the sake of *realpolitik*. Where does that leave the Papacy?—hoping no doubt that the recent evidence of a religious revival in the Soviet Union will induce the regime somehow to find an official place for religion in Soviet Society. The Vatican apparently does not fear that it might assimilate Communist modes of thinking and acting. However, its treatment of Cardinals Mindszenty and Slipyi makes one wonder.[23]

A concordat with the socialist world is also tied to the Vatican's seeming belief that some socialist ideas and practices are worthwhile. In 1967, Pius VI, in his encyclical *Populorum Progressio*, indicated sympathy for a number of socialist notions by decrying what was described as the evils of unrestrained capitalism, including the imbalance in the production and distribution of the world's goods, the tendency to place private property above the "fundamental exigencies of the common good," and the propensity for colonialism. In addition, the Papal missive approved violence "where there is manifest longstanding tyranny which would do greatest damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good." [24] In 1971, the Vatican found some Christian ideals in Maoism and, incredibly, in the Papal Letter, *Octogesima Adveniens*, condemned liberalism and found praise for the world's "socialisms." [25] At the same time the Papacy is undoubtedly aghast at the secularization, materialism, and declining moral stands of the Western world. This is not to say that the Vatican has given up on Western society, but is possibly wondering if the controlled environment of the socialist world, with guarantees for religious liberty, would not be better for the moral health of mankind.[26] If such is the case, the Catholic leaders would do well to balance their views by familiarizing themselves with, among other things, the writings of Andrei Sakharov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and, quite recently, Amnesty International's devastating booklet, *Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR* (London, 1975).

[23] See Hebblethwaite, "Vatican Power Game," p. 9; Theodoré Novak, "L' 'Ostpolitik' du Vatican et l'eglise catholique ukrainienne," *L' Est Europeen*, No. 124 (Jan. 1973), 12–25; No. 125 (Fevrier-Mars 1973), 21–26; Blahoslav S. Hruby, "Cardinal Mindszenty as a Casualty of Détente," *World View* (Jan. 1975), pp. 13–18.

[24] For Soviet comment, see I. M. Kichanova, "Problema cheloveka," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, No. 6 (Moscow, 1968), pp. 268–69.

[25] *New York Times*, 6 Jan., 3 Oct. 1971; also see Hebblethwaite, *Runaway Church*, pp. 160–61.

[26] The Communist writers are ambivalent about the Church's attempts to find theoretical accommodation. Cf. *Kommunist*, No. 1 (Jan. 1964), 23–64 and *Kommunist*, No. 15 (Oct. 1964), 88–98; also M. P. Mchedlov, *Evoliutsiia sovremennogo katalitsizma* (Moscow, 1967) and *Sovetskaia Rossia*, 27 Aug. 1973 and L. Velikovich, "Religiia kak orudie ideologicheskoi bor'by imperializma protiv sotsializma," *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, No. 9 (1970), 90–97.

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A final and important driving force for accommodation is that the Vatican would have been isolated if it had not attempted a new relationship with the Communist orbit. To remain inflexibly anti-Communist while Western Europe and North America adopted conciliatory policies with the Communists bordered on valour or stupidity. Obviously the Church felt the latter would have been the cause.[27] Others, however, like Hervé Leclerc, fancy that the latter is the consequence.[28]

AS the Catholic-Communist détente has heretofore evolved, it has been primarily an affair involving the Soviet Union, its satellites, Yugoslavia and Romania, rather than the Communist world as a whole.[29] Albania remains antagonistic because the Church is inconsequential in its territory and has historical and nationalist ties to Italy, its former colonizer. In addition, the policy of détente would augment Soviet "revisionism," including Soviet acceptance of peaceful coexistence and, possibly, of Tito's inveterate design for Yugoslav control of the Balkans.[30] Bulgaria, although a Soviet pawn, has shown little interest largely because its Catholic Church is so minute and a concordat might upset the dominant Orthodox Church.[31] China has many excellent reasons for seeking out the Church, especially because the Church is strong in some parts of the Third World, which the Chinese consider their bailiwick, and because the Vatican could provide another means for bringing China out of its dangerous isolation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Representation at the Papacy, with its base in the West and parts of the Third World, could yield some of the same benefits that membership in the United Nations provided the Chinese: an international voice, respectability, a listening post on the western flank of the Soviet Union, friends and allies. However, China, while showing oblique signs of wanting an understanding, has, on the whole, remained aloof from the Vatican.[32] Its reluctance is undoubtedly bound to five factors. First, there has been an unwillingness to compromise its anti-Soviet propaganda by itself becoming a "revisionist," although Chinese overtures to the United States and the Western Alliance have already gone far to undermine that prohibition; secondly, the Chinese were determined not to tolerate, on their territory, a foreign-controlled Church which would surely revive unpleasant memories of China's former colonial status. Thirdly, there was the apparent resolve of the Vatican to maintain, even though on a

27 See Casaroli's interview with Otto Schelmeister, *Die Presse*, 21 Dec. 1974. Cf. Stehle, *Die Vatikans*, pp. 402 ff.

28 Hervé Leclerc, *Marxism and the Church of Rome* (London, 1974).

29 For a survey of juridical relations, see Christian Lamonin, "Les rapports juridiques entre Saint-Siège et les Etats communistes," *Revue Générale de Droit International Public* (Paris), No. 3 (1972), 698–767.

30 Albania has claimed to be the first totally atheistic state. For a recent commentary, see *L'Osservatore Romano*, 26 April 1973.

31 President Zhivkov, however, was received at the Vatican in July 1975. See *Catholic Herald* (London), 11 July 1975.

32 *The Tablet* (London), 9 Sept. 1972.

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reduced level, diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Fourthly, the Papacy's assiduous interest in the USSR certainly irritates Peking. Finally, and probably most importantly, the Catholic Church has little influence in the Chinese empire.[33]

The countries which have sought exchanges with the Catholic Church, have had varied motives. Yugoslavia's desire for a concordat appears to be linked to the fact that the Catholic Church is a significant voice in the multinational state of Yugoslavia, with the preponderance of the Croatians and Slovenians adhering to Catholicism. Tito's miracle has been his ability to hold together the ethnic heterogeneity of the eastern Adriatic coast. Part of the reason for this success has been his seeming awareness, growing in proportion to his age, that continued religious persecution would serve as a centrifugal force destroying Yugoslav unity. Conversely religious toleration, Tito seems to think, has brought the Papacy to the support of the government and to the concept of a continuing, unified Yugoslavia.[34] Strong ties with the Vatican would, at any rate, dissipate Catholic alienation in Slovenia and Croatia and rob nationalists there of Papal patronage and religious martyrs. Secondly, Tito, in his unique but isolated position as the maverick of Communism, requires an economic and political *locus standi* in the West. Rome, at minimum, can provide Belgrade with a bridge to an array of Western powers, particularly Italy.[35]

Rumania's reasons for encouraging contacts with the Vatican are somewhat similar to Tito's. The Church can offer Bucharest a touchstone in the West where Nicolae Ceausescu has been seeking economic and political security from the Soviet bloc. At the same time, relations with the Roman Church emphasize Rumania's claim to be a historical vestige of the Roman Empire. The relationship is compounded, though, by the existence of the dominant Orthodox Church and the Uniate Catholic Church.[36]

It is the Soviet Union and its obedient satellites, however, which have pursued détente with the most vigour. First and foremost among Soviet motives is Moscow's apparent belief that the Church can help in main-

[33] For background, see Louis Wei Tsing-sing, *Le Saint-Siège et la Chine* (Paris, 1968); John C. Haughey, " Religion in China II: Shredding the Catholic Church," *America* (New York) (22 Apr. 1972), pp. 418–23.

[34] Tito worked out a concordat with Rome in 1966, and, in 1971, was received at the Vatican. Religious persecution has continued, however, because the Catholic Church is viewed not only as a rival but the backbone of Croatian and Slovenian nationalism. For recent developments, see Zdenko Antic, " Tension Between State and Catholic Church in Yugoslavia Continues," *Radio Free Europe Research Report*, No. 112 (1 July 1975), pp. 1–9.

[35] See Christopher Cviic, " Martyrs & Ostpolitik," *The Tablet* (London), 15 Feb. 1975, pp. 151–52 and " Tito Tightens Up," *The Tablet*, 26 Jan. 1974.

[36] See Radio Free Europe, *Rumanian Situation Report*, No. 3 (24 Jan. 1975), pp. 14–18; " L' ' Ostpolitik ' du Vatican," *Catacombes* (June, 1973), p. 8; A. Pordea, " L'Eglise catholique de Roumanie," *Catacombes* (Oct. 1973), pp. 6–7; Hervé Leclerc, " Le drame de l' Eglise latine," *Est et Ouest*, No. 543 (Jan. 1975), p. 9; Hervé Leclerc, " La persécuton religieuse en Roumanie et le drame de l' Eglise uniate," *Est et Ouest* (March 1973), pp. 115–18; " L' Eglise uniate de Roumanie a l' honneur dans sa douleur," *Catacombes* (April 1973), p. 9.

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taining order in the Soviet Union and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. The Ukrainian Uniates, suppressed since 1946, are today a growing force of disruption in the USSR. There is abundant evidence that the Uniate Church continues to operate as an underground movement and as a wellspring of Ukranian nationalism—realities that are anathema in a totalitarian society.[37] Since the early 1960s, a "neo-Uniate" group called the *Pokutnykh* ("Penitents") has emerged and, significantly, in contrast to other Uniates, it refuses to profess even outward loyalty to the Soviet regime.[38] In addition, hundreds of Ukrainian Uniate émigrés keep the plight of their Church in the Western news and recently have demanded that the Vatican establish a patriarchate for the Ukrainian Catholics and name Cardinal Joseph Slipyi, the head of the Ukrainian Uniates-in-exile, as the Patriarch. Such irredentist activities expose the Achilles' heel of the USSR and, accordingly, the Soviets have responded with an incredible but revealing barrage of diatribes against the Cardinal and the idea of a Uniate Patriarchate.[39] Certainly, as part of the fruit of its *Westpolitik*, the Kremlin wants, and to date has been getting (1) the isolation of Cardinal Slipyi, (2) his continuance as a Cardinal rather than a Patriarch, (3) the Vatican's *de facto* recognition, at least, of the 1946 forced reunion of the Ukrainian Uniate Church with the Russian Orthodox Church, and (4) finally, Rome's refusal to encourage Ukrainian Uniates either abroad or in the Soviet Ukraine in their efforts to re-establish the Uniate Church.[40]

[37] Soviet sources reveal the continued vitality of Uniatism and, at the same time, the increased police measures against it. See *Zhovten* (Lviv), No. 4 (1974), pp. 92–95; M. P. Mchedolov, *Katolicism* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 242–46; V. L. Bodnar, "Osobennosti razvitiia ateizma v processe kulturnoi revolutsii v natsionalnoi respublike," in *Ateizm i socialisticheskaia kultura* (Moscow, 1973). A. Grishkevich, in a review of two books published by "Kameniar" in Lvov (*Pod znamenem sotsialisticheskovo internatsionalisma* and *Lvov-Ulianovsk*), stressed the need to fight the ideology of bourgeois nationalism by the "disclosure of intimate links between Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and reactionary clerics and the Uniate Church," *Agitator*, No. 7 (April 1975), pp. 62–63. Also see *Liudyna i svit*, No. 12 (1966), pp. 4–10; No. 4 (1967), pp. 46–48; No. 12 (1969), pp. 54–57; No. 1 (1970), pp. 26–30; No. 5 (1971), pp. 42–47; No. 7 (1973), pp. 31–37; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 5 Mar. 1974, 21 Feb. 1974; 11 Aug. 1972; 28 Nov. 1968. For Western commentaries see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Religious Situation in the Soviet Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, forthcoming, and, by the same author, "Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," A. Shevchenko Memorial Lecture Delivered at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada, 23 Mar. 1972. Vasyl Markus, "Religion and Nationality: The Uniates of the Ukraine," in Bociurkiw and Strong, pp. 101–22. Also see Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine* (London, 1971), Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (London, 1970), and Valentyn Moroz, "A Chronicle of Resistance," in *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz* (Baltimore, 1974).

[38] See footnote 37 above and *Liudyna i svit*, No. 11 (1968), pp. 36–39.

[39] In addition to footnote 37 above, see *Liudyna i svit*, No. 6 (1971), pp. 29–33 and No. 3 (1971), pp. 31–33. Soviet fear of a Slipyi Patriarchate is clearly revealed in an article by S. Danileno entitled "The Patriarchate—a divertissement," in *Liudyna i svit*, No. 1 (1972), pp. 36–40.

[40] See Cardinal I. Slipyi, "On the Tragic Fate of the Uniate Church," *Kontinent*, No. 3 (1975); "Paul VI et le monde communiste," *Est et Ouest*, No. 16/28 (Feb. 1975), pp. 15–21; Novak, "L' 'Ostpolitik' du Vatican," No. 124, pp. 15–25. In regard to the Uniate problem of recognition, it can be argued that the Papacy, by remaining silent about the Uniate suppression, sanctions it. The most striking example of the Papacy's taciturnity to date came when Cardinal Jan Willebrands, at the 1971 Local Sobor of the

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In addition to the Uniate Catholics, there are also Lithuanian, Latvian, Belorussian, Polish, German, and Armenian Catholics in the USSR. The Lithuanian Catholics, particularly, are a numerous, compact group with a strong nationalist-Catholic tradition.[41] Since the late 1960s they have become one of the most vocal and active wings in the religious-nationalist agitation sweeping the USSR.[42] In dealing with the Lithuanian Catholics, Moscow has fashioned two major policies: (1) to dilute their concentration through the migration of Russian nationals into Lithuania and of Lithuanian nationals out of Lithuania; (2) cause atrophy in the organizational structure of the Catholic Church through indirect and, where necessary, overt persecutory measures such as closing churches, controlling the hierarchy, and keeping the number of new clerics below normal replacement needs.[43] As a price for détente with regard to Soviet Catholics, the Kremlin obviously desires and has been receiving from the Vatican a policy of benign neglect. The Papacy treats the Lithuanian persecution as if it were a problem of Soviet internal affairs in which it has no direct interest. More positively, the Kremlin also undoubtedly hopes that the Vatican will sustain the continuation of Soviet domination in the Baltic Region and, possibly, terminate its diplomatic relations with the Lithuanian Government-in-exile. In the meantime, the Soviets have deftly wielded détente with the Vatican to discourage and confuse Lithuanian nationalists who feel, with good reason, that the Church is selling them out for no obvious gain.[44] The Papacy cannot plead ignorance of what is going on in Lithuania. The *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, a *samizdat* journal published since 1972, has made that excuse impossible.[45] At best, Rome's stand can be rationalized on the grounds that it is convinced that the Communists will increase persecution in the satellites if it attempts to interfere in Soviet Catholic affairs.

In the Eastern European part of the Soviet empire (as in the Soviet Union itself), there is widespread disaffection. The patchwork of rebellions and uprisings that have enveloped Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia since the second world war has, of course, been linked to economic and political discontent rather than religion. But, nonetheless, religion is a powerful tool of public persuasion and can be utilized to dampen political-economic disturbances. This was borne out,

Russian Orthodox Church, failed to protest a resolution approving the " reunion." For details, see Bociurkiw, " Religious Situation in the Soviet Ukraine."

[41] See V. Stanley Vardys, ed., *Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation* (New York, 1965).

[42] Bohdan R. Bociurkiw has provided an excellent analysis of this phenomenon in "Religious Dissent in the USSR: Lithuanian Catholics," in James Scanlan and Richard De George, eds., *Marxism and Religion* (Dordrecht, 1976).

[43] V. Stanley Vardys, " Catholicism in Lithuania," in Richard Marshall, ed., *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union 1917–67* (Chicago, 1971) pp. 379–403; V. Stanley Vardys, " Geography and Nationalities in the USSR: A Commentary," *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3 (Sept. 1972), 564–70.

[44] See *Kronika Litovskoi Katolicheskoi Tserkvi* (Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism, Keston, England), No. 4 (1972), pp. 3–4, 10; No. 9 (1974), pp. 16–17

[45] By November, 1975, 18 issues of the CCCL had reached the West.

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quite dramatically, in 1970 when one of Edward Gierek's first responses to the Polish workers' riots along the Baltic was to request the cooperation of the Catholic Church in restoring order.[46] From the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, the Soviets hope to gain what they tried to achieve at the end of the second world war. Simply stated, Moscow wants the support of the Catholic Church to facilitate its supremacy in Eastern Europe. As the dominant religion in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the Church can go far to reinforce the *status quo* in Eastern Europe and make the satellite governments more palatable and popular with the masses.[47] The Church's leverage in Poland, the kingpin of the Soviet Eastern Epropean empire, is awesome and there *rapprochement* with Rome holds out the hope of balancing, if not stifling, anti-Soviet, religious-nationalist feeling.[48] With the Church neutralized, the Kremlin would go into the future with a much surer hand on Eastern Europe.

A second reason why Moscow is seeking a *modus vivendi* with the Church is that Catholicism, as a major religion in Spain, Ireland, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Portugal can help win Western European acceptance of Soviet security goals on the USSR's western border.[49] This has been aptly demonstrated in the Vatican's attitude towards the Soviet-originated Helsinki Conference. The Church might even be used for preparing Europe for eventual assimilation into the Soviet orbit. The Soviet military build-up, which would be impossible without détente with the West, is, in the first instance, a reflection of turmoil in the Soviet Empire and, thus, a police force to keep what Moscow already controls. But the Kremlin's military machine is so extensive and formidable that it can easily be turned to aggressive designs. If Western Europe could be Sovietized or, at least, fitted into the Soviet sphere of influence, the boons to Moscow would be tantalizing: (1) such stimuli of anti-Sovietism as the contrasts between the Communist life style and Western freedoms would disappear from the borders of the Soviet empire; (2) a rich store of economic, technological, scientific, and manpower resources would become available (3) Marxism-Leninism might be reanimated as the wave of the future; (4) finally, Moscow would make strategic and tactical gains against the position of the United

[46] *New York Times*, 24 Dec. 1970.

[47] See M. V. Andreev, *Katolitsizm i problemy sovremennogo rabochego i natsionalno-osvoboditelnogo dvizheniia* (Moscow, 1968). This book, recognizing the Catholic Church as a major influence in the world because of its 590 million members, studies the Church's position in workers' movements and in the Communist-Christian dialogue. On Soviet postwar goals in Eastern Europe, see Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–67* (New York, 1967), pp. 338–495. Also see the still valuable study by Miklos Vetö, "Kremlin and Vatican," *Survey* (July, 1963), pp. 163–72.

[48] See Stanislaw Staron, "State-Church Relations in Poland," *World Politics*, Vol. XXI, No. 4 (July 1969), pp. 580, 598–601; Stehle, "Vatican Policy," p. 115. Cf. Henry Korotynski, "Church and State in Poland," *New Times*, No. 36 (7 Sept. 1966), pp. 14–16 and Eleonora Syzdek, "Gosudarstvo i katolicheskaia tserkov' v narodnoi pol'she," *Politichesoe samoobrazovanie*, No. 4 (1966), pp. 138–44.

[49] R. Puchkov states that the Church has great influence in the West because of its vast following and wealth. See *Sovetskaia Rossia*, 27 Aug. 1973, p. 4.

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States and China. Friendship with the Catholic Church removes, at minimum, a major enemy from the Western camp and tends to arrest fears of Soviet aggression.

Another Soviet ambition for affiliation is related to the fact that the Catholic Church is an authority in the Third World; this is especially true in Latin America, but also in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.[50] As such the Church can be quite useful to the Kremlin by giving the Communists a degree of acceptance among the Vatican's Third World friends. Certainly the Papacy's *rapport* with the Communist world reinforces the disposition of those Catholics in the Third World who are already cooperating with Communist movements in Latin America. The Soviets also seem to appreciate that, in the Third World, religion is an important key for motivating and influencing the masses.

An additional reason why the Soviets would be willing for a concord is that the Vatican can be manipulated, as Russian Orthodoxy has been exploited, to belie the charge that the Communists persecute religion and suppress dissent and minority groups. Association with the Papacy can also improve the USSR's image among religiously-conscious people and help garner world opinion for Soviet foreign policy goals.[51] Moscow shares at least two explicit international objectives with Rome, as mentioned earlier: the avoidance of nuclear war and stability in Eastern Europe. It is logical that the Kremlin should search out backing for these designs in every sympathetic quarter, including Rome. Détente, especially the Christian-Marxist dialogue, can also, significantly, help persuade the world that, in fact, socialism is in ascendancy and that Marxist atheists are not intellectual *parvenus*.[52]

A further part of the explanation for the Catholic-Communist détente is that the Church, since Vatican Council II, has emphasized ecumenism and understanding of non-believers and atheists. Soviet ideologues responded with some praise, some confusion, but, generally, with a charge that the Church was engaging in futile efforts to save its inevitable demise.[53] Nonetheless, the Vatican's alterations offered, at last, an excuse for a more friendly attitude toward Rome.

[50] See I. V. Lavretski, "Nekotorye voprosy politiki Vatikana v Afrike," *Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma*, Vol. VII (Moscow, 1958), pp. 105–129 and Andreev, *Katolitsizm i ego problemy*.

[51] For a recent survey of the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and Soviet foreign policy, see William C. Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy* (London, 1973).

[52] The Chrstian-Communist dialogue has met, by and large, with approval. See, for example, S. Popov, "Sotsial-reformizm i religiia," *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, No. 11 (1970), 89–96 and *Kommunist*, No. 15 (Oct. 1964), pp. 88–98.

[53] See, for example, the entire issue of *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, No. 6 (Moscow, 1968); E. M. Babosov, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revolutsiya i modernizatsiia katolitsizma* (Minsk, 1971); M. P. Mchedlov, *Katolitsizm* (Moscow, 1974); M. P. Mchedlov, *Evoliutsiya sovremennogo katolitsizma* (Moscow, 1967), p. 45; N. A. Sadovskii, "Novye momenty v sotsial'noi doktrine katolicheskoi tserkvi," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 1 (1971), 87–96; "Vatikan pered vizovom ateizma," *Kommunist* (Lithuania), No. 9 (1974), pp. 79–87; L. Velikovich, "Catholicism and the Time," *New Times*, No. 48 (Nov. 1972), pp. 18–20.

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Another springboard for a more amicable relationship is that toleration à la West seems to have led to a genuine religious decline. Possibly the Soviets, taking to heart Tertullian's adage about religion thriving in persecution, have adopted détente to take the focus off religion and allow it to sink, as Marx advocated, into apathy and neglect. However, the Kremlin must be aware that religion, in its sphere, is fed not only by persecution but also by nationalism, backwardness and ignorance.

A final factor in Moscow's acquiescence to work for an agreement with the Vatican could be grounded in historical revanchism. The Russians, perennially behind the West and always suffering from a grievous inferiority complex, probably take a certain atavistic glee in having Rome kowtow and bow to Soviet censorship regulations on Lithuanian and Ukrainian Catholics. Indeed, it would not be too surprising if some historically-conscious Kremlinites entertained all sorts of fantasies, including the healing of the Schism of 1054 in Moscow's favour and the re-emergence of a new Roman Empire united under Byzantium's self-appointed heir, Muscovite Russia.

WHO is receiving the most from détente? The answer to that question depends on one's philosophical and political outlook. If one believes that the Catholic Church has been, at least in theory, an institution which stands for the dignity of man and his cultural and scientific evolution and that Marxism-Leninism is, in theory and practice, opposed to these, then there can be no doubt but that the Church is compromising its heritage. If one holds that Marxism-Leninism or some form of socialism is the inevitable or desirable future of mankind, then, the Vatican has certainly adopted a realistic position, but one which, given the nature of socialist thought, is a prelude to destruction or, at minimum, neglect and isolation. If one is convinced that the Church, through the ages, has worried solely about souls rather than bodies, theology rather than knowledge, then *rapprochement* seems to make sense on the basis that the Church and the Communist governments share a profound obscurantism. If an individual is convinced that détente should be evolved on a *quid pro quo* arrangement, then the Church with its potential for disruption in the Soivet Empire and, thus, with the ultimate *raison d'être* for Soviet participation, is being short-changed because it has not achieved religious freedom throughout the Communist dominion. If one is persuaded that a compromise is desirable for the sake of peace, and stability, or *realpolitik* and in the knowledge that, in time, everything changes, including the most rigid systems and ideologies then a *modus vivendi* does appear to be justified. But it is vindicable only on the conditions of reciprocity and convincing and perceptible evidence that Communism is evolving towards a recognition of basic human freedoms and rights. Otherwise the dream of peace is *ersatz* and change would be in the direction of an expansion of Soviet rigidity and against Western cultural evolution.

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As for the Communists, if their ideology is right, then an expedient relationship with the Church is a shrewd, temporizing tactic. If religion is doomed by the laws of historical materialism, it is logical to attempt to exploit it for one's benefit before it dissipates. On the other hand, if the ideology is wrong, a marriage makes even more sense in order to obtain support to continue the *status quo* as long as possible. In fact, Catholicism, with its touchstones in the Western world, if handled deftly, can be an effective propaganda agent and possibly a fifth column for Communist expansion. Persecution, at any rate, has proven to inject life into religion to the point where religious-nationalist unrest is a significant threat to political order. Détente helps curb such internal dissidence and toleration holds out the hope, however slim, of inducing in Eastern Europe a parallel to religion's decline in the West. For the moment, Stalin's reputed remark about the Pope having no legions has been disproved.

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Student Theatre in Poland *

Jeffrey Goldfarb

POLAND. The city—Lodz. A snowy December. Midnight. The many invited guests of the "art opening" are waiting for the doors of 77 Piotrkowska Street to open. As their anticipation of the night ahead mounts, so does their impatience, and everyone experiences the involuntary pushes and shoves of an anxious crowd. The third major première of Theatre 77 is about to take place and all are aware of the great artistic and political importance this theatre has had in Polish life since the ousting of the Communist Party leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, in December 1970. Tonight begins *Retrospektywa* (a Polish neologism joining "retrospection" and "perspective")—an art opening? —a play?—an event is certain. The audience is speculating on what its role will be. They have followed the instructions on their invitations and have read the attached excerpt from the controversial personal diary of Witold Gombrowicz (the late Polish *avant garde* playwright, novelist and man of letters) where Gombrowicz asserts that Poles ought to abandon their history and turn to the future, irrespective of past problems and complexes. What does this all mean? Finally the large doors squeak open, but only enough for one person at a time to escape the jamming mass and enter the stately, subdued atmosphere of what appears to be an art opening.

Wine is being served. Coca Cola (a highly valued soft drink in Poland), smoked fish, cheeses, breads and all the embellishments are present, as are the host and, most importantly, the art works: groups of actors taking on poses of famous historical paintings. After nearly half an hour of talk, food, and drink, the host interrupts what proves to be the first phase of the evening's events. He welcomes the guests to *Retrospektywa* and asks them if they all have their ballot-papers, which were handed out at the door. Reading the ballot aloud, he asks: do you agree or disagree with Gombrowicz's assertion that Poles should abandon their historical traditions? He tells the audience that if they disagree, to hand in their ballots so indicated and go upstairs to the room on the right, if they agree to so indicate and go upstairs to the room on the left, and if undecided, they are to remain on the first floor holding their ballots. There would be two separate performances upstairs, after which everyone would return for another common meeting downstairs. A discussion would follow that meeting.

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Upstairs, the action centres on a song. The song is "Red Poppies on Monte Cassino" ("Czerwone maki na Monte Cassino"), which celebrates the heroics of the Polish Army in the second world war not aligned with the Soviet Union. Banned in Poland in the 1950s, it carries nationalistic and even some anti-Russian overtones. For those who wanted to disregard Polish history and traditions, the song is sung half in Polish and half in Russian, a disquieting presentation almost to the point of disbelief to a Pole. In the next room the people are standing in darkness. They hear the voice of a man whom they can barely see. He is speaking to them as a commander would to his troops before a battle. Then suddenly a fire is lit in an old pot-bellied stove in the corner of the room. Shadows dance around the walls and everyone naturally moves closer together, seeing each other's faces again. There is a temporary break in the mood as a closed circuit television set is turned on. The programme is the members of Theatre 77 singing "Red Poppies on Monte Cassino." They sing proudly, perhaps a bit too proudly. Each session disconcertingly plays to the professed belief of the audience.

After these presentations the groups separately return to the main room on the first floor. There, Polish history is re-enacted from liberation following the second world war to 1956, the year of the fall of the Stalinist regime in Poland. The play takes the audience through the events leading to the Communist victory: liberation of Polish territory by the Red Army and the Polish People's Army, the establishment of the coalition government dominated by the Communist Workers' Party, and the liquidation of all coalition foes. The process of Stalinization is underscored. Ideological discussions on such fine points as the meaning of cosmopolitanism and internationalism, and the difference between anti-cosmopolitanism and anti-Semitism, and the nature of the classless society and the role of the workers in it, are reiterated. Self-criticism sessions are shown, as are prosecutions of enemies of the people, each serving as an example of the dogmatic excesses that characterized political life of that time.

During all this, the continual plight of the common man is presented by "77" through personal conversations directed at members of the audience by the actors. Grand speeches are made in the centre of the room, while members of the audience are directly confronted by the actors sitting among them about everyday problems: problems of procuring food, proper housing, clothing for children, and so forth. These problems were more intense in that period, yet they still exist to this day. The actors ask individual members of the audience their opinions and advice for solving these problems. Conversations result, which sound like many such conversations spoken on the streets, in cafeterias, and in homes.

The simultaneous, but separate, enactment of the politics and struggles of the political elite of the nation, and the everyday problems of common people, without any apparent effect of one upon the other, is a clear

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dramatization of a most important problem in Poland. The parallel between the historical presentation and the contemporary situation of Poland is not missed by the audience. The action in the centre of the room continues. The debate goes on, each participant more vigorously citing Marx to make his point. Yet, slowly, following the leadership of the members of " 77 " in the audience, people leave the " action " to go to the discussion upstairs.

After the scene downstairs, it is clear that the prevailing opinion of the members of " 77 " is that Poland must confront its history and come to terms with it in order to plan for the future. Zdzislaw Hejduk, the director of the theatre, in introductory remarks before the discussion, flatly states this and suggests that it is a good time to discuss the problems presented during the art opening, those dealing with Gombrowicz's statement and any other problems that seem important.

(Hejduk later explained to this writer that his primary goal in theatre is to provide a vehicle for people, particularly young people, to discuss problems openly and to their logical conclusion, rather than being evasive, unclear or unnecessarily dogmatic as is most common in the press, on television and in official public meetings. Thus, for him and for his group, the concluding discussion is the most important segment of the evening.)

At the discussion, the audience is confronted and uncomfortable. A discussion begins nervously. It is more about the appropriateness of public discussions of this sort than about the issues involved. The uneasy atmosphere created by the confrontation is itself a testament to the importance of the evening's message. Theatre 77 seems to be suggesting that the sorry legacy of Stalinization in Poland resulted partially, at least, from too many people passively accepting it, that the deadening " stabilization " of the Gomulka period in the 1960s occurred because effective resistance was not mounted. If particular problems had been confronted forthrightly, the mistakes of the past might have been avoided. In the discussion, " 77 " encourages an honest look at this legacy, but more importantly, it encourages an open accounting for similar problems that exist today.

The discussion lasts for hours, developing toward openness and honesty, though ultimately achieving neither. People discuss history, Gombrowicz, specifics of the play, some people denounce certain aspects and some approve. Yet the leap from the hypothetical to real and deeply felt contemporary issues is only suggested and never made explicit. Nevertheless, the art opening has made its mark. The guests understand that if they fail to speak out, they will be contributing to the perpetuation of old problems. Grand political events will occur, divorced from a mass of people who dare only to whisper among themselves. On the other hand, if they speak boldly and candidly there may be reason for hope in the future of Poland. On this note, the theatrical event ended at about 4 a.m.

Retrospektywa was openly provocative in a society where open

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provocation is rare. This play is only one of the theatrical creations of "77," all of which have exhibited boldness. And indeed, Theatre 77 is only one of a half dozen leading theatres in the student theatre movement in Poland, a movement that innovatively confronts the present situation in Poland with a sincerity and an openness that makes it important both for cultural and socio-political reasons.[1] The theatre groups deal in their works with some of the most essential problems facing Poland today, such as: the role of Catholicism, the role of Marxism, the role of political and cultural traditions in Polish life, national myths and complexes, and recent social and political developments.

Yet these theatres clearly are not anti-communist and their members are not Polish counterparts of the Russian dissidents of whom we hear so much. Rather, they are a group of artists: playwrights, actors, directors, musicians, some of whom are Party members, who through a legal channel offer alternative views of Polish life: cultural, political, artistic and social. All works are censored, yet they push and challenge, always attempting to expand the possibilities of expression. Through innovative methods of expression, they often circumvent the barriers created by official censorship.

The works of these theatres are not totally unusual in the communist world. Cabaret theatre in Czechoslovakia in the mid-sixties,[2] some of the works produced in the Taganka Theatre in Moscow in the late sixties,[3] and student theatre in Hungary, today,[4] are each generically related to this Polish movement. Yet it is only in Poland that this type of theatre has developed and flourished as a mature art form, playing a significant role in the social and political life of students and even wider circles.[5] The strength of Poland's dramatic tradition, epitomized by the

[1] Published materials on Polish student theatre are minimal. In Poland, scattered reviews of particular plays are the only readily available source, but these tend to be cursory and often deliberately evasive about the performances. Five general sources provide an overview: ed. Wlodzimierz Sandecki and Jerzy Leszin, *Almanach: Ruchu Kulturalnego i Artystycznego Z.S.P.* (Warsaw, 1968), ed. Jerzy Leszin, Eugeniusz Mielcarek and Krzysztof Mroziewicz, *Kronika Kuturalna Z.S.P., 1950–70* (Warsaw, 1971), ed. Jerzy Leszin, Eugeniusz Mielcarek and Krzysztof Mroziewicz, *Almanach: Kulturalnego i Artystycznego Z.S.P., 1969–72* (Warsaw, 1973) and most valuable, ed. Jerzy Koenig, *Teatry Studenckie W Polsce* (Warsaw, 1968). In addition, Konstanty Puzyna provides a perceptive analysis of student theatre in his *Syntezy za Trzy Grosze* (Warsaw, 1974). Materials in the West are practically non-existent, with the exception of an occasional journalistic article when on occasion these student theatres have gone on tour in the West. The discussion here up to 1970 is based upon the aforementioned Polish materials and upon interviews with veterans of the Polish student theatre movement. The analysis of student theatre since 1970 is based upon unpublished materials, which the theatre groups made available to me, and upon extensive interviews and observations I made of the theatre groups in 1973–74. The scripts of the performances discussed are unpublished having passed censorship specifically for production in student theatre and not for the general reading public.

[2] Cf. Galia Golan, "Youth and Politics in Czechoslovakia," *Journal of Contemporary History*, V, 1 (1970).

[3] Cf. Harrison E. Salisbury, "Theater: The Naked Truth" in Salisbury (ed.). *The Soviet Union: The Fifty Years.*

[4] E.g. Szeged student theatre, which I observed at the 1973 International Open Theatre Festival in Wroclaw.

[5] Puzyna, op. cit.

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epic drama of Adam Mickiewicz, and the vitality of contemporary Polish professional theatre, led both in accomplishment and spiritually by Jerzy Grotowski, promote a theatrical frame of mind in the young creative community. The nature of the art form as developed by student theatre, in addition, has fortified this frame of mind, for this theatre has provided for the critical young a means to speak their truth in the face of dogma, simple-mindedness and repression.

POLISH student theatre was not always outspoken. Its beginnings, given the situation after World War II, were quite modest. Poland was totally devastated by the war: one fifth of the population perished, political, educational and cultural institutions were eliminated, and during occupation even the use of its language in public transactions was severely restricted. Liberation by the Red Army and its Polish allies opened a new, though unstable period in Polish history. The borders of the new nation were shifted westwards. Guerrilla warfare was waged by a number of different movements. Looting was rampant. Food, clothing and shelter were still a problem for the bulk of the population. On top of this, an open political struggle was waged between the anti-communist forces of the Polish Peasants' Party and the communist forces led by the Polish Workers' Party, supported by the Soviet Union. The communist forces had the upper hand, but it took a number of years before their absolute control was solidified.

In this chaotic atmosphere, Polish cultural life was reborn. One of the first goals of the new Polish government was to re-establish and rebuild Polish cultural institutions: to open schools, universities, publishing houses, cinemas, etc. Later an ideological struggle would be waged in and through these institutions.

Innovative, critical and open student theatre did not develop until 1954. Many observers of Polish theatre therefore consider that 1954 marks the beginning of student theatre as an art form, although student theatre was already being produced in the unstable period immediately following the war.

With the opening of the universities in 1945, students from various departments began to form university theatre groups. These groups were formed primarily to entertain both the creators and the audience. Entertainment in the new Polish state was not thought of as a problem of the first order, falling behind the more urgent problems the new authorities had to face, such as suppressing the resistance and rebuilding necessary physical structures. Thus, these theatres played an important role.

In the academic year of 1946–47, Jerzy Michotek, student of Polish studies, formed such a theatre, the Wroclaw Teatr Akademicki (Wroclaw Academic Theatre).[6] Under Michotek's leadership this group presented the first full length play by students in Wroclaw, *Professor Pytl's Concoc-*

[6] See *Teatry Studenckie w Polsce.*

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tion (*Roztwor Profesora Pytla*). After the première in March 1948, the group took the work to small towns in the surrounding region, bringing Polish culture to an area which was not clearly Polish (having been controlled by Germany for hundreds of years). The work was apolitical in content, yet its presentation in this area had specifically Polish nationalistic connotations.

The early works of Polish students in theatre helped the rebirth of Polish culture, albeit at a very low level. Though their presentation did little more than entertain, it was Polish entertainment; in a nation where open presentation of its culture was forbidden for years, all forms of Polish expression, no matter how mundane, had significance. In as much as student theatres were sponsored by the new government, their productions were an asset for this government, as indeed were all revitalized Polish cultural activities.

Yet, as the communists' hold on the power of the new government solidified, the legitimacy they achieved by sponsoring Polish culture was not sufficient for their ends. An ideological struggle was escalated nationwide at every level of society. The party leaders called for nothing less than the complete ideological supremacy of Marxism.

In 1948, the whole nature of the communist movement in Eastern Europe changed: Cominform was established, the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute erupted, a communist *coup d'état* took place in Czechoslovakia, and in Poland, Gomulka's Party leadership came under attack from a faction of the Polish Workers' Party with the support of the Soviet Union. Gomulka and his allies were accused of a "rightist-nationalist deviation." Ultimately, Boleslaw Bierut replaced Gomulka and a period of rigid Stalinization was initiated.

The rise of Stalinism directly affected university life and, consequently, student theatre. In 1948, a new organization of Polish youth was formed, Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej (Polish Youth Union). This organization was established specifically to organize educational and propaganda efforts of the communist regime. A student newspaper noted the function of the ZMP as a purveyor of mass culture: "to give students the knowledge of our progressive culture, for today and for the future, to free students from the myth of being apolitical, and to educate and establish a receptiveness to the building of socialism and socialist man." [7]

Under the leadership of ZMP, student theatres abandoned their apolitical nature and became agencies of explicit propaganda. The Wroclaw Academic Theatre's play thus ceased performances, the work having been criticized as "petit-bourgeois." The group was then transformed into two "artistic brigades," each working on the recitation of revolutionary poetry and the singing of revolutionary songs. The works of the groups were presented in factories in Wroclaw and in towns and villages surrounding Wroclaw.

[7] Ibid. p. 209.

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The cultural life of the university at this time was orchestrated and mechanical. Under the leadership of ZMP, nearly every institute at the universities had its collection of amateur artistic groups: choir, ballet, agitational reading groups, etc. A ZMP directive as published in its official organ elucidates the nature of these artistic groups:

> Cultural groups must be of and for the masses. A principal issue in the work of these groups is having a telling repertoire. Each group should have a command over several creations, independent of each other. They ought to include hymns and songs of the revolutionary masses and of the workers, particularly drawing from the extremely rich repertoire of Soviet songs which provide an expertise and which meet with success in presentation. . . .[8]

In the judgment of a respected observer of student theatre, these policies led to the total disintegration of artistic activities at the universities. Talented people were effectively kept from naturally forming artistic groups and remained atomized.[9]

THE death of Stalin was the beginning of significant change in the whole of Eastern Europe. In Poland, de-Stalinization came slowly. Three years elapsed before a real change in political and economic leadership was initiated. Yet between 1953 and 1956 signs of change began to emerge: one of the first was the development of a new kind of student theatre.

At a university work brigade during the summer recess of 1953, about a dozen people began discussing the idea of forming a student artistic group which would perform satirical skits and songs in a cabaret style.[10] In the autumn, back in Warsaw, they started examining various satirical texts, spoke with local writers and among themselves, looking for ideas dealing specifically with their own situation, i.e. the situation of students at Polish universities. This activity was entirely unofficial.

At the same time, the local board of ZSP (Zrzeszenie Studentow Polskich, Polish Student Association) independently decided to sponsor a Warsaw student theatre. The initiators in ZSP probably imagined that this group would become involved in some sort of social action along the lines of the groups supported by ZMP. Yet when the people who had been planning the formation of a satirical theatre joined with ZSP, something completely different was launched. A new type of student theatre developed with the support of ZSP, a support which would continue for 20 years.

This Warsaw group, Studencki Teatr Satyrykow (Student Satirical Theatre), was the first in a long series of student cultural groups to grapple with major social problems.

[8] *Kronika Kulturalna, 1950–70*, p. 15.
[9] See *Teatry Studenckie w Polsce*, p. 210.
[10] See *Teatry Studenckie w Polsce* and *Almanach* '68 for discussions of the history and the birth of critical student theatre in Poland.

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STS used a simple cabaret form and presented a straightforward message. Its early revues painted for its chiefly student audience a reflective picture of the absurdities of university life. At its best, STS reviewed these absurdities in a fresh and unpolished way. In their first programme, they apologized to their audience. Mockingly, they explained that their work was awkward and unrefined, but they assured the audience that they would work harder so that by the next programme, their production would be good enough to be presented to the end of the next six-year plan. Professionalism was not viewed as a virtue; virtue lay rather in amateurism with its fresh and critical approach to the boring stupidities of their time. In this apology, they were attacking the ossified nature of cultural policies then current.

On 2 May 1954, STS presented their first work, which consisted of humorous skits and songs. One skit was outstanding, a pantomime conceived by the director of the group entitled, "A Day at the University." A grotesque academic schedule was performed for the audience: 8.00 a.m., a mass meeting of ZMP, 10.00 a.m., a mass singing of the "Internationale," and so on throughout the day until 10.00 p.m., culminating with an artistic brigade's ballet rehearsal. The concluding rehearsal consisted of successive groups of actors, as students, dancing across the stage, tiring to the point of exhaustion as the exercise and the worthless day's activities are prolonged. The presentation of this simple skit was the first publicized questioning in theatre of the over-politicized nature of the university. Cautiously, STS opened up an avenue of critical expression.

From this mildly critical presentation, STS gained public recognition. The revues by STS that followed became increasingly more caustic. The most provocative sketch in *The Simpletons* (*Prostaczkowie*) entitled "The Narrator," openly ridiculed the common practice of citing Marx as an authority for practically any sort of action through the parody of a man going through such acrobatics. Such works became the common staple of STS productions. Then on 2 June 1956, they presented what for the time was perhaps their most controversial work, *The Agitation* (*Agitka*). Just one month before the violent confrontations between Poznan workers, and police and soldiers (which eventually led to the fall of the Stalinist regime), STS began a call for action against the stupidities of life in Poland. Using the words of Robert Eberhardt, they declared:

> Don't be afraid of enemies—enemies can only kill you. Don't be afraid of friends, for friends can only spy on you. Dread neutral people, for they don't kill nor spy, but through their agreeable silence, there is wickedness and betrayal.[11]

In 1954 and 1955, in its first few programmes, STS criticized with increasing sharpness the basic nature of life in Stalinist Poland, particularly those aspects that most affected students. Similar protests were heard

[11] *Almanach '68*, p. 73.

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in other forums at this time. Most notable of these was Adam Wazyk's "Poem for Adults," which denounced the grim realities of life in Poland.[12] The situation in Poland at that time was ambiguous and volatile. Between 1954 and 1956 scattered protests were heard in Poland, chiefly voiced by the intelligentsia. The reaction of the authorities was to orchestrate criticisms and denunciations of these voices through its house organs. The work of STS, as well as the work of Wazyk, became the objects of such criticism. Yet, unlike previous periods, dissident critics were not incarcerated.

Dissatisfaction in Poland was probably no greater in 1956 than it was in previous years. Yet the belief that things could be changed was more and more widely held. The revolt of the workers in Poznan in July 1956 and the subsequent proliferation of discussion groups in intellectual clubs and of spontaneously organized workers' committees in the factories of Poland are testimony to this belief. Deprivation alone would not have caused these actions; some sense of optimism must have been present.

The artistic and intellectual activities of poets such as Wazyk and such theatres as STS contributed to the growth of this optimism. The fact that discontent was made public was itself testimony of the changing situation. The secret police no longer reigned supreme nor was censorship as stringent as it had been. The leadership was losing control. General dissatisfaction with everyday life, as well as discontent about Polish-Soviet relations was being expressed, initially through artistic means, and would later turn towards mass action.

At the universities, STS did not stand alone. Soon after its first première, another satirical group was established in Warsaw, the Journalistic Satirical Cooperative (Dziennikarska Spodzielna Satyryczna). Inspired by and modelled after STS, they, too, chiefly directed their straightforward attacks at student and university problems. In Gdansk, Theatre Bim-Bom presented a cabaret with political overtones, similar in this sense to STS, but different from STS in that its presentations were more metaphorical. It declared that if socialist realism has been the major thrust of Polish culture since the war, now they, Bim-Bom, represented a group of social romantics—more interested in Chagall than Brecht, believing in the spirit of Pablo Neruda and Chaplin.[13] More groups soon followed: Trout (Pstrag) of Lodz, The Golden Bill (Zoltodziob) of Poznan, and The Cracow Stage (Estrada Krakowska), to cite the most prominent.

In May 1955, these groups gathered formally at the First Student Satirical Theatre Festival in Warsaw. Ideas were exchanged and lasting contacts were made. Such festivals have now become an annual tradition, formalizing contact between theatres and lending a high degree of continuity to the student theatre movement.

Today, observers of Polish student theatre often refer to the period

[12] *Nowa Kultura*, 19 Aug. 1955.
[13] *Teatry Studenckie w Polsce*, p. 148.

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from approximately 1954 to 1959 as the golden age of Polish student theatre.[14] Student theatre at that time was one of a number of media which publicly articulated generally held Polish values concerning both the condition of everyday life and the stark contrast between reality and its official interpretation. Student theatre confined itself to these problems, particularly as they were manifested in the universities; it viewed university issues as a reflection of society's more general problems. The deeper significance of this medium gradually became evident to an ever broadening audience and student theatres thus became important arenas for public debate and discussion.[15]

From 1956 to 1959 student theatre continued generally along these lines. The works used the cabaret format and the major genre remained satire, although political content became more muted and productions became notable exclusively for their artistic merit. Bim-Bom, from its beginnings, presented poetic events, which were political only in the sense that, as art, they were authentic and not works subjected to the preconceived politically derived ruling form of socialist realism. Authentic artistic enterprises along these lines slowly became the dominant form of student theatre. This development occurred because the groups themselves found satirical cabaret too limiting, and because official censorship eventually re-emerged, rendering satirical cabaret incapable of striking directly at the most pressing problems of the time.

The new Gomulka regime, while making "liberal" concessions in some areas (curbing the power of the secret police, abandoning the blind dogmatism of the past leadership and, very importantly, reasserting national pride and a sense of independence from the Soviet Union), nonetheless re-established censorship and close control of all forms of public expression. Most prominent among the silenced was the critical journal *Po Prostu* (*In a Straightforward Way*); one of the first casualties, it was shut down in 1957. The sharply critical aspects of student theatre were, likewise, casualties. By 1960, the satirical cabaret was all but abandoned, with a few groups hanging on to the style, but using it without its former satirical edge. The presentation of full dramatic works became the most interesting occupation of student theatre.

STUDENT theatre's most substantial contribution in the sixties was the presentation of the dramatic *avant garde* and not, as in the fifties and later in the seventies, the presentation of a forum for creative observers of contemporary Polish life. It was in student theatre that the works of some of the most outstanding twentieth century Polish and foreign playwrights were first given legal public airing. Only years later did professional theatres come to produce these plays.

The relationship between the Gomulka regime and artists and intel-

[14] In other fields, i.e. in journalism, film and social science, this period is viewed similarly.

[15] Puzyna, op. cit.

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lectuals in the sixties was characterized by continual conflict, with the former placing heavy restrictions on cultural life. In this context, Polish student theatre presented such works as Genet's *The Maids* and Becket's *Krapp's Last Tape* (produced by Theatre 38 of Cracow), Gombrowicz's *The Wedding* (produced by the Student Theatre of Gliwice), and Witkiewicz's *The Shoemakers* (produced by Theatre Kalambur of Wroclaw). The last two were of particular importance in that Gombrowicz and Witkiewicz are two of the most important Polish playwrights of the twentieth century dramatic *avant garde*, who before this had not been given full exposure in Poland.

IN 1968, events occurred which affected all cultural activities in Poland. Even the limited artistic function which student theatre had played in the early sixties was no longer permissible. A most severe confrontation between the regime and the artists and intellectuals was ignited by a direct censorial assault upon professional theatre; it ended in a stultification of cultural life, particularly on the universities.

In January 1968, a decision was made to terminate the theatrical production of *Forefathers' Eve* (*Dziady*) at the National Theatre in Warsaw. Written between 1823 and 1832 by Adam Mickiewicz, perhaps the greatest romantic poet of Poland, *Forefathers' Eve* is a patriotic play depicting various aspects of life in partitioned Poland. Portions of the play are explicitly anti-Russian, and this particular production emphasized this aspect. The audience responded to the anti-Russian overtones with enthusiasm and when it became known that the play was being closed, rumours spread that the decision was a result of a Soviet protest. The banning of this play was viewed as an open provocation. A reaction to the closing of such a monumental national work was inevitable.

The last performance of the play was on 30 January 1968. After the performance there was a street demonstration in protest against the closing. Confrontations between students and police occurred; a number of students were arrested. In the months that followed, a series of events occurred which tore apart the Polish intellectual and artistic community. Other plays were closed throughout Poland. The Warsaw section of the official Polish Writers' Union, in defiance of the Party, filed a formal letter of protest against the closing of *Forefathers' Eve*. Mass demonstrations and riots erupted at Warsaw University and quickly spread to universities in other cities. Violent confrontations between students and police took place throughout the country. All protests were ruthlessly suppressed.

Officially, blame for these events was placed on those whose true interest purportedly lay not with the nation, but elsewhere; "Zionists" came in for particularly severe condemnation. Much of the blame for the disruptions was simply diverted from the Party (which was riven by

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serious factional conflict) through the use of a traditional mechanism, anti-Semitism.

Beyond this tactic, official strategy aimed to transform the university from a base of protest and criticism into an institution of propaganda and support. Troublesome professors were dismissed and key departments were eliminated or reorganized. Students who were involved actively with the protests were expelled and arrested and the males were often sent to special units in the army. Required courses in ideology were reinstated for the first time since the Stalinist period. Physical work brigades for students on summer recess became part of university life.

In this environment, student theatre could not survive. For a number of years, neither the artistic excitement of the dramatic explorations of the early sixties, nor the critical excellence of the fifties were present. The spring student theatre festival of 1968 was postponed until the early winter of the next academic year. With it, student theatre creativity was suspended not simply for six months, but for two years.

AT the coffee shop in the Kalambur theatre, following 1968, conversations laced with fear and disillusionment about the recent events dominated the social life of the members of the theatre. Those traumatic days overshadowed their lives, and a sense of helplessness prevailed. The events of 1968 were felt personally by the members of Kalambur. Their colleagues had suffered directly: some were exiled in the West, some drafted into special units of the army. This uneasiness was intensified by the belief (which appears to have been commonly held, at least among the leaders of the group) that Communism and Marxism were not the causes of these terrible events: that idealism and humanism remain basic to Marxism, and that these can be realized in a communist system. They were faced, then, with a major contradiction between the crudeness of the political and social life of the recent past, and their dreams and images as to what could and ought to be. In their play entitled *In the Rhythm of the Sun* (*W Rytmie Slonca*), which had its première in 1970, they expressed this contradiction in a typically Polish romantic fashion and called for a battle of idealism against the ugly reality of the existing situation. Theatre Kalambur told its audience to dream: "look for a while at the sun, consider the spring of life. . . ." They implored their audience to nurture that dream and not be consumed by the vulgarities of the past, nor the conformism of the present. Boguslaw Litwiniec, the playwright and director, explained to this writer:

> There was a necessity. We had to understand our idealism and make clear its place within the context of political conformisms. Dreams "in the sun" had to be understood with the political life so near to the ground. . . . Ours was a dream of a more beautiful Marxism.

In the Rhythm of the Sun called for a renewal of idealism in the struggle against the ugly realities of the socio-political situation in Poland after 1968. Calls of this sort have been heard in Poland for the last 150 years,

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forming the very basis of a central Polish cultural trait, Polish romanticism. Similar calls were made by the most prominent Polish poets, Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Slowacki and Stanislaw Wyspianski, and by the most prominent politicians, Jozef Pilsudski and, in his own way, even Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1956.

In the Rhythm of the Sun was a Polish "Hair," though it was not a copy of the American *Hair*. Taking its form from *Hair*, it was presented as a rock musical. Like *Hair*, it was about naïve idealism. Yet idealism has taken on a special form in Polish culture. Polish romanticism's most essential component is a strong belief in the ideal of the Polish nation. In *In the Rhythm of the Sun*, romantic notions were brought forth. The dreams in this play were perhaps more abstract than the dreams of the past when Poland did not exist as a state. Now the dreams were not simply about the freeing of the land; rather, they were about liberating the nation from the conformist, the collaborator, the opportunist and the racist, who themselves manipulate and enslave Poland.

Together with *In the Rhythm of the Sun*, *The Falling* (*Spadanie*), produced by Theatre STU of Cracow, had its national première at the 1970 Student Theatre Festival at Lodz. In this play the members of STU explored the meaning of Tadeusz Rozewicz's poem "The Falling," and specifically his words, "before we fell vertically, now we fall horizontally." STU expressed a mood of uncertainty and disquiet, that somehow something was fundamentally wrong with the social order.

The Falling was a series of juxtaposed scenes presenting anomalies of socio-political thought and rhetoric, performed in opposition to each other: Baudelaire with Ginsberg, Gorky with Sartre, interviews with General Giap with interviews with the white Biafran mercenaries, and most specifically Polish, didactic arguments by Polish political leaders about the role of youth, juxtaposed with the unstated but real political context in which the concerns and problems of students were being suppressed actively by these same political leaders. All parts were played sincerely, leaving the audience to infer the message. In conclusion, the company turned and asked the audience: "What is going on?" referring explicitly to the play, but implicitly to Poland's socio-political situation.

Half an hour after this question was first posed at Lodz, political events underscored its urgency. Wladyslaw Gomulka resigned as leader of the Communist Party and the nation, officially because of "illness of the eyes." The problems of the time, forming the basis of STU's play, had also been the basis of wider social discontent and ultimately of social action.

BEFORE December 1970, *The Falling* was only obliquely critical of the whole gamut of problems in the nation. This obliqueness was no doubt a consequence of censorship. After the fall of Gomulka in December 1970, and after the officially expressed condemnations of past mistakes and pledges for fundamental improvements, this censorship

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barrier was temporarily eliminated. The mistakes of the most recent past could be analysed and criticized and proposals could be made concerning the future. STU took advantage of this situation.

There was a second version of *The Falling* which no longer hid behind the issues of youth or Western policies. Tadeusz Nyczek, the editor of *Student* (a Cracow based newspaper) and long time observer of STU's works observed: "The second version of *The Falling* had its première in March 1971. The generation issue became the Polish issue. This was no longer the voice of "downbeaten" youth, but of Poles wanting to take part in the national process of reevaluating basic problems." [16] The second version openly reflected upon the concrete events leading to the fall of Gomulka in 1970 and upon their meanings for the future. Fittingly, instead of ending with the question "What is going on?" as in the first version, it ended with the question, "How are we going and with what?" This became the question which a new group of leading student theatres would face in the years following the political changes of December 1970.

Following the workers' strikes in December 1970, the Party was immediately concerned with subduing the workers, a goal which was achieved by a change of leadership and a full-scale effort to satisfy the demands of the workers. Having forced a change in leadership, the workers sought fundamental economic reforms and concerns. Though the intelligentsia stood aloof from this struggle, it faced, nevertheless, a specific challenge: to arrive at an understanding of the significance of these events in the framework of the Polish experience. Student theatres answered this challenge in a variety of different ways: Theatre 77 through political theatre, STU through a theatre of national reflection, the theatre at the Catholic University of Lublin through a religious theatre, and theatres Nawias and Pleonasmus through a theatre of the "new young."

THOUGH the situation in Poland improved greatly following the events of 1970, given the experience of 1956 and 1968, students greeted the appearance of better times with scepticism. In *Circle or Tryptych* (*Kolo czy Tryptyk*) the members of Theatre 77 posed the question: will Poland fall into old patterns and come full circle to established, intolerable ways or will this be the last new beginning from which Poland will move forward, cognizant of the causes of the past problems and avoiding them in the future? Circle, as in the Gomulka era, or three part story: the Stalinist period, the failure of Gomulka and now, post-1970, to the future armed with a critical understanding of the past and avoiding its problems—which will it be?

High hopes and expectations followed by tragic failure has been a chronic pattern in Polish history. This pattern was connected with the

[16] *Student*, No. 4, 1971.

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gradual fall of the Polish elective monarchy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was connected with the high hopes of the modern constitution of 1791, enacted to forestall the enslavement of the Polish nation, but conceived too late to avoid disaster. It was connected with the numerous abortive uprisings in the nineteenth century designed to free Poland from the partitions and in the early twentieth century it was connected with the Pilsudski movement. Again after the war, it occurred with the hope of October 1956, and the subsequent disappointments. After the 1970 events the members of 77 in *Circle or Tryptych* examined this pattern as it was most recently manifested and they searched for means to transcend it.

With *Circle or Tryptych*, 77 abandoned all trappings of the conventional theatre. In this work there was no stage and no audience; the role of the actor and viewer was not clearly differentiated. Everybody partook in the production. No one knew its outcome and each had a stake in its results.

This theatrical declaration (the term used by 77) takes the actors and audience through: a news conference using the taped recordings of the initial official reaction to the uprisings in 1956 and 1970; a question and answer period characterized by important questioning by actors and audience and official avoidance of all important issues; a banquet scene, initially with serious discussion, but degenerating into a wild celebration; and finally, at the climax, a condemnation by the group's leader, Zdzislaw Hejduk, of the tendency of the Polish people to turn away from necessary action immediately following critical events, exactly what Poland did in 1956 and what it was doing symbolically during 77's banquet.

Circle or Tryptych was a theatrical creation presented within the aftermath of the events of December 1970. 77's next work, *Passion* (*Pasja*), presented one year later, continued along the same thematic lines, though in a much less emotionally charged environment. *Passion* was a play with two parts: the first, a pantomime depicting aspects of the life of Christ, and the second, a parallel story with spoken text portraying the reception of a Marxist leader by "the people." The play dramatized the alienation between well intentioned and "good" leaders from the majority of the population, and emphasized the tension between two basic needs: material needs, which must be the everyday concern of most people, and a "higher" spiritual need for an ideal, which is the primary concern of leaders of the people. In a country such as Poland, where both Christianity and Marxism are of central importance, the members of 77 wanted to show how leaders, who only think of their high ideals, be they Marxist or Christian, often lose contact with people, who must live largely in a world of selfish concerns and desires, and only at special times concern themselves with selfless ideals. The Catholic Pole empathized with Christ in *Passion* when his abandonment was enacted in the first act; the Marxist Pole empathized with the Marxist

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leader when he was ridiculed and left standing alone to end the second act. Despite this, each desired a cake on the table before him, tempting him throughout the play. The ideals of Christianity and of Marxism were treated as equals, both with high beauty. The material needs of people were shown to be natural and necessary. The point of the production, bearing in mind recent Polish history, was to show how the leaders of the country became alienated from their followers and to suggest a solution: respect for everyday needs.

The most recent work of 77 is *Retrospektywa.* It contains the main theme presented in *Passion,* but involves much more. Not only is the problem of alienation of leaders from the people considered, but more critically, the problem of people's alienation from each other is probed. Lack of open discussion, lack of substantial criticism, the acquiescence of people in intolerable conditions of the most recent past and the acquiescence of people in their fatalistic "Polish nature" are some of the issues presented in this play. It concludes with an attempt at an open discussion. No longer simply an analysis by the theatre group (as in *Passion*) and more than a demonstration of principle (as in *Circle or Tryptych*), *Retrospektywa* is the beginnings of social action, led by the members of 77, outside the realm of theatre.

The future plans of 77 even go beyond this. All who have seen *Retrospektywa* have given their names and addresses to 77. The hope of the members of 77 is that they and the people who have given their names can act together on some real social problems. The hope is that the issues, as presented in their theatrical pieces, may be acted upon outside institutionalized channels through petitions, open letters and through theatrical presentation, not in a conspiracy, but in the open. Already such actions are being tentatively planned.

Polish people, who are acquainted with the work of 77, speak about the theatre group only with admiration. People in and out of theatre, people from all over the country, speak of the quality of their work and of their bravery. Yet those who know their plans add a disquieting look of fear and have suggested that these people may not last. Members of 77, especially the leaders, realize the risks. They know they are challenging, and sometimes those who challenge have no future. These people nevertheless continue their plans with a real hope that their work will be accepted and be constructive.

THE two most important institutions as centres of authority and power in Polish society today are the Communist Party (PZPR, Polish United Workers' Party) and the Catholic Church. The Party is dominant, but an accommodation with the Church is absolutely necessary for the Party if it is to hold the loyalty of the great mass of Poles who are practising Catholics. Since 1970, the Party has clearly sought this accommodation with the Polish hierarchy, as well as with the

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Vatican. Simultaneously, the Church, both in Poland and in Rome, has come to accept the legitimacy of the existing government of Poland.

One of the most independent theatres in Poland is a student theatre directly associated with the Catholic Church, at the Catholic University of Lublin (Katolicki Universytet Lubelski). Associated with KUL, it derives its independent position from the nature of this university. KUL is the only independent Catholic University in socialist Europe, or as the students say, " The only Christian University between Berlin and Peking." It is relatively free of Party and governmental control, being funded by Sunday church collections from all over Poland and through the support of Poles living abroad, especially the American " Polonia." This special atmosphere permeates the university grounds.

The student theatre at KUL was founded in 1952. Through the years the theatre has concentrated on producing works explicitly religious in nature. Originally quite amateurish, the theatre gradually abandoned its narrow parochial focus and developed instead a sophisticated religious treatment of the trials and tribulations of modern man. Moreover, the quality of production has increased to the point where the " plastic theatre " [17] at KUL is now one of the most innovative in Poland, if not in the world.

Leszek Madzik is the genius of this theatre. Officially, he is a third year art student at the University, but he takes no classes and does not study. He is provided with an idyllic house by the University (given the acute housing problem in Poland, this is quite a luxury): he is paid for designing book covers for university publications; and material and space for his theatrical activities are generously supplied by the University. In fact, Madzik might be called an artist in residence at KUL. A group of students work in his theatre, helping Madzik to realize his visions.

Madzik's creations are experiences almost beyond description. His talent is to create drama through the use of colour, shape, movement and space. The word has no role in his theatre. The actor is the wearer of masks and costumes and the mover of set design. The productions resemble animated paintings: through them, drama is created.

The goal of this theatre has been to communicate religious and moral experiences, which are still widely held and appreciated in contemporary Poland. The works are never concrete, narrow or restricted in meaning. *Icarus* (*Ikar*), the latest production (première, May 1974), begins where the classical myth of Icarus ends—after the fall (i.e. in the KUL production, the path to God). The play attempts to convey a simple truth: that man's striving for the unattainable—in this case his desire to fly—results in pain, but this is the only way to the sublime. The story takes us through horrors, but also through beauty. Ultimately, it shows us the way to

[17] In Polish, the term " Teatr Plastyczny " literally may be translated as " plastic theatre." The meaning in Polish connotes theatre of painting and sculpture. There is really no equivalent term used in English so I use the literal translation of the Polish.

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heaven, the way man realizes himself. Earlier productions of the plastic theatre generally have been of a similar character.

The press has done little to acquaint the public with the KUL theatre's work. Very little has been written about the group, and when something is written it is generally derogatory. In particular, the overtly religious themes have been discussed as being outmoded and have been criticized as having little relevance to the problems of today's young Pole. Though the existence of such criticism in the government-controlled press is not surprising, given the Pole's strong identification with Catholicism, among both the old and the young, this criticism is far from true.

There are some indications that the situation is improving and that the KUL theatre may come to the attention of a larger segment of the public. Recently, a number of reviews of a substantive and positive nature have appeared. While the religious aspects of the theatre were all but ignored, the very fine aesthetics were given some attention. The situation is somewhat paradoxical: in past negative reviews, artistic innovations were ignored and the religious aspects were denounced; now, the artistic innovations are given positive consideration, but the religious quality of the work is ignored. A journalist confided to me that this is the only way a positive article about the group could be published. Nevertheless, for its audience, the KUL theatre expresses important religious feelings and reflections in a sophisticated manner. Indeed, there are indications that its audience is widening. Recently, for the first time, KUL was allowed to participate in a major student theatre festival, performing *Icarus* at the December 1974 student theatre meetings at Lodz.

IN 1971 Poles were actively considering their immediate problems after the events of December 1970. STU sought to go beyond this to consider the basis of Polish national character, suggesting that only then could the immediate problems be resolved permanently. In the *Polish Dreambook* (*Sennik Polski*), the members of STU consider the basic issues of Polishness. Here they direct their attention on the "high cultural tradition" of the Polish romantics, though they do interweave some aspects of the experience of the average Pole as well. Their emphasis on the romantic tradition is understandable, for it is this tradition that has become the common ethos of the Polish people, more so today, perhaps, than ever before.[18]

In Poland, the romantic tradition has a special significance. Throughout the nineteenth century the verse of the romantics sustained the idea of the Polish nation. The poets were the nation's leaders in the absence of a government and a state, and the ideas espoused by these poets have become generalized to the point where they form a basis for Polish people's affinity to Poland. The nationalistic romantic verse—in combination with the partition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,

[18] See Joseph R. Fiszman, "Poland—Continuity and Change" in Peter R. Toma (ed.) *The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe* (1970).

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the occupation and complete subjugation of Poland at the hands of the Nazis, and the brutalities of the Stalinist period—have instilled in the Polish people a deeply held belief in the nation as a spiritual value which transcends history and politics.

This romantic worldview has encouraged a strong Polish nationalism that has played an important role in recent history. When in 1956 Gomulka was able to establish himself as the guardian of Polish national culture—manifest in the doctrine of the *Polish* road to socialism—the Party's leadership of the Polish nation was for the first time truly solid. In 1968, challenges from students and intellectuals were averted only after the leadership (under pressure from the conservative nationalist "partisan" wing of the Party) blamed the events on people who were unconcerned with Poland's national interests.

It is exactly this complex of problems which STU considers. In 1971 STU posed the question in *Polish Dreambook*: What role shall these nationalistic notions play in the future? Understanding their impact upon two important political events in postwar Poland (in 1956 and again in 1968), the members of STU considered the significance of these notions for the post-December period.

Polish Dreambook is a sequence of 15 theatrical scenes presented as dream images taken from important segments of Polish literature. The soliloquy of Kordian, expressing his desire to act for the nation, taken from Slowacki's *Kordian*; an excerpt from S. Dygat's *Bodenksie Lake*, which grotesquely examines Kordian's inability to act; and a dialogue, adapted from Wyspianski's *Liberation*, between Kordian (the man who cannot act) and Konrad (the man who dreams of action) are examples of the literary romantic images STU presents in its "dreambook." These images are presented ambivalently by STU. They feel emotionally tied to the national myths presented in these dream sequences, yet they also have doubts about their implications. The images are lovingly presented with a classic dream-like romantic aesthetic. Often, however, they degenerate into a grotesque satire. Kordian gives a speech to the nation, a speech that is itself the essence of Polish messianic notions (a recurring theme in Polish romantic literature is an equation of the fate of Poland with the fate of Christ), and the nation responds with derision—"Hippies, the river Wisla is on fire!" At points, the dialogue is simply lifted from the romantic texts, but spoken with a disconcerting irony. At other points, the dialogue is changed slightly, becoming a satire of itself when spoken with all the solemnity and conviction the great romantic texts call for.

In addition to these scenes, several scenes depict the problems of the common man, seemingly detached from larger national events but, in fact, affected by them. A middle-aged man, who sincerely believed in Stalin, who "cried at Stalin's funeral" is shown to be neither evil nor sinister, but a simple man, who was led to believe something and believed it; who, with the turn of events in 1956, had the world turn on him, and

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who was subsequently condemned. An important scene depicts the simple beauties of peasant culture while showing its potential for anti-Semitism at critical moments: seemingly a direct result of the peasants' simplicity. In a pamphlet about the *Polish Dreambook,* the members of STU explain their objective:

> *Polish Dreambook* brings to surface . . . myths and phobias, which have long existed in our tradition and national psychology. "Dreambook" is not attempting to mock, this would only lead to unintended fascination. Neither does "Dreambook" attempt to approve of these myths. In "Dreambook" we refer to our deeply rooted stereotype notions, ideas and feelings, in order to force the audience into an intellectual reflection on their national fate.

They do not mock or approve, but clearly want to suggest to young people that they must go beyond these "stereotype notions, ideas and feelings."

The climax of the play, the song "Blood is Necessary," is used both as a symbol of tragedy and as a symbol of life, of life's ongoing struggle, and of renewal. The actors sing: "Blood is necessary . . . for ornaments, decorations, illusions, allusions, facts and suppositions, reality and hypotheses, for the *avant-garde* and tradition, for the great speech and the sweet silence. Blood is necessary." The members of STU are calling for a rebirth, for the cessation of dwelling on past problems and mistakes. They seek to understand these problems, but call for moving beyond them to more basic necessities of men. Poland exists as a nation, and as a nation, Poles must now turn to basic human problems, symbolized by blood, to give reason to its existence.

In the final scene of the *Polish Dreambook* the actors dance a polonaise (a symbol of Poland's aristocratic traditions). It starts regally, but its pace gradually quickens; the music gets louder; lights flash wildly; one by one the dancers fall from exhaustion. In the end there is no one left. Darkness falls. From the darkness a single actor calls out, "Already the dawn! Already the dawn!" Look with hope to the new day, turn away from the past once you understand it, build the new without the old complexes, STU seems to be telling its audience.

After a long period with no new productions, in June 1974 STU presented its next work, *Exodus*, which is in many ways a continuation of the *Polish Dreambook.* It begins without reference to the historical myths and complexes of "Dreambook," but simply builds upon the climax of the previous play, the song, "Blood is necessary." Leszek Molczulski, the creator of that verse, wrote the "ritualistic poetry" (his term), which serves as the text of *Exodus.* The new play concerns the pursuit for the life which is extolled in the song.

Exodus is a search for honesty, for natural thoughts and, most importantly, basic deep rooted feeling. Its journey is the realization of dreams, not private dreams and not highly elaborate dreams, but common universal dreams of child-like innocence, dreams of a place where

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" bread, water, salt will mean bread, water, salt." The play dwells on the realization of honesty and contact between people. The author emphasizes that it is a play about the banal, the commonplace; thematically, the work is intentionally non-controversial.

Such images as: angels with blazing wings, a mother contemplating the birth of her child, a mass baptism, a nude walk by " Poland " and the " nation " through the blazing " gates of heaven " and, the finale, a mass exit of audience and actors through the " gates of heaven " and out of the theatre, are presented in a fantastic manner. The entire text is in verse and most of it is sung with musical accompaniment. The result is a " grand spectacle " that attempts to communicate simple truths. Though its methods and effects differ radically, *Exodus* has already been compared to the work of Jerzy Grotowski.[19] The striving for basic communal truths through art is the key to the similarity.

With *The Falling*, STU reflected upon the critical political situation; with *Polish Dreambook*, they reflected upon central national myths; most recently with *Exodus*, during a period of increasing stabilization with economic successes and critical complacency, STU reflects upon basic human themes. They suggest to their student audience that they must turn to themselves and establish a positive humane moral environment. Only then will students transcend the problem of stagnation which they now face.

THERE are some indications that a new generation of student theatre is emerging. The theatres no longer attempt to make the grand expositions of such groups as STU, 77 and the KUL theatre, nor are the members generally as experienced or dedicated to theatre. The groups, indeed, like STS, in 1954, turn apparent weaknesses—amateur status and lack of sophistication—into strengths, both artistically and ideologically. Two of the leading groups of this sort are Nawias of Wroclaw and Pleonasmus of Cracow.

Theatre Nawias was founded in 1965, yet the composition of the group has changed every two years since then. The group as it now exists has been together since 1972. Nawias has presented one major work, *The Rehearsal* (*Proba*), which had its première in January 1973, and two " *commedia dell' arte* " skits, " The Dragon " and " The Emperor's New Clothes," which they perform in isolated villages during the summers.

Nawias' trips to the country are a particularly interesting aspect of their work. They have brought " The Emperor's New Clothes " to villages which often have had no contact with modern theatre and even less contact with student culture and student theatre. The " Emperor's New Clothes " is a fable. For children, it is a realization of their fantasies concerning the foolishness of adults. For adults, it may be understood

[19] See T. Nyczek, " Co nowego w teatrze? " Student, 3–16 Oct. 1974.

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as a mild rebuke of those who see power as the basis of all truth. Childish, simple and perhaps naïve, its content is little more than a fairytale with a moral, yet its simple truth is easily posed by Nawias to its village audiences. Nawias shares with its audience a young critical attitude towards authority through the utilization of folk style and fable content.

The child-like atmosphere of this touring piece is reproduced in their major work, *The Rehearsal*. This play revolves around the recitation and singing of children's rhymes which express openness and sincerity. These rhymes, joyously performed, are juxtaposed with repetitious slogans of the present regime and those of Polish traditionalists. The young people try to ascertain the significance of these dictated slogans, but cannot. They do their school work. The teacher recites the slogans and they repeat them, but without feeling. One student rebels, but is ridiculed by the rest. Then, in the final scene, a second rebellion, symbolized by the building of a big play block structure, is successful. The old slogans are buried; the building of the new structure is celebrated through music and song. Nawias seems to be saying that the old stereotyped notions and dogmas must be abandoned. Yet, they imply that a consideration of historical processes (as Theatre 77 does) or an analysis of Polish literature (as STU does in *Polish Dreambook*) are unnecessary to understand this; rather, it may be realized by expressing the feelings that can be found on any playground. It is not only the slogans found in newspapers and plastered on billboards throughout the country that the members of Nawias ridicule. With a child-like form and storyline. the members of Nawias seem to be taking the role of youth, declaring the universal line of the young, " Don't tell us what we are to feel or do, we must seek and discover our orientation and lives for ourselves."

PLEONASMUS is the theatre of the pleonasm, a theatre which uses the repetition of simple words and movements to invoke intense meanings, judgments and feelings. Each actor's self-expression is the mode of creation; the invisible hand of the director, Ryszard Major, transforms this self-expression into theatre.

Pleonasmus was founded in the fall of 1970. Since then, the group has produced four plays. In the third play, *United Goingness* (roughly translated: *Szlosc Samojedna*), and in the fourth play, *The Fire Brigade Couldn't, once, twice, three times* (*Straz Pozarna by nie zmogla—jedna, druga, trzecia*; their titles are almost untranslatable, being nonsensical in Polish) they have realized their own distinctive form of theatre, a theatre of concentrated meanings revolving around simple words supplemented by group acrobatics. The text of *Szlosc* is simply the verb " to go " in the different textual and acrobatic contexts. In both plays a spirit of freedom, of release, and a multitude of meanings are expressed with a sense of humour.

The Fire Brigade can be produced almost anywhere. One mat (on which to perform), 20 candles (two for each performer to hold) and one

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spotlight are all that is required. The members of Pleonasmus create the stage effects, additional props and scenery with their own bodies.

In darkness the audience waits for the play to begin. Two actresses are on the shoulders of two actors, who walk quickly into the room. Six other actresses and actors follow. They all walk around the mat insanely repeating seemingly nonsensical phrases declaring their wisdom.

> I am wise, I am wise,
> Today wise, tomorrow wise, always wise,
> Lower wise, higher wise,
> I am wise.
> Where is wisdom? Where is wisdom?
> There is wisdom. There is wisdom.
> I am wise, I am wise . . . etc.

For the next 40 minutes, they will recite similar phrases while holding hands, climbing on each others' shoulders, putting their legs in others' hands and placing their heads on others' stomachs. Totally intertwined, they form their own props while slowly revealing the story line. Towers of wisdom, firing squads, karate battles, funerals, military tanks and boats are formed, each, in conjunction with the text, relating a cyclical story. They seek a leader and an ideal. They find, cherish and propagate it, but three times they lose it, each time only to seek a leader and an ideal again. Ideals are lost because of dogmatism, betrayal by leaders and boredom on the part of the people. Yet, the fresh light of the new ideal each time arises again, so that the people's strivings are presented as being unending. The play ends on the same note as it began with the actors declaring their wisdom.

The underlying message of *The Fire Brigade* is its free feeling spirit. It suggests multiple associations with Polish history and culture, and with general orientations and reflections on life. It warns Poland to beware at a time of general optimism and hope, for betrayal by leaders may occur, or Poles' over-exuberance or complacency may lead to bad times again. It implores those who think they have wisdom ("The Truth") to beware, for their wisdom may degenerate into foolishness. It calls to attention those who formulate and realize ideas, ideals and ideologies, telling them that they must always struggle. It suggests as well that the enemies of these ideas, ideals and ideologies will never be able to extinguish the free human spirit. The play's associations are intentionally endless.

STUDENT theatres are important for both cultural and political reasons, but it must be understood that they are not active agents of social or political change and the members of these groups do not see themselves in this light. The theatres now enjoy a high degree of freedom, yet the audience is indirectly restricted; anyone can attend their productions, but since information about performances is generally

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confined to the university, the audience is made up mostly of students, some professors, and interested people in other theatres. Though student theatre acts as a forum for young critical students to express their particular orientations to life in Poland, it must be remembered that the forum is controlled. Student theatres constantly struggle with the censors; they attempt to express as much of their own truth as is possible given the limitations on expression dictated by the prevailing conditions. They often succeed in this attempt (the theatres reviewed in this paper), but at times, certain theatres have overstepped the bounds (e.g. The Theatre of the Eighth Day presented an important work in 1971 along with STU and 77, but because of problems with the censor that resulted from that production, the text of their most recent work was 90 per cent censored). In addition, it must be remembered that the work of student theatre has definite value for the authorities who permit it to function. Given its free nature and its high artistic quality, this theatre does serve as a showpiece of cultural freedom (and thus, the groups travel to non-communist countries); yet since it is controlled, its negative impact (from the point of view of the authorities) is kept to a minimum.

These cautionary notes, however, must not be overemphasized. The expression of critical ideas and the creation of artistic beauty in any society tends to be affected by the institutional power centres of society. The impact of market considerations on the fine arts in the United States today is a somewhat different, but parallel, manifestation of this process. Despite periods of repression and despite manipulations, for the past 30 years, Polish young people have had in student theatre a forum for the expression of critical thought and a stage for aesthetic innovation.

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The New Wave in Polish Poetry

Tadeusz Nowakowski

IN Poland—a country which cannot boast of a Solzhenitsyn of its own, but which has over 30 million dissidents as they say in Warsaw—signs of growing ferment have emerged in recent times among the newest generation of writers.

There is an annual literary event in Poland on which the nation's interest is focused. It is known as the "Poet's Spring in Klodzko." Two years ago it became a forum where young writers plunged into bold discussion and put forward a number of proposals which were not only of an artistic nature.

A report on the latest Poets' Spring appeared in a low-circulation monthly *Nowy Wyraz*, after a delay of one year and bearing traces of mutilation by the censor.

And yet, the public knows that the "poets rally" demanded that daily life be purged of the mendacity of propaganda and that cultural policy—shackled by censorship—be liberalized. One of the poets decried the influential role of those representatives of the older generation who had morally discredited themselves during March 1968. He mentioned by name those literary zealots who then took part in the anti-zionist and anti-revisionist witch-hunt.

THE so-called "new-wave" professes a creed which was defined by the poet and critic Baranczak:

"Our contestation should be expressed by the mistrust, criticism and unmasking of evil. It should be expressed thus until the time when the very last lie and demagogy, the last act of violence shall have disappeared from this earth." The young poet Krynicki says:

"The creative contributions of the young generation should participate in social processes, in other words: it is wrong solely to *assent* to reality!"

Born after World War II, the mistrustful angry young men, whose biography includes vivid memories of the students' riots of March 1968 and the workers' revolt of December 1970, are opposing opportunism and the attitude of "life on bended knee." They call themselves by a variety of names: "The intervention group," the "contesters," the "moral maximalists," "the unmaskers," the "unofficial poetic front," the "confederation of New Romanticism," the "generation of the 'Seventies,'" "the seekers of the Truth." They have many names, a multitude of groups and programmes, but there is undoubtedly a common denominator for them all: discontentment with the present ethical and intellectual atmosphere. "Less prevarication and more perturbation" one of the young poets wrote, challenging the "little stablization" in the moral sphere which the present cultural-political establishment has been advocating in its frequent invocations of the need for involvement, while secretly wishing that the young generation would not concern itself with the problems of present-day reality. Despite all their poetic diversity, the "contesters"—even the

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" linguists " among them who are clamouring for rehabilitation of the language, that, is purging it of mendacity—can be rallied together in the joint quest for a new, genuine—let us emphasize the term " genuine "—humanistic *Weltanschauung*. " We demand the apposite use of unequivocal expressions ! " says one of the numerous manifestos of this " new wave." " This is no time for irony, allusions, mockery, metaphor, allegory and double rhetoric," one of the contestors' theorists has said, " enough of this garb of worn-out words and alien slogans ! "

There is, of course, the question whether the criticism of ostensible political engagement which we find in the collection of poetry by Julian Kornhauser under the meaningful title, *In the factories we act like sad revolutionaries*, and the programme of anti-aesthetic poetry in the same collection can, in fact, fulfil their declared aims, since simultaneously their favourite weapons are irony, the grotesque and the pastiche. Certain misunderstandings tend to occur here, resulting from an over-abundance of quotation marks, so to speak. For instance, how is the censor, indeed, even the reader, to understand such ironical exclamations as: " Massacre the poets!', or, " for the love of God, kill Rosa Luxemburg!", or " clenching our teeth we sing the *Internationale*," and " our mothers devour books on the history of the Soviet Communist Party."

On the other hand, the young poet, Ryszard Krynicki—whose works often have difficulty passing through the needle's eye of censorship—dislikes this type of grotesque-ironic camouflage, as is revealed in his volume of poetry *The Collective Body*. Thus, he writes in the poem entitled " How I lost my virginity " that he wears his " Sunday best " on special occasions, such as when he goes to ask the authorities to shorten his period of waiting on the list of applicants for an apartment of their own " from ten years to eleven years," or, when he " visits a hospital treating the injured victims of the well-known events, whom nobody knows what to do with." The Polish reader is fully aware that the poet is referring to an anathematized subject: the dialogue between the Workers' Party and the shipyard workers in Gdansk and Szczecin in December 1970, a dialogue conducted with the aid of tanks.

The poet Jacek Bierezin, who won the privately-founded award " for beauty and courage " at the Lodz Spring contest, criticized the familiar landscape of present-day reality. " Drunkards fighting in the streets, mobile radio-units, patrols, *fin de siècle* buildings with the plaster flaking off their façades and a neon sign: 'THE PUWP [1]—THE LEADING FORCE OF THE NATION,' in which several letters fail to light up properly." Another talented young poet, Zagajewski, observed that he has his " mouth lined with the cardboard called silence," and his colleague Karasek wonders about " the never-ending battle between fair-haired and . . . dark-haired " protagonists.

Tadeusz Nyczek does not want the young to suffer from a split personality—split into private and civic—because Truth is indivisible. He writes:

> The rebellion of colleagues who rallied around Zagajewski is based upon the platform of individual and social ethics, it penetrates to

[1] Polish United Workers' Party.

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> where genuine attitudes are to be found, it opposes not only literary myths, but above all *the myths of our collective existence.*

Recently, Jacek Bierezin and Pawel Nowicki organized an artistic soirée in Lodz—at the Pstrag Hall, to demonstrate not only their poetic *Weltanschauung*. One of the reviewing critics had the following comment:

> The performance was pervaded by an air of conspiratorial excitement, since Jacek Bierezin is not a man with self-deceptive propensities (. . .). The young audience became initiated into a poetic cause. The texts were recited against the background of photoreels of the March [1968] Events projected on to a screen. . . .

One of the student theatres in Lodz put on an avant-garde performance called "Retrospectives,"[1] a programme imbued with unusual political courage. The spectators were confronted with sound documents illustrating the self-accusations practiced during the Stalinist era —for example an excerpt from Rajk's show-trial in Hungary.

In Warsaw, the intellectuals are still reminiscing about the young poets' soirée held at the Polish Writers' Union club. It has been a long time since an event attracted such a large crowd. There was hearty applause for the young poets who read out courageous texts, especially Ryszard Krynicki and Adam Zagajewski. Political watchdogs Bartelski and Colonel Zaluski who attended the event were summoned to the Central Committee offices the next day, where they were admonished that the works of these young poets are "ideologically dubious" and do not serve the cause of socialist upbringing, and that performances of this kind should be avoided in the future.

TO put it in a nutshell: the party authorities do not, as yet, know what stance they should adopt to this new "protest" wave, especially as it embraces not only Warsaw, Cracow, Poznan and Wroclaw, but other cultural centres as well. Will they risk taking a hard line towards this most valuable group of literary youth whose courage and idealism can be assured of public support?

Will they confine themselves, as they have done so far, to using chicanery against three or four persons picked as scapegoats, ordering new volumes of poetry written by them to be withheld by the censors and trying to blackmail them with the withdrawal of their scholarships and their foreign travel passports?

It is worth observing developments in this sphere carefully, because the problem is gradually becoming a gauge of the party's cultural policy, which not so long ago professed that it does not intend to interfere with artistic trends nor circumscribe the freedom of literary expression.

[1] See the article by Jeffrey Goldfarb in this issue of *Survey*, pp. 155–8, 170.

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Document :

The Polish League for Independence— A Programme for Poland

THE three documents printed below testify to the reawakening of dissident political activities in Poland. After a period of apathy induced by the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the extinction of the Dubcek regime, there was a gradual recovery of political stamina among the oppositionists. The old Polish yearning for freedom reappeared among the youngest generation of poets (see the article by T. Nowakowski in this issue of Survey*). At the same time the economic improvements for consumers introduced by Gierek (which were largely made possible by massive credits from the West) have come to an end, and the proposed new rise in prices led to riots in June 1976, a repeat performance of the events which resulted in December 1976 in the fall of the Gomulka regime. Both the growing apprehension about Gierek's regime's policies and the rising self-confidence of the population which twice in six months has forced the authorities to modify its policies (the first being the case of the proposed changes in the Polish Constitution) are reflected in this document. Three of them were written before the June riots and explain the malaise underlying them. After the workers' protest there was a number of statements by Polish intellectuals supporting the striking workers. The first of them was the " Letter of the 11." Then came the letter of the dissident historian, Jacek Kuron, to Berlinguer, asking him to help in the defence of the prosecuted workers. In his letter Kuron states that it was wrong to hold " the participants in the workers' demonstration morally and legally responsible " for damage that was actually caused by the system which promised to consult them about price rises, but did nothing of the kind. The prosecution, wrote Kuron, has " nothing to do with legality. It is a vendetta by men who, during their 30 years in power, have understood nothing," an ironic echo of Edward Gierek's own comment on the " Letter of the 59 " of 5 December 1975 by the intellectuals, criticizing the proposed constitutional amendments. Gierek characterized them as people who " in the course of the past 30 years have learned nothing and understood nothing." The third document published below, " The Appeal of the 13," came after the letter of Kuron. Some of its signatories were toddlers 30 years ago.*

In the existing political framework, the people of Poland are not allowed to influence either the internal or the external policy of their country. Furthermore, they are prevented from exercising control over the government. In fact, the wishes and aspirations of the people are increasingly disregarded, and the party-state apparatus is heading unmistakably towards restricting further such liberties as have been won in 1956 and 1970. A look at the international situation makes it clear that it would be useless to rely on foreign influence or pressure to improve our situation. It is up to ourselves to act.

There are numerous indications of a growing need for a programme

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expressing not only the discontent of the people but also their specific demands and long-term objectives. It is widely felt we must reach beyond disjointed protests for a clear definition of the aspirations of the majority of our people.

The programme we are putting before you stems from deeply felt and thought-out convictions. We ask everyone not only to study it but to carry it into effect whenever an opportunity occurs. We appeal to all Poles who wish for the true independence and prosperity of our country. We believe that even among Party members there are many such.

Our programme means to provide a foundation for appraisal of the changing situation in this country and abroad and of the political conduct of groups and individuals. The nation is fragmented and the Party tries to prevent any degree of understanding and cooperation between different groups by all means at its disposal. The existence of the common platform we propose should serve to bring together ideas and, at an opportune moment, actions of all who share a common purpose, even if they have no formal ties.

The Polish League for Independence brings together people of different backgrounds. We differ in our views on many specific economic and political problems. We do agree, however, on the essentials. This programme is the measure of our agreement made possible because, at present, the interests of all Poles are the same.

The countries of the "socialist bloc," i.e. countries subordinated to Moscow, and the USSR itself, are in a state of continuing, although concealed, crisis. The reasons for it are the growing internal tensions, the discontent among the oppressed nations, the malfunctioning of the economy together with the continuing backwardness in technology, culture and social welfare. The crisis is bound to come into the open, both internally and internationally. The continuing disintegration of the international Communist movement, breaking away from the Russian control, is one aspect of the situation.

It is impossible to predict the moment at which the crisis will manifest itself to the full. It may be precipitated by the adventurous policy of the USSR, trying to conceal its internal conflicts internationally by being aggressive. It may start in Poland. We have to be ready for that moment, conscious not only of our disapproval of the present situation, but also of the objectives we wish to achieve. Only in this way shall we be able to choose our own weapons. We have to act together, so that the violated rights of the whole nation are not defended by a single social group, but by all.

WE have built our programme on the following assumptions:

1. The nation, in the sense of a group of people conscious of national identity, is sovereign and has an inalienable right to decide its own destiny.

2. All citizens are absolutely equal before the law and should have equal opportunity to organize their own lives.

3. The enormous majority of Poles are people of religious beliefs; the majority of those are Catholics. The political system in Poland cannot be based on discrimination against the majority.

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4. The Polish national tradition was based on the progressive expansion of civil rights and the participation of an increasing number of people in government. Polish political thinking has been foremost in the development of democratic ideas since the sixteenth century. The autocratic, anachronistic, totalitarian system imposed on us is humiliating and alien to our tradition.

5. Poland belongs historically to the great family of nations of Western and Central Europe, the inheritors of the Graeco-Roman and Christian civilization. We wish to continue within that tradition, strengthening our ties with nations close to us spiritually.

THE Polish League for Independence has, as its general objectives:

1. The regaining of genuine national sovereignty.

2. The giving to all Poles the opportunity to participate in the government of the country.

3. The introduction of civil rights in accordance with our own tradition and the natural development of free nations of Europe.

4. The creation of legal and organizational frameworks for the introduction and continuous existence of a multi-party democracy.

5. Real prosperity, to be experienced by the people and not measured by overfulfilment of fictitious norms; the progress of the national economy, without constant sacrifices and acts of self-denial being called for.

6. The free development of learning and national culture.

7. Throwing open Poland's windows onto the world with freedom of movement, of exchange of thought and of information.

TO achieve these objectives we have drawn up a programme based on the assumptions listed briefly above. Each of the 26 points contains a concise analysis of the present situation and proposals for change.

It is an integrated programme implying a complete reconstruction of the economic and political system. It would be possible, however, to put its separate elements into practice independently, without endangering the whole and by using existing opportunities. In this sense, ours is an evolutionary platform.

1. In the contemporary world, despite its division into ideological blocs, all countries are interdependent. Smaller countries like Poland have to form alliances and treaties with their neighbours as well as with the great powers. But behind any negotiation there must be the freely expressed will of the people.

In our opinion all treaties negotiated by the PPR since the war restricting our national sovereignty have been entered into under duress and are therefore invalid. Only a freely elected Parliament acting without foreign pressure has the right to undertake obligations binding both legally and morally.

2. The experience of the last 30 years has removed nearly all confidence between government and people. It has bred a cynicism threatening anarchy, dangerous both for the country and for the government.

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Since the war the political system has relied on dissembling and secrecy. The Party and the government conceal the real process of decision-making behind a curtain of deceptive slogans, but the results of their decisions affect everyone's daily lives. The country is informed *post factum*, if at all, and only when the effect is manifest. Secret government, a Russian tradition, shows the contempt of those in authority for the people they rule. It well suits the governing clique, but not the country.

All authority should come from the people and be answerable to the people. In a real democracy the government depends on the governed and not vice versa. The executive and its agencies should be responsible to a freely elected legislature.

Openness and confidence should be the cornerstones of political and social life. The people are entitled to know the truth as it concerns them.

3. The legal and economic discrimination against such varied groups as peasants, tradesmen, monastic orders, people of religious convictions etc. and the forced elevation of Party members and all those who conform and flatter them are highly damaging to our human resources. It is out of the question for anyone of outstanding ability to be promoted unless he is a Party member. Yet Party membership means renouncing all independence and submitting to frequent policy changes in Moscow and Warsaw. Imprisoned in a vicious circle, hundreds of thousands of people cannot use their talents, knowledge and initiative; many have been pushed into the margin of life, temporarily or permanently; thousands have emigrated legally or illegally.

The return of equality of opportunity for all—without regard to origin, religion or political connexions—is a precondition for improvement. The administration of the country badly needs able and ambitious people to replace obedient nobodies and Party yes-men.

4. We are being drowned under a sea of double-talk. "Sovereignty" means obedience to the USSR, "security"—the ever-present secret police, "freedom"—the absence of choice.

Public life must be cleansed from layers of humiliating, stupefying and choking falsehoods. Our children learn to tell lies from infancy and we spend our adult life in a world of deceit, bitterness and cynicism. Such words as country, independence, democracy, socialism, equality and justice must regain their true meanings and our respect.

5. One of the most devastating effects of the Communist administration is the disappearance of an independent judiciary. It is well known that the courts are under constant pressure from the Party apparatus. It is equally well known that the Party selects the judges and exercises direct control over the activities of public prosecutors. The process of law is dominated by the security agencies. Neither the judges nor the public prosecutors dare question statements made by the Ministry of the Interior. There is a danger of a return to the Stalinist police terror.

The rebuilding of an independent judiciary is one of the most important tasks facing the nation. The first step should be to establish that judges be appointed by elected representatives of the people and may not be removed by the executive. It is up to all of us to demand that the rule of law be preserved. This is particularly important with the

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legal profession, now in grave danger of being compromised totally in the eyes of the people.

6. At no point under our system have the people any control of the government. Parliament is a parody, a pure decoration; members of local government are in practice Party appointees permitted to exercise their powers only as far as it is convenient for the local Party committee. No one outside the Party is permitted as much as to enquire into the affairs of the village workshop or local grocer. Even in cases of admitted abuse the public are not allowed to probe the activities of the administration. The matter is "dealt with" and hushed up, as was done with the Gdansk massacre of 1970 and the recent Warsaw fires.

We believe that the supreme authority in the country should rest with Parliament elected on the basis of universal, equal, secret, direct and proportional suffrage. From Parliament downwards, at all levels and in every field of public activity the freely elected representatives of the people and the private citizens should have the right and opportunity to control the executive. Until this becomes possible, the existing powers of control by trade unions should be brought to bear.

7. Freedom of speech is in theory guaranteed by the Constitution of the PPR. The operation of censorship of the Press and other media is contrary to the law. The censorship agencies have been created by an administrative order and never legalized. Their existence is a continuing insult to a nation known in the past for its devotion to individual freedom.

Freedom of speech means also freedom of information and exchange of ideas. Its absence results in ignorance of what happens in our own country and abroad. For 30 years we have been methodically fooled with lies and concealment. As a result we are lost and helpless when facing reality. We are threatened with being reduced to the level of ignorance reached by the population of the USSR under their own censorship and propaganda.

The normal healthy development of the nation cannot proceed without the free exchange of ideas. In lying to the public, the government are, in the end, lying also to themselves. On a number of occasions this led to tragedies such as Poznan in 1956 and Gdansk in 1970. Today we see again the gulf growing between official propaganda and the information and views exchanged by people in private.

Freedom of speech is not a luxury for intellectuals, but a necessity for all. One of our first tasks must be to bring about its return. Access to the media should be given to those willing to inform the public objectively about the world and about our own country. This applies particularly to radio and television. Independent periodicals and newspapers should be introduced. No one should be penalized for expressing political opinions, for spreading factual information or for distributing printed matter of any kind.

8. The Party is the only association in the country allowed freedom of action. Other organizations are either controlled, hampered or corrupted by the Party. It is practically impossible to start a new association as this has in turn to join the Front of National Unity, directed by the Party. The Party tries to absorb even those organizations it already

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controls such as youth associations. The whole society is to be transformed into a docile, uniform herd and any attempt to band together on voluntary basis is to be prevented. Neither the return of confidence between government and people, nor the introduction of public control are possible unless and until there is real freedom of association, whether political, social, religious or cultural. The existence of such associations would be the best guarantee of democratic relations between the authorities and the people. In the advent of an open multi-party democracy those associations could develop into political parties.

9. The education of children and young people in the PPR aims at moulding obedient subjects rather than at development of mind and character. Teaching of Polish history is restricted, teaching about contemporary events has been replaced by slogans, all expression of independent thought is thwarted. Teachers are expected to abandon their proper role and to transmit orders from above. The Polish schools are turning into schools of opportunism and dissembling.

The results are disastrous and ruinous to the authority of our teachers, established over many years. There are thousands of qualified teachers who, rather than undergo this indignity, have abandoned teaching for other occupations.

We demand schools free from fear, lies and political pressures; schools that would return dignity to teachers and encourage independent thought, moral courage and personal integrity.

For the moment, teachers just have to carry out their difficult task with the utmost honesty and patriotism. Their often tragic constraints will have to be understood by the pupils.

10. The progress of learning has been hampered by ruthless interference with Universities and the Academy of Sciences by the Party and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Curricula are dictated, freedom of research is restricted, and people in charge of research institutions have to follow the whims of the authorities. Students are watched and the leading academics are persecuted. The damage done to cultural and economic life is very serious and causes us to lag behind other countries.

Autonomy must be restored to the universities, and the academic authorities must be elected without political or police pressure. The Academy of Sciences should become again a self-governing association of learned men of talent and achievement.

11. The Catholic Church has for centuries played not only a religious but also a social, moral and educational part in Polish life. Since the war its social and educational activities have been curtailed by the closure of schools and other organizations. Hospitals and homes have been taken away from the Church with a consequent fall in the standard of care for the invalids and the elderly. The teaching of religion has been forbidden in schools and made difficult out of school. The building of new churches faces enormous difficulties. Welfare work in parishes is made impossible. Teachers, soldiers and administrators who practice religion openly face trouble if not persecution. This is not only contrary to constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, but wastes the stabilizing influence of the Church, so valuable in our time of great social mobility.

The Catholic Church has further increased its moral authority by its

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resistance under the German occupation and Communist oppression. It should be allowed to function in full freedom. The importance of this great institution should be recognized and it, and other denominations, should all enjoy tolerance under the law.

12. Poland has considerable potential importance in international relations as a country of some 35 million people, having suffered greatly in the second world war and having progressed since through an immense effort of its people. That potential is squandered, and our name compromised because we play the part of a compliant satellite of the USSR.

Our foreign policy should be conducted for our own benefit on lines consistent with democratic tradition. This is the only way to restore our credibility as an independent state whose voice counts for something.

13. Our relationship with Russia is the most important problem for Polish foreign policy. Officially the relations are based on friendship, mutual help and our gratitude. The fact that we have suffered innumerable wrongs from Russia during the last two centuries is passed over in silence. Silence covers the unprovoked attack in 1939 in collusion with fascist Germany, the transportation of millions to Siberia, their suffering and often death, the mass extermination of educated Poles in territories annexed by Russia, and the Katyn massacre. We are told to be grateful, but before we can think of gratitude we have to forgive. This is made difficult by the guilty party (whom we have neither attacked nor provoked), carefully covering up its own crimes while continuing a policy of ruthless domination.

Only if Russia sincerely admits the past wrongs and agrees to place Polish-Russian relations on a footing of equality would there be hope for future friendship and the healing of old wounds.

The Russian government must realize that the present situation tends only to increase the dislike, even hatred, felt by the Poles towards Russia and that present tensions may easily lead to tragedy. The interests of the two countries are not necessarily at variance; only greed and stupidity of the governments makes them so.

14. We are not Russia's neighbours. Our Eastern neighbours are the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania. For centuries we lived together in one state—not always in harmony, occasionally disturbed by our own expansionism—but at least voluntarily. Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians and Latvians are not independent today. Their countries have been forcibly annexed by the USSR and they are subjected to much stricter political, ideological and religious pressures than ourselves. They are exposed to intensive Russification. It is impossible to look on with indifference or with silent sympathy. We wish to express warm solidarity and support for their attempts to regain independence. Whenever possible we should aid and assist them.

We make no territorial demands on our neighbours although the loss of Wilno and Lwow, the two cities linked for centuries with Polish culture, is a great sorrow. We demand, however, from all governments likely to exercise authority over ex-Polish territories that they guarantee to Poles living there equal rights and give them opportunities to preserve their language and national culture. We also demand that Polish citizens should enjoy unrestricted right of access to regions historically close to us.

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15. German-Polish relations, still suffering from the horrors of the last world war, are aggravated by another factor. The Moscow-directed Party propaganda exaggerates the danger of German revisionism. It conceals from the public that a far-reaching change is occurring in political thinking in West Germany and that an understanding between us is indeed possible. This fact has to be suppressed, because the Polish people have to be convinced of the need for constant military readiness. This involves the costly alliance with the USSR and the maintenance in Poland of a large contingent of the Red Army said to be necessary for our own safety.

German acts of expiation are concealed from the Polish public. This discourages the Germans from making further friendly moves and the hope of a lasting genuine improvement in our relations is lost.

Better information and free movement of people and ideas are necessary if old enmities are to be buried.

16. The European Community, for many years ignored and ridiculed by Communist propaganda, is developing so successfully that it attracts new members and new political adherents such as the Communist Party of Italy. This group is our natural trading and economic partner and also our natural political ally. We believe that we are as close to the countries at the centre of the EEC as are Greece and Portugal. The closest possible links with the Community would be the best guarantee against any future conflict with Germany.

17. The present government flirts with the great mass of Poles living abroad, whether of the new emigration or of the old. The government hopes for economic gain, while hindering any genuine cooperation between us and the Poles abroad.

The *émigrés* represent a great potential and a pool of experience. We should profit by it, allowing our countrymen from abroad complete freedom of movement and work in Poland. We should encourage them to bring here their professional skills and their political expertise. Their experience of real democracy would be of great help when we come to disentangle the effects of many years of totalitarian rule. We are looking particularly towards the Polish community in America. They are the most numerous and the most influential. We expect much from them. We already owe them much.

18. In theory every citizen of Poland has the right to foreign travel. But the difficulties put in the way of anyone trying to obtain a passport (given as a special privilege and often refused for no reason) seem humiliating to anyone who knows how those things are done in the West. These difficulties have caused many Poles to stay abroad and in this way we have lost a number of first-rate people.

We believe that passports should be available on demand and be retained for the period of validity by anyone not indicted for a criminal offence. A passport should allow any number of frontier crossings.

19. Contrary to the assurances about progress and leadership, the Communist-governed countries of Eastern and Central Europe are looking to the past, not the future. Ideologically, politically and economically they are building on obsolete models. From time to time we experience a period of desperate catching up, trying to close the gap between our-

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selves and countries which are free and genuinely modern. But the most up-to-date economic methods (when imported under orders into totalitarian countries) often result only in an expenditure of foreign currency, waste and confusion.

We need to think independently and constructively about our economic potential and our place in the economy of Europe and the world. We need to work out new principles for the division of labour. It is sadly anachronistic to measure economic progress in tons of steel and coal. It is as pointless as the outdated official class division between " manual " workers and the rest of the working population.

Pressure must be taken off the hardest working groups (farm workers, those in industries suffering from low investment and the miners) while the potential of others such as thousands of underemployed graduates should be used to the full. Many members of the bureaucracy could find more useful and interesting employment in the neglected fields of commerce, transport and leisure services.

20. Party propaganda warns us against the dangers of a consumer society. The warnings are insulting in a country where working women have to queue for hours to buy meat.

Despite official condemnation of the consumer society it is precisely that ideal, people well fed and dull, obedient and forgetful of their own rights, that the Party would like to achieve. Only malfunctioning and the inefficiency of the Communist economy stand in the way.

The Party, devoid of moral authority and unable to attract anyone by meaningless ideological slogans, tries to bribe some sections of society. We must not let ourselves be taken in. Each trade, service or professional group has a right to try and obtain better conditions for its members. But for better pay and privileges the Party wants to buy our political and moral inactivity. Our opinions and our actions are not for sale, nor is dignity and conscience to be exchanged for bonuses and motor cars.

We do not need the government, the government needs us. If they cannot buy us, they will have to give in and increase the degree of freedom.

21. This state which calls itself " a people's republic " and wishes to become " socialist " needs an enormous amount of money. It needs it to keep up and pay for the vast Party apparatus doubling the public administration. It needs it to maintain the gigantic budget of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, assiduously guarding the loyalty of the people, to pay for the maintenance of the troops of the Warsaw Pact who do not defend us against anyone but see to it that we follow the Moscow line. It needs it to pay for propaganda, official visits, ceremonies and celebrations. Not all the expenditure is in zlotys; much of it eats into our foreign currency, earned by the sale of food and other goods which are unobtainable in Poland.

The Ministry for Internal Affairs alone costs more than education, health and the arts put together. But the housing situation deteriorates steadily and the waiting lists are up to 8 or 10 years long. Patients spend weeks lying in hospital passages because there is no room in the wards.

The sums involved amount to over a hundred thousand million zlotys

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a year. Spent on housing, it would mean a million newly housed people every year.

22. The economy is at all levels subordinated to the targets, needs and whims of politics. Decisions about international cooperation, foreign trade, large and small investments, location of industry, are all taken from a political standpoint and economic reasoning counts for little. This applies also to appointments in higher management. A modern economy needs highly qualified experts, knowledgeable in their field at home and abroad, capable of taking quick and bold decisions and not afraid of responsibility. The Party has the final say in appointments and it prefers its own *apparatchiks* interested above all else in keeping their party position intact. If they fail in their jobs, they are moved sideways but never downwards. Economic failure is less important than absolute obedience and good Party connexions.

There should be only two criteria for judging the performance of nationalized industry and its management: the fulfilment of its social function and profitability. Political connexions should have no part in the matter. If anything it should be considered an unhealthy situation for one person to occupy an administrative and a political post. A good example lies in the rivalry between ministries and cooperatives, who compete for credit and raw materials not because they need them but because those in charge have to prove their influence and power within the Party.

Economic and political power should be separated. This is particularly important in a country where the government has direct control over the bulk of the economic resources.

23. Since the war the nation has made a tremendous effort to rebuild the economic life of the country. The work continues. The Poles work longer and rest less than other people in similar economic conditions. They are relatively badly paid. The development of industrial production is slow and its profitability low in relation to the investment and the effort put in by the workers.

One of the main reasons is monstrous wastefulness. The workers are accused of low productivity and bad discipline. But the example comes from above and the wastefulness is, as often as not, caused by the unconsidered decisions, stupidity and indifference of the management. There is no chance for real labour discipline and concern to develop in conditions of chaos, constant reorganization, irresponsible lack of planning and administrative muddle.

To improve these conditions it is vital for the workers in industry to participate in the running of their plants. They should take part in all decision-making processes including investment, production planning and organization. The workers' councils should have real independence and a right to reject management decisions. The workers should have a direct stake in the profits of their enterprise. As co-owners and co-managers they would develop both a concern and a sense of responsibility. They should be given an opportunity to acquire shares.

24. To achieve growth in industry it would be necessary to remove the brakes placed on cooperatives and joint stock companies by our doctrinaire ideologists. The key industries, such as energy, should be retained by the state. But the introduction of private capital on a large

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scale in the new companies would mean many billions of zlotys put to good use. The housing and the consumer industry in particular would benefit from this new development.

25. The potential of Polish agriculture is desperately under-used. In view of the continuing shortages of food this amounts to a scandal attributable largely to the Party's ruinous agricultural policy. At first, we had collectivization causing much damage difficult to repair. Later, we had the hypocrisy in dealing with the private farmers and smallholders, the obstacles put in their way in buying land and machines, the disastrous operation of the workshops, the irregular supply of fertilizers and feedstuffs and low prices for the produce bought in. Nothing to encourage modernization, everything to force the farmer to work too hard and in consequence to tempt him to abandon the land. Thousands of hectares lie idle and fallow. And the state farms with their tens of thousands of hectares are run at a loss.

There is a need for a radical change of policy. First, the farmers should be assured of the ownership of their land and the spectre of collectivization removed. Secondly, they should be allowed to buy more land and machinery and to employ labour. There should be no upper limit put on the area owned by an individual and all partnership arrangements should be voluntary. There should be special credit available for modernization. Much should be done to improve the standard of living in the rural areas. Better housing and roads, more tractors and other vehicles suitable for individual holdings are needed. Above all, the whole attitude towards private agriculture must change; it needs more than grudging tolerance.

26. Shops and other services rightly bear the brunt of complaint especially from women. And again the Party policy combined with inefficiency is at fault.

In this area the state monopoly is an obvious aberration. Thousands of stores and shops are run at a loss. Thousands of restaurants make a profit only because they encourage drunkenness. The so-called workers' cooperatives and the nationalized service enterprises are less profitable yet more expensive than their privately owned equivalents.

State ownership in service industries should be restricted to large enterprises such as haulage firms, department stores and large supermarkets. For the rest, it would be more efficient and profitable to have many private shops or small partnerships organized for their own benefit by those who want to run them. The numerous administrative personnel employed at present could find better and more interesting jobs and even the state would profit, collecting taxes from firms who would try hard to grow.

THE Party does not even try to satisfy the people. The only thing it wants from them is inactivity, indifference to what is being done to the country. It is supremely important that those who disagree with what the Party stands for should adopt an active role. To start with, let it be at least an intellectual exercise; constant attention to the possibility of different courses of action, better decisions and more sensible

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personal conduct. To oppose is not the same as to complain or to grumble. Our aim is to provide alternative solutions.

The task has to be undertaken by the whole of the intelligentsia, historically responsible for the spiritual life of the nation. The most powerful section of society, the industrial workers, must share in the responsibility. The events of the last 30 years have amply demonstrated that they represent an invincible force.

Polish League for Independence.

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Document:

An Open Letter to Comrade Edward Gierek

Edward Lipinski

Dear First Secretary,

Once again I allow myself to disturb you, even though of late my letters have probably been too numerous already. Once I wrote to request the release of some political prisoners who were serving a long sentence, following an iniquitously unfair trial. Later I wrote to demand the extension of an amnesty towards some young people, an amnesty which had been refused them, but which was theirs by right. Then I wrote about our country's very principles of justice and the shocking image of its prison conditions, and again about the soulless destruction of the Animals' Protection Society by the bureaucracy. One of my letters was concerned with the false arrest of some very young people for alleged political offences. And along with other representatives of the Polish intelligentsia I too demanded fair treatment for the Polish minority in the USSR.

At different times in the past, I have repeatedly asked that the many scientific workers who were barred from their jobs after the witch-hunt and administrative decisions in March 1968 should be employed in work which corresponded to their qualifications. I am sorry to say that my initiatives on these specific affairs were not only less and less effective, but they also caused increasingly adverse reactions on the part of the authorities. Yet it was not long ago that I was nominated a Meritorious Teacher of the People's Republic of Poland, and even earlier I received the following honours: for my scientific and educational work, Banner of Labour Class I, Commander of the Order of Rebirth of Poland (with star) and State Prize First Class. But now because of my statements I have become a target for all kinds of chicaneries. This leads me to the conclusion that as a socialist and a scientific worker I can only be socially useful by undertaking a critical examination of the background against which such and similar phenomena develop.

In the letter to the delegates of the seventh congress which I addressed to you on 6 December 1975, I, along with other signatories, demanded a thoroughgoing reform of the executive functions and power of the state and also of the Party, in order to eliminate the defects which had been at the root of the tragic events of December (1970); reforms were announced immediately after these events, but have never been implemented.

Later on I tried to take part in the official public debate on the proposed changes in the constitution. I have reason to believe that many citizens expressed their opposition to some of the changes proposed by the leaders of the state, in individual and collective letters. I also know that most of the letters supporting these proposals were written by the officials of the state administration on orders from above and according to central instructions. The public character of the constitutional debate was thus only manifested in the fact that the so-called

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mass media made public only these voices of support. There was a deafening silence about protests and about critical voices. One should therefore perhaps be content that at a recent meeting of journalists you devoted a few sentences to these voices of public opinion. You referred there, perhaps as a *pars pro toto,* to " the Letter of the 59, . . . a letter sent by Professor Lipinski." Unfortunately what was said bears no relation to the text of the letter, and the manner of criticism reminds one of the dark days [of Stalinism] when criticism was dealt with by means of epithets and abuse.

Our letter demanded respect for, and guarantees of fundamental liberties and civil rights; freedom of conscience and the free practice of religious convictions, freedom of work, of speech and information as well as scientific freedom. In short, it posed questions, the answers to which are vital to all representatives of democratic public opinion, whether they are socialists or Christians.

You assessed our letter as questioning " the formulations concerning the role of the Party in the life of the country and the principles of our foreign policy "; you commented on it afterwards at a meeting of journalists:

> And what does this amount to, comrades? A miserable attempt to resuscitate the ideas of the Polish bourgeoisie, ideas condemned by history, which contributed to the defeat of September [1939] and to the [German] occupation which had such tragic effects. It is an attempt to apply ideas long since abandoned to the current situation. Those who are trying to do this have not understood anything or learned anything in the past 30 years. They cannot admit the obvious fact that our country has lived in peace for 30 years on the basis of one principle, the only just principle, of an alliance with the Soviet Union. They cannot see that for the first time in her history, Poland has friendly states for neighbours; that she enjoys fixed, recognized frontiers and unbreakable guarantees of her independence and security; and finally, that cooperation with sister socialist countries is a powerful force for the development of our economy. It is anti-Communist prejudices and political blinkers which prevent them from understanding our nation's fundamental interests.

These are strong words. I am trying to understand what political motives dictated them. In the Letter of the 59 we didn't refer at all to foreign policy or alliances. If the letter has nevertheless been attacked from this angle, I think that there must have been the following motive behind it.

The alliance with the Soviet Union, and cooperation with the socialist countries, ensured that we had peace, secure borders and it is also the driving force behind the development of the economy. Therefore this alliance and this cooperation are of primary importance to our national existence and security. In the name of this superior consideration we have to act as neighbours and allies. Our internal policy, our social and political life, the scope of our civil rights and our cultural life must on the whole be such that our cooperation with our neighbours, particularly the Soviet Union, is not jeopardized.

Dear first secretary, you occupy far too important a place in our

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system of government to be allowed to make political analyses of that nature without a reaction. I'm afraid I see in an entirely different light from you the conclusions to be drawn by the Polish people and all those who feel engaged on the side of socialism from the history of these last three decades. That is why I feel obliged to express, in public, my opinions on the matter you raised. Having been part of the socialist movement for 70 years, I feel responsible for the practical policies conducted in its name in my country.

The criterion of success of the last 30 years of our statehood is taken to be the slogan launched at the last congress of the PUWP and incorporated in the constitution, that we are living in a socialist society. However, even the most beautiful words do not give birth to new socialist relations between people, nor a new, more creative character of human labour, nor human equality, nor partnership between superiors and subordinates, between citizens and the authorities.

Until now, there has been no theory capable of applying scientific analysis to the roads leading to socialism after the means of production have been nationalized. I have long studied the evolution of socialist thought in the West, particularly in the case of Italy (because, in the Soviet Union, and in our country, such thought is completely ossified). I observe recent events in France and Portugal, I note the development of political practice in the USSR, and I am forced to the conclusion that the Soviet road [to socialism], conditioned as it is by the traditions of Russian state despotism, and which today inhibits the country's whole development, is not the road which should be followed by socialist practice in Poland.

Poland would have developed quite differently from the beginning, but for the pressure of the USSR. There would have been no forcible collectivization, and the six-year plan would have been fulfilled in its original form. And later on, if our party had consistently carried on along the "Road of October," Poland would have been today a country incomparably better developed, economically, socially and morally. Unfortunately we have not taken this road. We have continued to cling desperately to the Soviet political system for the sake of the consolidation of power, and perhaps above all because of the pressure of the Soviet Union. Therefore there is no more important problem in Poland than to regain our political sovereignty. Only political independence would permit us to implement a consistent economic reform and to reconstruct the political and social system in such a way as to release the creative forces existing in the nation, and to remove the innumerable obstacles and restraints which today are hindering our social development. It will make possible a fundamental reform of the school system, it will improve the condition of scientific research, open the way for full information about internal and international affairs: it will promote healthy relations internally, and it would end the chaos resulting from the duality of party and state administration.

No one doubts that the alliance with the USSR has become a political necessity. We have a great respect for the Soviet people and for our sister nations of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. We would like to be good neighbours. We would like to form relations based on mutual trust. But that is impossible, until Polish policy towards the USSR is purged of all

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traces of servility. And that will not be feasible until the USSR has the courage to admit openly the " errors " she has committed against Poland. I return to this painful question without wishing to rub it in. But in the present circumstances, imposing on us a love of the Soviet state, introducing it into our constitution, demonstrates a total incomprehension of human psychology. Every Pole remembers only too plainly the " devilish " pact between Ribbentrop and Molotov; the attack on our country; the mass deportations to the camps, of the soldiers of the Resistance against Nazism and the intellectuals who were taking an active part in the struggle against the Germans in 1944–5; of the refusal to send aid to the Warsaw Rising . . . I say again, all this could have been forgotten if the Soviet Union had openly condemned these crimes. Khrushchev made a step in this direction. The inequality of our coal trade [with the Soviet Union] was recognized, the dissolution of the [Polish] Communist Party in 1938 has been condemned, and some of its murdered leaders have been rehabilitated. For a short while the " Polish road to socialism " was accepted, but that was the end of that. And even the [Stalinist] pact with Germany is still defended by all kinds of sophisms.

Poland has long traditions of parliamentarianism, civic freedoms and tolerance. The traditions of a police or totalitarian state are foreign to us. The imposition of a Soviet-style system caused grave damage to our social and moral life. It was a great disaster in our national history. We are obliged to go along completely and unconditionally with Soviet foreign policy; we are no longer an independent element in world politics, and that is often against our interests.

We were active participants in the invasion of Czechoslovakia; we snuffed out the sparks of its renewal, just when it was freeing itself from the economic and cultural policies of the Soviet system, policies whose imposition had caused its regression. The Czech and Slovak nations will not easily forget this. We violated their sovereignty in the name of the imperialist interests of the USSR, and in so doing, reinforced our own tutelage. At the UN, we always vote with the USSR, even for the most reactionary motions (most recently, for instance, on the identification of Zionism with racism).

In the whole world, and also amongst communists, feelings towards the Soviet regime are becoming more and more negative. People come to understand more and more clearly the importance of political democracy in its everlasting sense, and are abandoning slogans like the dictatorship of the proletariat and ideas like the one party system. This is not only, though it is sometimes, a result of political tactics, but also comes from the recognition of the essential characteristics of the social development, of the process of the emergence of socialist society, and from the growing understanding of the negative traits of the Soviet system.

The world communist movement has entered a new phase in its development. It is also a manifestation of a reaction against half a century of Soviet experience, against Stalinism and against the military intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, a reaction to Khrushchev's Secret Speech, the process of unmasking connected with the writings of Solzhenitsyn, to the courageous actions of the great scientist Sakharov.

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In Latin countries, the communist movement is a major political force, and it will not be long before the Italian and French communists are actively participating in the government of their countries. But at the same time, the communists of Italy, France, Spain and elsewhere have undergone a profound transformation. They pronounce themselves in favour of political pluralism, as opposed to the one-party system. They are aware of the need to safeguard the democratic freedoms, to attain which humanity has struggled for centuries: free elections, complete freedom of speech, the deciding role of the social majority. These communist parties refuse to be the agents of the imperialist interests of the USSR; they want to implement their own, national, policies. These changes and shifts in ideology are of great historical significance. They are an important step towards true socialism.

The road towards socialism is long, difficult and wearisome. For socialism is not created by an ideology, i.e. by faith, but can only come as a result of a profound transformation in the organization of production (the replacement of the production line by the system of work in groups, at the Volvo factory at Calmar, is more important for the building of socialism than the plant's actual nationalization); by the transformation of social structures and political hierarchies into structures of partnership and dialogue; of the practical rather than the theoretical realization of society's right to decide its own affairs; of well-being for everybody and the inclusion of the creative element in work and of the idea of beauty into everyday life.

Socialism is an economic system in which production serves to satisfy needs, and its enterprises are judged precisely by their fulfilment of those tasks. Needs depend on production which can satisfy them and on the state of culture and education of the population. Consumption produces the quality of life and itself depends on production. Needs can be formed, constructed, directed. Capitalism manipulates needs through advertisements and by offering certain goods, such as for instance private cars which are priced moderately enough to be within reach of everybody. The car could thus determine the main production line of a country, its mass consumption style, and even the shape of towns and the country's landscape.

Consumption can be shaped by educating the masses, by bringing them near to cultural things, by widening their appreciation of beauty, by influencing their environment in their homes, buildings, offices and factories. By changing the techniques of production, we can at the same time create new forms of work; we can increase human creativity by harmonizing the process of production itself. All this could signify the planning of consumption, the planning of a new, higher quality of life, or rather of the possibility of a new quality of life, because ultimately only man himself can give value to his life. Economic welfare is not in itself sufficient to give meaning to life, as can be seen quite clearly in the countries of high economic prosperity. Socialism is an attempt to create objective conditions which may facilitate man's finding of such values.

In the course of the past 30 years, I have learned a lot. I know much better now than before that socialism is not made by a complete bureaucratization of the country's administration and its economy, by the

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imposition of a false vision of materialism, along with obligatory atheism. Socialism is founded on liberty, on decentralization; on the responsibility of each citizen's part in the making of decisions concerning society's economy and political policy. That is why we should demand the replacement of the Soviet system—which is stunting the forces for growth of our nation—by democracy.

It is true that the world is facing a crisis in the traditional parliamentary democracies. It is true, too, that Poland's experiences of democracy between the two world wars were not the happiest. Rather the reverse: they were very unhappy. It does not mean, however, that one can accept the opinion that the pre-war Polish policy brought about "the September [1939] defeat and the subsequent [German] occupation." That is an oversimplified proposition which cannot be accepted. Even a communist government in pre-war Poland would not have been able to prevent Hitler's aggression. If a war had taken place in Poland—any kind of Poland—she was bound to have lost it. Poland would have been occupied for as long as she indeed was occupied.

But is the one-party system of government any better? We remember the Bierut era, a period of errors, even crimes. Over those years, there were tens of thousands of prisoners who suffered torture. We remember the mad collectivization of the countryside, the mindless destruction of agriculture and of the artisan class. The further functioning of this system was interrupted by the bloody events at Poznan.

The Gomulka era ended in the revolt of the coastal district and the shameful suppression of the workers' movement. It is not a system which is deprived of the mechanism of adaptation, it is a rigid system which destroys its critics, a system not answerable to any form of social control, which has no respect for fundamental civil liberties. It is a system in which every change of the ruling group is preceded by the spilling of blood.

A government imposed by a minority has an inbuilt tendency towards totalitarianism. It is incapable of attracting the loyalties of the best people to its service and it is prepared, in order to reinforce its power, to destroy everything which forms the intellectual richness of society and of human imagination; such manifestations are censored as being dangerous to the interests of "socialism," that is, to its own power. This is why I support the communist Berlinguer, I am for the communist Marchais and the Spanish communists, but not a communist like Brezhnev.

That is why we need an opposition: a legal opposition, with the rights of freedom of association and assembly guaranteed by the constitution. Political pluralism expresses itself in the essential liberty of the trade union movement, the consumer movement and the press. If the Polish Socialist Party did exist at present we would have been in a different situation. Pluralism does not have to signify toleration of forces which would want to prevent economic, political and social renovation. Nor can there be any toleration of fascism. But even after the elimination of the bourgeoisie, the nation does not become monolithic socially, economically or ideologically in terms of class structure or its opinions. Allowing myself to use a term which has been much abused, all development entails contradictions. And these contradictions should be

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allowed to express themselves and manifest themselves freely. The system of parliamentary democracy is the only one which allows that to happen. And it does it so well that despite its incontestable faults, it represents the only way of exercising power without thwarting the wishes of the majority. Civil liberties are the necessary condition of social health and therefore also of the building of socialism.

Innumerable fighters for social progress and socialist thinkers have stressed that socialism cannot emerge and develop in a police state which destroys free thought or simply ideas which are different from the official ones.

The absurdity of a system of censorship which outdoes even the Tsarist system has become a very grave social problem in Poland. Among other things, it cripples the work of historians who touch, even lightly, upon the subject of the policies of Tsarist Russia. For instance, a [Polish] historian who writes about the siege and the massacre of Prague [a suburb of Warsaw] in 1794, just mentions that "part of the civilian population suffered." This is done in order not to offend the sentiments of Russian chauvinists. It reminds one of the eighteenth century, the times of the shameful Russian intervention in Polish affairs. Draconian limitations are placed on citizens who want access to information, while the flow of official sources tends to the infantalization of the social conscience. Poland no longer has a single daily paper worthy of the name, and the standard of what one hears on the radio and the television is really scandalous. The level of the press, even of the literary press, is pathetically low in the absence of freedom of speech and thought. In spite of the decisions taken at Helsinki, *emigré* publications which are vital to our national culture are not allowed in. The censors confiscate the works of Gombrowicz, Milosz and Kolakowski. They block the circulation of any product of the Western press if it contains any criticism of the USSR. The absurdity of these decisions is so obvious that one wonders what advantages can be derived from them, and what purposes they serve. Why should a political system feel itself endangered by the fact that 200 people read a few critical articles in *Le Monde?*

The social sciences have been brought to ruin. The official position for instance is that there is no need to seek out new ways in economics; what is necessary is only expert advice on the so-called key problems of the national economic plan. The censorship, particularly the censorship of the frightened editors, suppresses all the bolder ideas which are more independent of the petrified notions of the "official" scientists. Thus the social scientists cannot play a positive and fruitful role as they should do. Instead of critical science, there emerges a pseudo-science of an "ideological," i.e. propagandistic, character. But if social science is not a critical science, it is not a science at all.

We appreciate all the results of the five years which have elapsed since 1970, when we finally broke out of the chalk circle of the previous period with its fictions and prejudices. But there is no reason for feeling optimistic. There has been some attempt to reform the economy, but it proceeded indecisively, haphazardly, and without having previously created the necessary conditions for the smooth implementation of the new principles into the workings of the economy. Instead, a system has

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been created which is an instrument for implementing inflation. Instead of controlling prices, by economic or even administrative means, it has encouraged deviously concealed increases in a variety of ways. Huge monopolistic organizations have been created without first establishing a stable market which would have enabled consumers to resist such monopolistic tendencies, even if only to some extent. The formation of consumer organizations was forbidden. On the other hand, decisions about investment and other questions of great importance were taken without any public debate and without going very deeply into the consequences of those decisions. As a result, we get an increasing imbalance, resulting in chaotic conditions. We got a disorganized economy and the debasement of all planning, taken in the sense of an instrument of conscious guidance of the economic processes. In these conditions, any attempt to reform the economy was doomed to failure. It has in fact been abandoned to such an extent that we find ourselves returning to the old system of prohibitions and orders whose contradictions and inefficiencies had already revealed themselves plainly in the years between 1950 and 1960.

Considerable unease is also caused by an increasingly burdensome system of social stratification; the existence of an important and growing group of privileged people is accompanied by the incontestable evidence of the existence of fairly huge areas of real human misery. We do far too little to alleviate the housing misery, and what we do is ineffective, just as ineffective as our attempts to stem the rising tide of alcoholism. These are two very difficult problems, and it may well be that we do not yet have the means to tackle them effectively. Nor can I pass in silence the cancer of corruption. The euphoria induced by the achievements of the last five years diminishes the visibility of the negative phenomena and the censorship makes sure that the extent of their bad effects is not revealed.

The aim of socialism is the satisfaction of human needs in such a way that people really can have an all-round development, that they are able to live in prosperity and at the same time to enrich themselves spiritually, to participate actively in social life and not be stunned by the feeling that life is devoid of meaning, that it condemns them to solitude and blind subsistence on a sea of uncertainty and despair.

Socialism cannot be the result of a decree. It is born, and can only be born, in the free activity of free men. I see reason for hope in the fact that after 30 years of experience of the practical effects of the political system I have tried to describe above, there are still people who have the courage to think and to act for themselves.

I am profoundly convinced that the movement for renewal will become stronger and stronger and that the recently growing repression will not be able to contain it for much longer, although this does not make it any less dangerous for society and for the socialist cause.

Unfortunately, I cannot limit this letter to problems of a general nature. The absurdities and human tragedies in our own lives are so abundant that I cannot pass them by in silence.

Caught up in the wave of purges of revisionists and Jews in March 1968, an economist from Krakow is today still barred from the possibility of doing scientific research. In the same way Kolakowski, Brus

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and many others were deprived of their academic positions and can no longer continue their scientific work in their own country.

Lately the blacklist of those whose works cannot be published and who cannot speak in public has been made longer by including in it the names of artists, writers and intellectuals who signed or wrote in protest at the proposed changes in the constitution. Many of these signatories have been interrogated by officers of the security forces. Some are threatened with deprivation of work or termination of their studies. Some are insulted by means of insinuations and even provocations. The director Jerzy Markuszewski who, like me, signed the "Letter of the 59" has been deprived of virtually all opportunities to practise his profession.

Many young people are asked to collaborate with the security forces, in other words, to denounce their colleagues in return for generous payments. If they refuse, they themselves are threatened with losing their jobs, with being expelled from the university, or with other chicaneries.

Not long ago in the Academy of Medicine at Szczecin, a third-year student, Jacek Smykal, was expelled without any disciplinary procedure, for having taken part in a discussion during a political science seminar, and for having refused to renounce his views afterwards in a long interrogation by the security forces. I quote from the official justification of the rector's decision:

> The accused held these views in the presence of 30 people from Group D. His aggressive and ebullient pronouncements, cited in the evidence, must have had a destructive influence on the opinions and attitudes of his colleagues, sowing unnecessary seeds of doubt in the minds of his listeners, and even a distorted image of our society. In addition the accused showed passive resistance, adopting a nonchalant and insolent attitude during the interrogation at the police station, and by doing so he showed that he is lacking in all civil discipline as regards the officers of national security.

For five months, Stanislaw Kruszynski,[1] a fifth-year student at the Catholic University of Lublin, and gravely ill, has attended his trial at Lublin prison. He is accused of having "spread false rumours capable of serious prejudice to the interests of the RPP," in private letters to his wife and brother.

This year I am celebrating my seventieth year as a socialist. However, in this country which has decreed a state of socialism, there is no room for my thoughts or my experiences. I am forbidden to give interviews, I cannot be quoted in the press, let alone have my work published —they have banned the publication of my new book by the State Economics Publishing House. . . .

Dear First Secretary, Poland now finds itself in a very difficult situation. We know the enormous economic difficulties caused by increasing chaos, inflation and the need to pay off our foreign debts. We have no effective system at our disposal to direct the national economy. Our political system is an anachronism. It presents a positive selection of

[1] Kruszynski was released in May 1976 [Ed.].

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cadres. It gives priority to the mediocre and the careerist. It strangles all creativity in culture and in science. It arouses frustration and indifference amongst people who are deprived of any influence on the course of social events. We are a country subordinate to a foreign power, with all the consequences which it implies.

It is imperative to make fundamental changes or, at the very least, to make a clear start on them. Unless we do so, we will no longer be able to avoid a tragedy which could take the form of a violent revolt, or of a return to Stalinist methods.

Either of these eventualities is to be avoided at all costs, for the sake of the basic interests of the Polish nation, for the sake of socialism. I believe that socialism is still the idea which governs the aspirations of the greater part of our society, but this idea will be increasingly eroded if the social practice which proclaims itself socialist remains what it is today.

I know only too well that it is extremely difficult even to begin such fundamental changes. I know too that it is not very realistic to hope for a rapid return to full sovereignty. But I also know that certain positive changes are possible if the leaders of our state can find in themselves enough courage, character and political wisdom to act with the aim of increasing our independence. In this effort, as well as in working towards the goal of a democratic evolution of our political system, they will find that they have the support of our whole society. However, history will pass a severe judgment on all those who subordinated the interests of our nation and of socialism to their own comfort and the particular interests of a group in power.

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Document: Poland:

The Appeal of the 13

ON 20 July 1976 the Warsaw District Court sentenced to various terms of imprisonment (up to five years) seven participants in the workers' demonstrations which took place on 25 June in the tractor-producing plant "Ursus," near Warsaw. The purpose of this mass-demonstration, one of the most impressive to have taken place in Poland, was to protest against drastic price increases. The trial was conducted under conditions which violated the principle of openness of judicial proceedings. Only the close relatives of the accused were permitted to be present; entry to the court-room was totally prohibited to the foreign journalists, numerous intellectuals and students who wished to attend. The accused workers were charged with "active participation in acts of hooliganism." There were only officially-nominated defence counsel.

At the same time another trial took place in Radom. The participants in the mass demonstration there were sentenced to terms of up to 10 years in prison. And the Polish press has announced that further trials are to take place.

We consider it our duty to denounce the official condemnation of the workers' protest against unjust social policy and the government's authoritarian methods as "acts of hooliganism." It is necessary to state emphatically that the responsibility for the violation of law during the events in Ursus and other places, rests with the authorities, who have abolished the elementary forms of workers' democracy, have destroyed the "workers' councils" created in 1956, and have reduced the Trade Unions to a fictitious, dead organization completely subordinated to the ruling apparatus. In order to avoid a repetition of such dramatic events in the future, it is imperative to restore to the workers rights which are properly theirs, and not to resort to repression.

The political struggle of the Polish people for these rights, previously manifested in the numerous protests against the recent changes in the Constitution, is a struggle for democratic socialism, a socialism defined by Karl Marx as "the very opposite of the situation where man is humiliated, an abandoned slave held in contempt."

We are only too aware that Polish public opinion cannot hear our voices through normal channels, but we are convinced that we express the feelings of the majority of the population. That is why we are addressing ourselves through your journal to all those who are fighting for workers' rights which are an integral part of human rights.

We are making the following appeal: help the imprisoned Polish workers! The information reaching us from prisons and court-rooms demonstrates that the security police are using methods of physical violence during the interrogations. Moreover, it is generally known that the workers suspected of having taken part in the demonstrations are sacked *en masse* from their jobs; such dismissals endanger their own and their families' material existence.

We appeal to: Jean Paul Sartre, Andre Malraux, Pierre Emanuel,

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Louis Aragon, Jean Marie Domenach, Claude Roy, Jean Daniel, Laurent Schwartz.

We also appeal to: Gunther Grass, Heinrich Boell, Arthur Miller, Saul Bellow, Eugenio Montale, Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender and Robert Conquest.

We appeal to all who feel solidarity with the struggle of the workers the world over for the liberation of labour. Demand the release of imprisoned Polish workers!

Stanislaw Baranczak, poet; Jacek Bochenski, writer; Kazimierz Brandys, writer, Stefan Kisielewski, journalist and writer, Andrzej Kijowski, journalist and writer; Ryszard Krynicki, economist; Jan Jozef Lipski, literary critic and historian; Adam Michnik, historian, Halina Mikolajska, actress; Marek Nowakowski, writer, Julian Stryjkowski, writer; Father Jan Zieja; Edward Lipinski, economist.

[*Liberation* (Paris), 28 July 1976]

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SURVEY Crostic No. 2

William Petersen

Instructions

Decipher clues. Fill in answers on dashes over numbers alongside. Transfer letters to individually-numbered squares on diagram, where words form between black blanks to become a quotation. Letters printed in squares refer back to clues. First letters of answers over dashes become a vertical crostic giving author and source of quotation.

Answer in next issue.

M 1	L 2		B 3	YY 4	V 5		A 6	I 7	N 8	Y 9	W 10	U 11	T 12
O 13	F 14		D 15	V 16		R 17	I 18	L 19		C 20	Q 21	S 22	
T 23	M 24	H 25		A 26	P 27	Z 28	X 29		T 30	ZZ 31	W 32	D 33	E 34
I 35	F 36	L 37		V 38	A 39	B 40	M 41		K 42	J 43	I 44	ZZ 45	
L 46	W 47	B 48	Y 49	V 50	N 51		B 52	K 53	T 54		A 55	E 56	I 57
L 58	V 59	M 60	Q 61	N 62	P 63	W 64	YY 65		YY 66	B 67		M 68	D 69
H 70	I 71	O 72		G 73	L 74	YY 75		N 76	T 77	ZZ 78	M 79		V 80
B 81	L 82	I 83		E 84	Y 85	Z 86		YY 87	U 88	M 89		F 90	H 91
N 92	ZZ 93		V 94	N 95		I 96	R 97	T 98	B 99	L 100		A 101	O 102
D 103	W 104	S 105	M 106	C 107		YY 108	ZZ 109	D 110	Q 111	L 112		YY 113	M 114
	V 115	K 116	T 117	I 118		Y 119	R 120	I 121	W 122	D 123	M 124	ZZ 125	
T 126	L 127	YY 128	X 129		V 130	Y 131		A 132	I 133	YY 134	L 135	Y 136	
W 137	P 138	V 139	A 140		J 141	X 142	I 143	M 144	Y 145	F 146		A 147	G 148
I 149		M 150	Y 151	ZZ 152	I 153	YY 154		H 155	V 156	O 157	E 158	A 159	V 160
L 161		N 162	D 163	R 164	U 165	I 166	YY 167		Q 168	B 169	J 170	P 171	V 172
K 173	C 174		M 175	A 176	Z 177		W 178	N 179	L 180	Q 181		I 182	A 183
	O 184	S 185	J 186		T 187	Y 188		A 189	V 190	U 191	H 192	B 193	
E 194	K 195		V 196	G 197									

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Clues	Answers
A. Soviet marshal and military theorist (1882–1945)	101 6 147 55 159 183 26 176 / 39 140 189 132
B. See Word T (3 wds.)	52 67 193 81 40 99 3 169 / 48
C. Functioned as Vozhd	107 174 20
D. Soviet official (1896–1948), prominent in controlling the arts	110 69 33 163 123 15 103
E. Contemporary English politician	56 34 84 194 158
F. Founder of Christian Science	36 90 14 146
G. With Word Y, a radical British magazine	148 197 73
H. An editor of *Dissent* (initial and last name)	91 192 70 155 25
I. ——— Lysenko . .	83 35 57 143 182 118 149 44 / 166 133 71 7 153 121 96 / 18
J. Of a trial, designed to educate the populace	141 43 170 186
K. Membership of the Komsomol	173 195 53 42 116
L. An ASSR in south European Russia; capital Ordzhonikidze (2 wds.)	112 82 37 161 74 127 100 46 / 19 58 135 180 2
M. After *The,* a notable collection of essays by ex-Communists (3 wds.)	60 89 124 144 24 175 68 114 / 106 1 150 79 41
N. After "the great," Lumpenproletariat	8 95 76 62 162 179 92 51
O. One of Hell's rivers	13 102 157 184 72
P. Imitated	138 63 27 171
Q. See Word W	168 61 111 21 181

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R. Defying the dictates of Social Realism 97 120 17 164

S. Indian delegate to the first Comintern congresses, later an important anti-Communist . . 105 185 22

T. With word B, a Bolshevik-dominated organization of peasants, also known by the Russian acronym Kombed . . 126 12 98 30 187 54 23 117 77

U. Of exalted rank 88 165 191 11

V. Steinbeck novel about a Communist organizer of fruit pickers (3 wds.) 156 16 38 190 196 94 59 160 80 172 50 115 130 139 5

W. With Word Q, tsar from 1682 to 1725 (2 wds.) 47 122 137 10 32 178 64 104

X. Tokugawa Tokyo 129 29 142

Y. See Word G (2 wds.) 145 49 119 136 85 131 188 151 9

Z. Supplement 28 177 86

YY. Collection of short stories by Faulkner (3 wds.) 167 75 108 66 87 4 128 113 65 154 134

ZZ. *Emigré* Russian-language journal edited by Kerensky (2 English wds.) 109 31 78 93 152 45 125

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SURVEY Crostic No. 1 Answer

Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror:* "'The cult of personality,' a curiously inadequate description, is the invariable category in which the Stalinist past was criticized. This was not quite the essental characteristic of Stalin—that he was ruling by terror and falsehood."

A. Rathenau
B. Octobrists
C. B. N. Chicherin
D. Eugène Pottier
E. Race
F. Thaw
G. Circassia
H. Opposition
I. New Style
J. Quill
K. Ulchi
L. Elista
M. Solzhenitsyn
N. Tito
O. Talas
P. Haw-Haw
Q. ECCI
R. Gift
S. Reds
T. Edits
U. AAASS
V. Third International
W. Teffi
X. Equality
Y. Radishchev
Z. Ratty
YY. Ost
ZZ. Rud

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

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